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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the implications of family control for corporate governance in the
Chinese markets. This research is mainly motivated by the following factors. First, although
family-controlled firms represent the predominant form of businesses in both developed and
developing economies, it was not until the 1980's that family businesses emerged as a field of
academic study (Casillas and Acedo, 2007). Despite a "collective sense that significant
progress has been made" (Litz, Pearson, and Litchfield, 2012) in family business research,
whether family control is beneficial for all shareholders, however, largely remains an open
question (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005; Lins, Volpin, and Wagner, 2013).

Second, prior studies commonly assume that controlling families are a homogeneous group
of blockholders and existing literature provides little evidence on what are the core factors
that really matter for examining the different impact of family ownership/control on agency
problems in family firms. Although some studies find that the impact of family ownership
depends on whether the founder is actively managing the firm (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, and
Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), it can be argued that whether the founder or a
descendant is the CEO does not fundamentally change the controlling family’s incentives
when dealing with minority shareholders and/or debtholders. Thus, more evidence is needed
to reveal other firm-level factors that affect controlling family’s impact on agency problems.

Third, it has been a commonly held view that privately controlled firms, of which a
significant proportion is family-controlled firms, have become an important drive of China's
economic growth (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005). However, academic research of family firms
in China has been lagging not only behind family firm research in developed economies, but
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also far behind the fast growth of family firms (Wei, Lin, Wu, and Li, 2013). For example,
Cheng (2014) finds that only three studies that exclusively focus on Chinese family firms
have been published in major international accounting and finance journals.

The need for further research in family firms in the Chinese markets, together with the view
that China serves a good representative of the increasingly important emerging markets
characterized by fast economic growth and relatively weak formal institutions, motives me to
take this research. My study aims to address the imbalance between economic importance
and lack of academic research with three essays that investigate corporate governance of
Chinese family firms.

The first essay investigates the impact of managers’ political connection and founder-status
on the tunneling behaviour of publicly listed firms in China. The results show that privatecontrolled firms with founder-managers have significantly less severe tunneling than those
without founder-managers. Because the former account for the majority of all family firms in
China, the results thus suggest that family firms in China have less tunneling than nonfamily
firms. To overcome the imperfect market mechanism and disadvantage in resource allocation,
private firms have strong incentives to establish political connections. I next investigate the
impact of various political connections on firm tunneling behaviour. I find that political
connections, especially non-official connections at the central level, further restrain foundermanager firms from expropriating minority shareholders through tunneling.

Given the importance of debt financing for family firms, and to a broader extent, the growth
of the Chinese economy, I in the second essay examine the impact of family control on debt
cost. I find that overall family controlled firms pay a lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms.
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However, family firms are not universal in terms of the different agency conflicts between
family blockholders and outside investors (e.g., Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Chen et al.,
2014; Lins et al., 2013). I next explore how the relation between family control and the cost
of debt is affected by particular firm characteristic --- corporate information opacity, a proxy
for the relative dominance of controlling shareholders’ alignment and entrenchment
incentives. My evidence reveals that family firms pay a lower cost of debt than nonfamily
firms only when their corporate information is relatively transparent, i.e., when controlling
families’ alignment incentive dominates their entrenchment incentive.

In the second essay, I use either a comprehensive index or earnings quality as a measure of
information opacity to examine how it affects the relationship between family control and the
cost of debt. The results suggest that not all family firms are the same in terms of the level of
information opacity. In the third essay, I use an alternative measure, specifically, the
likelihood of accounting restatements to investigate whether family firms have better
accounting information quality than nonfamily firms. Furthermore, I also examine how
investors (particularly shareholders) react to the change in the quality of accounting
information as proxied by the announcement of accounting restatements. The findings
indicate that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms overall are less likely to misstate and
restate their financial reports. However, once a family firm announces an accounting
restatement it will trigger significantly stronger and more negative reaction from shareholders
than restatements by nonfamily firms. The third essay complements the second essay in that
the second essay is focused on the shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts while the third
essay is focused on the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder agency conflicts. Both
of these two types of agency conflicts are likely to be different between family and nonfamily
firms.
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Overall, this thesis provides consistent evidence that family firms in China as a whole have
better corporate governance practice than their nonfamily counterparts, in that the former
have less tunneling, pay a lower cost of debt, and are less likely to restate their financial
reports than the latter group of firms. However, the findings in this thesis also provide clear
evidence that family firms, even within a country, shall be regarded as heterogeneous in
terms of their impact on shareholder-shareholder and shareholder-debtholder agency
relationships. Corporate information opacity and financial reporting quality can play
important moderating roles in the above two agency relationships.
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Chapter One Introduction

1.1 Motivations of research

Family firms represent one of the most prevalent business and organizational forms across
the world. According to Faccio and Lang (2002), about 44% of all large firms in Western
Europe are family controlled; while in East Asia family control is associated with around two
thirds of the publicly listed firms (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Claessens, Djankov,
Fan, and Lang, 2002). Even in the U.S. which is regarded having one of the most dispersed
ownership structures, around 35% of the S&P 500 and 46% of the S&P 1500 firms are
classified as family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chen, Chen, and Cheng, 2008). For the
Chinese market, the percentage of family firms has been growing and as of 2012 stands at
around 56% (Cheng, 2014).

The prevalence of family firms becomes even more significant if non-listed private firms are
taken into account. For example, according to a report by the Family Firm Institute (2014,
Boston, U.S), in Germany 96% of all businesses in the private sector are family businesses
and they employ 55% of the whole workforce. In China the corresponding figures are 85%
and 65%, respectively. Across the globe, family businesses account for around two-thirds of
all businesses and generate about 70%-90% of the global GDP annually.
1

1

The literature has used various definitions of family firms (see e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, and

Cannella, 2007; Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, and Dekker, 2014 for reviews) and the figures cited here may be different
in different studies, depending on the definition used. I will discuss this issue in more details in the data section
of this chapter. In this thesis, I use a dummy variable (Family dummy) to denote a family firm if: (1) the founder
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Despite that family businesses have been an important drive of economic development since
the early stage of industrialization age (Hall, 1988), family firms as an independent field of
academic research did not emerge until mid-1980s or early-1990s (Bird, Welsch, Astrachan,
and Pistrui, 2002; Casillas and Acedo, 2007). Increasing academic interest and especially a
surge of interest in the last decade or so has seen significant progress in the field of family
firm research (Litz, Pearson, and Litchfield, 2012; Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, and Dekker, 2014).
However, despite the encouraging progress, some challenges remain.

First, whether family control is beneficial for all shareholders largely remains an open
question (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005; Lins, Volpin, and Wagner, 2013). On the one
hand, such studies as Anderson and Reeb (2003), Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003),
Villalonga and Amit (2006), Wang (2006), Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007), Tong
(2008), Fahlenbrach (2009), Li and Srinivasan (2011) and Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) find
that family ownership, especially the first generation’s presence, has a positive impact on
corporate governance and performance, in that family ownership lowers agency debt cost,
enhances investment efficiency, improves financial reporting quality and thus enables family
firms to outperform their nonfamily counterparts.

On the other hand, some other studies document a negative impact of family
control/ownership. For example, Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985) find
positive stock market reaction to the sudden death of a company founder; Leon and Liu (2010)
and Pi and Lowe (2010) find that it is rather difficult to remove a founder CEO even when
she is incompetent; Chau and Gray (2002), Fan and Wong (2002), and Anderson, Duru, and

and members of the founding family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at least 20% of the firm's
control rights; and (2) the founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder.
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Reeb (2009) find that corporate information is relatively more opacity in family firms; Morck,
Stangeland, and Yeung (1998) find that family control is detrimental to economic
development.

Finally, another group of researchers argue that the actual impact of family ownership/control
is conditioned on some other factors. Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, and Cannella (2007)
argue that whether family firms outperform nonfamily firms depends on how family firms are
defined and whether or not there is a lone founder. Maury (2006) and Ellul, Guntay and Lel
(2007) find that family ownership is beneficial only when investor protection is high.
Although Pindado, Requejo, and de la Torre (2011) find that family control lowers the
investment-cash flow sensitivities but such an impact is conditioned on no control-ownership
divergence of the controlling families.

Second, most existing studies seem to implicitly assume that controlling families, at least
within a country, are homogeneous and thus have similar impact on agency problems
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and between shareholders and
debtholders. Such an assumption seems to be inconsistent with some other studies that
document different incentives among family firms and how these differences affect agency
problems in family firms (e.g., Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Lins et al., 2013; Chen,
Chen, and Cheng, 2014).

Although some studies have examined the different impacts of family ownership/control on
debt cost (e.g., Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2003) and firm performance (e.g., Villalonga and
Amit, 2006) between those with founder-CEOs, descendants-CEOs, and outsider-CEOs, it is
documented that CEO type and the level of ownership can affect debt cost and/or firm
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performance in many ways (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and Srinivasan,
2011; Anderson et al., 2012). In other words, these studies do not reveal the core factor that
differentiates one group of family firms from the other, based on fundamental differences in
agency problems. Furthermore, Lins et al. (2013) find that country-level investor protection
alone does not explain such a difference. Thus, it is sensible to examine other firm-level
characteristics that can distinguish among family firms in terms of their impact on agency
problems.

Third, up until now the mainstream theoretical frameworks and the majority of empirical
evidence in family firm research have drawn from developed markets and few from
developing countries. However, China differs from both developed and other developing
economies in various aspects, such as legal environment, market development, corporate
governance system, culture, and etc. The literature has shown that these factors affect not
only the prevalence of family firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Amit,
Ding, Villalonga, and Zhang, 2015), but also agency conflicts within a firm (Claessens,
Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Li, Griffin, Yue,
and Zhao, 2013), and in particular the corporate governance and performance of family firms
(Ellul, Guntay, and Lel, 2007; Amit, Ding, Villalonga, and Zhang, 2015). Moreover, the
structure of family firm itself is influenced by the development of financial market and the
availability of external finance (Masulis et al., 2011).

Family firms have been playing a significant role in the development of China’s economy.
For example, a report by Forbes China shows that, at the end of July 2013, family-controlled
firms account for almost half of privately-controlled listed firms or 29% of all listed firms in
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the Chinese A-share markets 2 . But puzzlingly, family firms have so far attracted
disproportionate academic interest when compared to other ownership type such as stateowned-enterprises (SOEs) (Cheng, 2014). Therefore, further research is required to help
enhance our understanding of family firms in the Chinese market. To a broad extent, research
on Chinese family firms can also contribute to a better understanding of family firms in other
emerging markets as well, given that China is a good representative of emerging markets in
many aspects.

1.2 Institutional background

It is well known that institutions such as legal, political, regulatory factors have important
impact on behavior of market participants. China is a good representative of many emerging
markets in that China has a fast growing economy and yet it has a relatively underdeveloped
financial market and relatively weak institutional environment. At the same time, there are
several salient features of the Chinese market that makes it a stand-out from other emerging
markets.

The private sector, of which a significant proportion are family firms, has been the main drive
of China’s rapid economic growth over the last three decades (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005).
Yet, private firms still face ongoing ideological discrimination by the ruling Communist
Party (Liu, Tang, and Tian, 2013). Private firms are still being discriminated and
disadvantaged in many areas such as the allocation of resources (e.g., land and mines) and
government procurements and projects. Bank loans are disproportionately allocated to SOEs
even when they are not performing. Private firms are also frequently discriminated against
2

http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130922/150216814955.shtml.
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when it comes to obtaining certain licenses and the enforcement of contracts with
governments or SOEs. The government still retains strong control over IPO quotas even after
years of reform (Liu, Tang, and Tian, 2013). Such an imperfect market mechanism highlights
the importance of political capital and motivates private entrepreneurs to enter politics or to
establish political connections (Li et al., 2006).

It is well known that the information environment plays a central role both in determining the
extent of these conflicts and in designing the mechanisms to mitigate them (Smith and
Warner, 1979; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010). Although
there are explicit stock exchange rules that prohibit false disclosure, in practice institutional
factors (e.g., government control over capital markets, a lack of independent auditor, and
influence of political connections) lead the Chinese markets to be frequently ranked as one of
the most opaque among the world’s large economies. For example, according to Piotroski
and Wong (2011), China ranked the last in corporate transparency out of 35 countries
surveyed by Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) in 2001. In a subsequent survey by PwC in
2009, China continued to rank 38th out of 48 countries, despite significant market
development during that period. Piotroski and Wong (2011) also list other reports/surveys
that similarly rank China’s information environment well below other major markets.

The overall opaque financial reporting environment naturally raises several important
questions. Does corporate transparency still plays an agency-problem-mitigating role in
China, as it does in developed markets? And relatedly, given the importance of family firms
in China and the different agency problems between family and nonfamily firms, is the role
of corporate transparency different between family and nonfamily firms? If yes, what is the
difference?
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Third, as a result of the weak legal institutions formal contracts (e.g., purchasing, lending,
and investment) are frequently not enforced or costly and ineffectively even when they are
enforced. This suggests that informal contracting plays an important role in mitigating agency
problems among different parties (Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010). Consequently market
participants often rely heavily on informal mechanisms in the design, negotiation, and
enforcement of informal contracts (e.g., a lending contract between a creditor and a
borrowing firm). Typically an informal mechanism often comprises multi-period relationship
and personal reputation probably plays the most important role (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005)
in such informal contracting. An implication of this is that family firms have a greater
concern for reputation than nonfamily private firms and SOEs for the following reasons.
Compared to SOEs, private firms face more difficulties and hurdles in obtaining formal
financing (most notably, banking loans). Compared to nonfamily private firms, family firms
are more likely to enter relationship lending in which they borrow from the same lender(s)
over a long period of time (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003).

1.3 Theoretical frameworks

The majority of existing family firm research applies one or more of four main theoretical
frameworks, namely agency theory, resource-based view, stewardship theory, and socioemotional wealth theory (Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, and Dekker, 2014). The foundation theoretical
framework of my thesis is the agency theory, but I also apply a mix of the other three theories,
given the unique institutional and family firm development background in China.
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1.3.1 Agency problems in family firms
1.3.1.1 Agency conflicts between shareholders and managers

The classic principal-agent problem resulted from the separation of ownership and control
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is commonly referred to as the Type I agency problem. The
Type I agency conflict may lead agents (managers) to act opportunistically to maximize their
own wealth rather than the interest of shareholders (principals). The unique characteristics of
family firms mean that Type I agency problem may be mitigated in family firms compared to
nonfamily firms.

First, family owners commonly have under-diversified and concentrated ownership in their
firms, which enables controlling families to internalize most of the benefits from close
monitoring of managers. This gives families strong incentives to monitor managers (Demsetz
and Lehn, 1985) and reduces free-rider problem commonly associated with small
shareholders at other firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).

Second, family owners’ long-term connection with their firms means that they have better
knowledge about their firms’ businesses than shareholders at other firms (Anderson and Reeb,
2003), which enables family owners to more easily detect managers’ manipulation. Moreover,
compared to nonfamily firms, the compensation of managers at family firms are less tied to
accounting based performance measures (Chen, 2005). Therefore, managers at family firms
have fewer incentives to manipulate. As a result, managers at family firms are more likely to
align their interests with controlling families than those at nonfamily firms.
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Third, it is not unusual for family members to be actively involved in the management of
their firms, often taking the positions of CEOs and/or other senior management roles. This
leads to not only better monitoring of nonfamily CEOs, but also naturally better alignment of
interests of managers and controlling families.

1.3.1.2 Agency conflicts between dominant and minority shareholders

While family firms are often characterized with subdued Type I agency problem when
compared with nonfamily firms, they have potentially more serious agency problem between
the controlling families and other minority shareholders which is commonly referred to as the
Type II agency problem.

Family owners’ highly concentrated equity ownership gives them the capability of often
unchallenged decision making power. In addition, the dominant position and authority
associated with founding-family status makes family CEOs significantly less likely to fired
even when they are incompetent (e.g., Leone and Liu, 2010).

Furthermore, family firms typically have one or more control-enhancing mechanism in place,
for example, divergence between control rights and cash flow rights (Villalonga and Amit,
2006, 2009), due class shares (Villalonga and Amit, 2009), and excess board representation
(Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2009).
The above two sources of entrenchment give controlling families incentives to expropriate
the firms at the expense of minority shareholders.
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1.3.2 Other factors unique to family firms

While the feature of potentially less serious Type I but more serious Type II agency problem
may not be exclusive to family firms (e.g, other firms with dominant controlling
shareholders), there are other unique features that distinguish family firms from other
nonfamily firms.

Although many nonfamily blockholders are also concerned about their reputation, family
owners’ great reputation concern is frequently highlighted as a distinguishing feature of
family firms. Gilson (2007) points out that the inter-generational nature of decision making of
family owners as well as their desire to pass a successful business to future generations
naturally give them stronger incentive to take a long-term approach and to invest in
reputation building. This in turn brings non-monetary benefits such as social status to the
controlling families (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003) and some hard-to-duplicate
resources such as social capital, patent capital, and survivability capital (Sirmon and Hitt,
2003). Family owners thus have strong incentives to maintain a good reputation and
competitive advantages associated with it, according to the resource-based view (e.g., Chua,
Chrisman, and Steier, 2003).

Furthermore, the stewardship theory (e.g., Donaldson, 1990; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and
Lester,

2011)

argues

that

family

members

are

more

likely

than

nonfamily

shareholders/managers to have a feeling that they are part of the firms, which motivates them
to act in the collective good of the firms’ stakeholders. This is likely to lead natural alignment
of controlling families’ interest with that of other stakeholders (e.g., managers, minority
shareholders, and creditors).
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Overall, the agency theory argues that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are likely
to face less serious Type I but potentially more serious Type II agency problems. The
resource-based view and stewardship theory further support family owners’ greater alignment
with other stakeholders of the firms.

1.4 Key findings and contributions
1.4.1 Key findings

This study examines whether and how family control affects corporate governance in the
Chinese market and the implications of family control on firm behaviour. The empirical
evidence from this study suggests that firms controlled by families differ systematically from
those controlled by nonfamily blockholders and those without controlling shareholders.
However, not all family firms are the same when it comes to the impact of family control on
corporate governance. The exact impact of family control is conditioned on some other
factors. Some of the key findings are listed below.

First, firms with families as the controlling shareholder as a whole have better corporate
governance practice than those with nonfamily controlling shareholder and those without
controlling shareholder. Specifically, the evidence shows that family firms have less
tunneling and a lower incidence of mandatory material restatements when compared to
nonfamily firms. As a result, family firms on average enjoy a lower cost of debt than
nonfamily firms. This finding is consistent with the notion that family firms have greater
concerns for reputation than nonfamily firms (e.g., Burkart et al., 2003; Anderson et al.,
2003), especially in an emerging market such as China where formal institution is relatively
26

weak and investors and creditors frequently have to rely on informal channels (e.g., personal
reputation of a firm’s founder/controlling shareholder) to make investment decisions (Allen
et al., 2005).

Second, family owners are not a homogeneous group of controlling shareholders in their
impact on agency relationship with creditors and minority shareholders. Although prior
studies have found that the real impact of family firm depends on whether the founding
family is actively involved in the management of the firm and if yes whether the founder or a
descendant is the CEO (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003, 2009; Villalonga and Amit, 2006;
Falenbrach, 2009), I investigate family firms’ heterogeneity from a different perspective
partly due to the fact that the majority of family firms in China are still controlled and
actively managed by the founder(s) because the relatively short history of the development of
private businesses in modern China. I find that the impact of family ownership/control is
conditioned on the level of information transparency of the firms. Specifically, the lower cost
of debt paid by family firms only applies to those family firms that have relatively transparent
information. There is no significant difference in the cost of debt between family and
nonfamily firms when corporate information is relatively opaque.

Third, although family firms’ greater concern for reputation leads to their better corporate
governance practice and consequently lower costs of debt, the consequences from reputation
loss are more costly and serious for family firms than for nonfamily firms. Specifically, when
family firms’ reputation is impaired when they are forced to restate their annual financial
report they face more negative and volatile stock returns, wider bid-ask spreads, and larger
and longer-lasting loss in the information content of their stock prices. This finding suggests
that while outside investors have certain level of trust in controlling families’ incentives to
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build and maintain a good reputation, they are quick to readjust their perception about the
relative balance between controlling families’ reputation concern and incentive of private
benefits of control. In other words, outside investors’ concern about the potentially more
serious Type II agency problems will quickly become a dominant factor in their decision
making.

1.4.2 Main contributions to the literature

The contributions of this study are threefold. First, this study contributes to the literature on
the impact of political connection. Existing literature commonly treats political connection as
a homogeneous factor when assessing its impact on corporate governance. I find that the
impact of political connection on controlling families’ tunneling behaviour depends on the
nature and the hierarchy level of the connection. Specifically, while CPC/CPPCC-type 3
political connection helps to mitigate controlling families from tunneling activities; officialtype political connection has no significant impact on family firms’ tunneling behaviour.
Furthermore, while CPC/CPPCC political connections at both central and local levels reduce
tunneling; the impact of the central-level political connection is significantly stronger than
that at the local level. The finding that the impact of political connection is conditioned on the
nature and hierarchy level helps to enhance our understanding of political connection which
receives increasingly academic interest.

3

CPC stands for Chinese People’s Congress. CPPCC stands for Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference. These two organizations are the prominent political bodies in China’s political system. Members of
the CPC/CPPCC enjoy a wide range of privileges.
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Second, this study reveals that the impact of family ownership/control on agency conflicts
(especially on the conflicts between controlling shareholders and creditors) and hence on the
cost of debt is conditioned on corporate information opacity, a firm-level factor on which the
controlling shareholder has great influence. Furthermore, the evidence shows that family
firms with relatively transparent information can enjoy a lower cost of debt than nonfamily
firm even when formal institutions are weak and when controlling families’ control rights
exceeds their cash-flow rights. My research thus adds important complementary contribution
to the existing literature that finds that family ownership/control is beneficial only when
investor protection is strong (Ellul et al., 2007) and when there is no divergence in control
and cash-flow rights (Pindado et al., 2011). This finding is particularly important for family
firms in many emerging markets where investor protection tends to be weak but controlenhancing mechanism, which often results in control-ownership divergence, is important in
helping maintain effective control of the firms.

Third, this study makes an important contribution to the literature about family firms and
reputation. I provide consistent evidence that family firms have a greater concern for
reputation, which is in line with many prior studies (e.g., Burkart et al., 2003; Anderson et al.,
2003; Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Falenbrach, 2009). More importantly, I find that
once a good reputation is lost the consequences are significantly more serious and more
costly for family firms than for nonfamily firms. The issue about the consequences to the loss
of reputation for family firms, however, has so far been largely ignored by existing literature.
This finding has important implication in that it demonstrates that family firms not only need
to build a good reputation to alleviate investors’ concern about private benefits of control, but
also they need to maintain such a good reputation in order to avoid the costly consequences.
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1.5 Structure of this thesis

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines if and how a CEO’s political
connection and founder-status affects the tunneling behavior of the firm. Chapter 3
investigates if the relation between family control and a firm’s cost of debt is conditioned on
the firm’s information opacity. I further investigate how the impact of information opacity is
affected by other factors. In Chapter 4 I explore the impact of family control on the incidence
of firm being involved in material misstatements as well as investor reactions to mandatory
restatements. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter Two Tunneling in founding-family firms:
The role of political connection

2.1 Introduction

When larger shareholders or other insiders such as managers have the capability of
controlling the firms they may have an incentive to extract private benefits as well. The
practice of expropriating value from a firm is commonly referred to as “tunneling” (Johnson
et al., 2000) or “self-dealing” (Djankov et al., 2008). Friedman et al. (2003) find that
tunneling by entrepreneurs who control the firms is prevalent in countries with a weak legal
system.

The Chinese market has been criticized for its generally ineffective institutional

system, weak investor protection, and lack of internal monitoring and external discipline
mechanism. Tunneling behavior has frequently been detected in China’s publicly listed firms.

Some studies have tried to identify the specific factors, in addition to the common regulatory
environment, that determine tunneling in China’s publicly listed firms. Li et al. (2004)
document that concentrated ownership exacerbates the expropriation of assets by block
shareholders. Chen et al. (2005) indicate that the state as the controlling shareholder
facilitates tunneling. Tang et al. (2004) concede that institutional ownership is favorable for
tunneling, while Gao and Kling (2008) argue that having the state and institution as principal
shareholders is not necessary to facilitate tunneling. Jang et al. (2010) show that institutional
investors avoid investing in firms that experience severe tunneling and this problem is much
greater in non-state owned firms.
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It is obvious that the existing literature on tunneling in China’s listed firms provides
inconsistent evidence. In this research, I do not intend to duplicate any of the evidence to
align with some viewpoints because I conjecture that there is a ‘hand’ behind the factors
identified by the abovementioned studies, which is the ultimate determinant of the tunneling
behavior in China’s listed firms. This ‘hand’ is the powerful ‘Guan Xi’ (relationship) in
China – political connection. Political connection and its impact on firms’ performance in
various ways has been found in many countries (Friedman et al., 2003; Faccio et al., 2006),
but it is more profound in China because political connection in China represents a
complicated framework with three dimensions and permeates various enterprises.

First, political connection in China can be categorized into two types. One is an official-type
political connection where a firm’s manager is a current or former government official or
military officer. The other is a CPC/CPPCC-type political connection where a firm’s manager
is a current or former member of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

Second, political connection in China is attributed to two levels of administrative hierarchy.
One is that a firm’s manager holds or held a political position in local (provincial or regional)
government organizations. The other is that a firm’s manager holds or held a political
position in central (national) government organizations.

Finally, firm manager in China is a vague concept that in reality can be either a chief
executive officer (CEO) or chairman of the board who plays different roles in the firm. Thus,
a firm can be politically connected by either its CEO or chairman, or both. These differently
politically connected managers represent a diverse form of interests of shareholders,
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government organizations, and themselves and thus should have various incentives for
tunneling.

If a manager is the establisher of the firm, the manager is entitled to be a founder manager
and the firm is entitled to be a founder firm. The founder manager may be a block
shareholder of the firm or an expert in the production, marketing, and management of the
firm. Literature shows that founder managers and non-founder managers have different
incentives in a firm’s decision making (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2009; Li
and Srinivasan, 2011). It is expected that when founder managers are politically connected
their incentives may have changed.

In this chapter I investigate the function of the ‘hand’ – political connection – in firm’s
tunneling behavior. The novelty of this research is that I am the first to classify political
connections in China’s publically listed firms into three dimensions: official-type and
CPC/CPPCC-type, local level and central level, CEO’s connection and chairman’s
connection. Accordingly, I fill a gap by analyzing the motivation of managers with different
political connections towards tunneling, intertwined with firms’ ownership and managers’
founder status.

I show that both political connection and founder status determines tunneling behavior and
their impact varies in private firms and SOEs (state owned enterprises). Specifically, I find
evidence that overall, manager’s political connection reduces tunneling in private firms,
whereas it facilitates tunneling in SOEs. There is less tunneling in both private firms and
SOEs with founder-managers than in firms with non-founder-managers, but the tunneling
between founder-manager firms and non-founder-manager firms is significantly greater in
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private firms than in SOEs. When founder managers are politically connected they can still
resist tunneling to some extent.

I find that for private firms, CPC/CPPCC-type political connection significantly reduces firm
tunneling, while official-type political connection has a positive but insignificant impact on
tunneling. On the contrary, official-type political connection in SOEs significantly increases
tunneling, while CPC/CPPCC-type political connection has a negative but insignificant
impact on tunneling. These results are consistent with the nature of these two types of
political connections.

Finally, I show that a chairman’s political connection has greater influences on tunneling than
a CEO’s political connection, in both private firms and SOEs. Political connections at the
central level affect tunneling more than at the local level, for both official-type and
CPC/CPPCC-type political connections. These findings are also in line with my hypothetical
analyses.

This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, numerous studies show that
managerial attributes affect firm risk-taking, investment policy, capital structure, and other
corporate governance practices (May, 1995; Adams et al., 2005; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Faccio,
2010). I show that managerial attributes such as political connection and founder status, can
also have a significant impact on tunneling, so this study adds to the existing literature by
identifying a new channel through which managerial attributes affect firm valuation and
performance.
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Second, most existing studies of the Chinese market treat all political connections equally
(Fan et al., 2007, Peng et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). I not only find evidence that political
connection affects firm tunneling, I also show that the impact of political connection between
types of political connection (official- or CPC/CPPCC-type), hierarchy levels (local or central)
and managers’ positions (CEOs or chairmen) changes significantly. In my study I take the
private or state controlling ownership as a firm’s background, so to this extent, my study is
also related to Wu et al. (2010), who find that the impact of political connection on firm
performance, government subsidiary, and policy burden varies depending on the type of firm
ownership.

Third, this study contributes to the literature on founder-managers in relation to political
connections. The behavior of founder-managers and their impact on firm performance and
valuation is attracting a great deal of academic interest (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Adams et
al., 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Anderson et al., 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009). The
Chinese stock market is still in its early stage of development and the number of listed firms
is growing fast, which suggests there may be a higher percentage of firms with foundermanagers than in Western markets, 4 and yet there are only a few studies that directly
examine the impact of founder-managers in the Chinese market (e.g., Wang and Wang 2011;
Zhang et al., 2011). These two papers examine the relationship between founders and
venture-capital performance, and the relationship between a CEO’s founder status and
turnover. I examine the impact of founder-managers from a different perspective, including
political connection, which gives a better understanding of the impact of founder-managers in

4

Founders are managers in more than 21% of the sample firms, with a percentage of 33% for private firms and

15% for SOEs, respectively. The overall percentage of firms with founder-manager almost doubles that in the
US, where only about 11% of firms have founder-managers.
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China and provides an important complement to the literature that still largely focuses on
Western markets.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of existing
literature. Section 2.3 presents the institutional background in China and lays out my
hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the samples and data. Section 2.5 reports my empirical
results. Section 2.6 carries out robustness tests and Section 2.7 concludes this chapter.

2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Impact of ownership structure and firm characteristics on tunneling

A large number of studies examine the relationship between the structure of firm ownership
and the nature and severity of tunneling by controlling shareholders. Berkman et al. (2009)
and Jiang et al. (2010) find that the incidence of tunneling through loan guarantees and
related lending is greater in private firms than in SOEs. Both Chen et al. (2009) and Cheung
et al. (2010) find that firms controlled by the central government are more likely to be
propped up, while firms controlled by local governments are more likely to be tunneled. La
Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002) provide empirical
evidence that firms belonging to business groups and being controlled by the ultimate owner
through a chain of companies are more likely to be tunneled. The ultimate controlling
shareholder exerts control over lower-level firms in the chain without necessarily having a
majority of cash flow rights, which separates control rights from cash flow rights. This gives
the controlling shareholder a strong incentive to extract private benefits and expropriate
minority shareholders.
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Researchers also examine other factors that may affect tunneling behavior. Cheung et al.
(2006), Gao and Kling (2008), and Jiang et al. (2010) all find that tunneling is more severe in
small firms relative to large firms. Gao and Kling (2008) find that the proportion of
independent (outsider) directors is negatively associated with the severity of tunneling. Both
Gao and Kling (2008) and Jiang et al. (2010) find that auditors do play a monitoring role with
respect to reducing firm tunneling, but the latter point out that non-clean auditor opinions
alone are not enough to deter tunneling. Finally, Jiang et al. (2010) find that good
performance (ROA) in the previous year significantly reduce tunneling in the current year,
whereas Cheung et al. (2006) show that the market-to-book ratio in the previous year is not
negatively related to the likelihood of connected transactions; rather, it is positively
associated with certain types of connected transactions that are of a tunneling nature.

2.2.2 Impact of political connection on firm performance and valuation

The literature finds both positive and negative impact of political connection on firm
behavior, performance, and valuation. On the positive side, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006)
find that politically connected firms have preferential access to loans from state owned banks.
Li et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms gain favorable regulatory and legal
treatment, while Boubakri et al. (2012) find that politically connected firms enjoy lower costs
of equity capital than their non-connected peers because investors consider them to be less
risky. Finally, Faccio et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms are significantly more
likely to be bailed out by governments.

On the negative side, Cheung et al. (2005) find that political connection worsens the
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders and is detrimental to the
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firm, while Fan et al. (2007) find there are more bureaucrats and fewer professionals on the
boards of politically connected firms in China. Consequently, these firms underperform their
non-connected peers in both the short term and long term. Faccio (2010) finds similar
evidence using cross-country data.

2.2.3 Impact of founder-managers on firm behavior and performance

Research on the impact of founder and founder-managers generates extant literature with
mixed empirical evidence. On one hand Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit
(2006) find that firms with founder-managers have a higher market valuation and better
performance than firms without founder-managers, while Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that firms
with founder-CEOs invest more on R&D, have higher capital expenditure, and make more
focused M&As, and Li and Srinivasan (2011) find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is
higher and the level of pay is lower when there is a founder-director on the board.

On the other hand Johnson et al. (1985) find that stock markets react positively when a
company founder suddenly dies, suggesting that founder control has a negative effect. Leone
and Liu (2010) find that compared to non-founder-CEOs, founder-CEOs are significantly less
likely to be fired following an accounting irregularity, which indicates they are probably
entrenched. Anderson et al. (2009) find that firms with both founders and heirs are
significantly more opaque than firms with diffuse shareholders and founders and heirs tend to
exploit this opacity to expropriate minority shareholders.

Firms with founder-managers account for about 11% of the largest public firms in the US
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003) whereas firms with founder-managers make up more than 21% of
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all sample firms (or 33% for private firms and 15% for SOEs). Yet the impact of foundermanagers in the Chinese market attracts little academic interest. As one of few exceptions, Pi
and Lowe (2010) study the patterns of CEO turnovers from 1997 to 2006 and discover that
being a founder makes a CEO less likely to be replaced involuntarily. Wang and Wang (2011)
find that the performance of a cross-border venture capital firm is strongly related to the
founder’s departure. These authors argue that the departure of the founder is an indication of
the firm’s transition to a modern corporation.

In summary, the literature on the Chinese market examines tunneling, political connection,
and founder managers from various perspectives but in an isolated manner. This study differs
from existing studies in that I integrate these three lines of research and investigate how
manager’s political connection and founder status can influence tunneling.

2.3 Institutional background and hypotheses
2.3.1 Institutional background

The Chinese stock market offers a natural setting for studying the tunneling activities of
controlling shareholders for the following reasons. First, Chinese firms are commonly
dominated by controlling shareholders with highly concentrated ownership. In a bid to
recapitalize the ailing SOE sector, the Chinese government initiated the share issue
privatization (SIP) reform with public share ownership in the early 1990s. In the preparation
of IPOs, most selected SOEs went through a partial restructuring process where part of the
assets and businesses of SOEs (often the best performing units) were either carved out or
spun off to become publicly listed firms. The parent companies retained the majority of
shares in the listed firms and also served as the controlling shareholders.
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The data shows that the ultimate largest shareholder of a median SOE holds 40.87% of
ownership. Deng et al. (2006) argue that such a parent-subsidiary structure provides
controlling shareholders with strong incentives and the capabilities of engaging in tunneling
activities. In recent years an increasing number of privately controlled firms are listed on the
market. Private firms have a relatively less concentrated ownership structure than SOE firms,
but the largest shareholder, on average, still has 32.60% of all control rights, which is above
the 30% criterion set by the CSRC in determining effective control. 5

Second, the corporate governance system in China is still incomplete because China lacks a
well-developed legal and investor protection system, which means minority shareholders
have few channels through which to take action against controlling shareholders when their
rights are jeopardized (McNeil, 2002; Allen et al., 2005). Although the China Securities
Regulatory Committee (CSRC) is the official regulator of the stock markets in China, it lacks
investigative and prosecuting power and sufficient resources to effectively enforce its own
rules. External discipline is also weak in China. For example, takeovers and other forms of
competition for corporate control (e.g., proxy contest) are far from common. The news media,
which plays a significant role in improving corporate governance in Western markets (e.g.,
Miller 2006; Dyck et al., 2010), is ineffective in China due to tight government control of the
news media sector.
Third, China is a politically dominated country where the Communist Party is the sole ruling
party and other parties assist the Communist Party in improving its governance. Nominally,
the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) is the legislative institution and the Chinese People’s
5

“Notice about Issuing ‘Guides to Constitutions of Listed Companies’”, CSRC, December 16, 1997 (in Chinese,

title is translated by the authors).
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Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is the advisory body and the government is in
charge of routine decision making and governance. In reality, the government retains the
highest power while the other two organizations perform assisting roles. A prominent
politician may hold a position in the government and/or have contemporary membership of
the CPC or CPPCC.

The national system of administrative control is a pyramid structure where, under the
administrative control of the central government, there are 31 provinces and municipalities
(excluding Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao). A province controls a number of regions and a
region administrates a number of counties, but the government and the CPC and CPPCC are
embedded in each of these administrative hierarchies. Members of any of the three political at
all levels enjoy special rights and personal benefits, either explicitly or implicitly.

To summarize this up, in transiting itself from a highly centralized planned economy to a
modern market-oriented economy, China has been unable to synchronize other necessary and
complementary reforms such as property rights, investor protection, and corporate laws. The
concentrate ownership and salient institutional environment makes the Chinese stock market
conducive to frequent and severe tunneling by large shareholders. Managers with different
political connections represent diversiform interests of shareholders and government
organizations, and thus may impel or prevent tunneling in firms.

2.3.2 Hypothesis development
2.3.2.1 Manager’s political connections and firm tunneling
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The majority of publically listed SOEs in China were mainly transformed from large stateowned enterprises that carved out or span off their profitable businesses and assets and
restructured them into independent legal entities for listing. Thus, publicly listed SOEs have
two notable features; one is that they have parent corporations, and the other is that the
government retains the largest ownership stakes.

These parent corporations were reorganized with the remaining assets and labor resources in
the original state owned enterprises after the publicly listed SOEs were carved out. Normally,
the listed SOEs were affiliated to their parent corporations in both ownership and
management teams’ nomination, at least for a certain period after the SOEs were listed, but
the assets and labor resources are of a lower quality than those in the listed SOEs because the
high quality resources were allocated to the listed SOEs so they could qualify for listing and
market competition. The parent corporations did not always receive fair compensation for
carving out high quality resources in the period before the SOEs were listed, thus, they
expected to receive valuable feedback from the listed SOEs in the future, and so felt that such
action was reasonable.

The government retains the largest ownership stakes in the publicly listed SOEs, either
directly or via their parent corporations, and holds the ultimate decision making rights in
those firms 6 . These newly listed SOEs often assume the legacies of a planned economy
because their primary goal is social stability and sustainable government power rather than

6

Of course in some cases, the government may choose to relinquish their stakes by selling it to private entities,

resulting in “private control transfer”. However, as Chen et al. (2008) find, there were only 62 such private
control transfers during 1996 and 2000.
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maximizing shareholder value. To fulfill these goals, listed SOEs may be required to transfer
some assets and resources to support the government’s social and economic policies.

To ensure the listed SOEs follow the requirements of both government and their parent
corporations, both governments and parent corporations have strong incentives to appoint
politically connected manages to run the listed SOEs, and these managers, being more
concerned about their political future,

7

are often willing to collude with government

controlling shareholders and their parent corporations and engage in tunneling activities.
Thus, I propose that:

H1a: Overall for SOEs, manager political connection is positively related to the severity of
firm tunneling.

In contrast with SOEs, most private firms were listed because of their overall qualifications,
with only a few being carved out from existing enterprises. Several listed private firms were
formerly listed SOEs who relinquished their controlling stakes to private entities, which
means the parent-subsidiary structure is not as common here, and the associated incentive for
the parent corporation to tunnel is less severe in listed private firms .
Despite the fact that the private sector has been the main engine of China’s economic growth
over the past two decades, private firms are still being discriminated and disadvantaged in
many areas. Governments, either central or local, still maintain considerable control over the
allocation of resources such as land, energy, and awarding of government projects and
procurements, etc. Bank loans, a primary source of external financing, flow disproportionally
7

In a year 2000 survey cited by Chang and Wong (2004), Communist Party Committees and governments have

remained involvement in all major corporate decisions in listed SOEs, particularly personnel decisions.
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to SOEs despite their poor performance (Cull and Xu, 2000). Private firms often face many
administrative obstacles in trying to obtain licenses and enter certain industries. Furthermore,
private firms are frequently discriminated against when it comes to the enforcement of
contracts with governments or SOEs.

To overcome this imperfect market mechanism and disadvantage in resource allocation,
private entrepreneurs have strong motivation to enter politics or to establish political
connections (Li et al., 2006). Unlike listed SOEs who must put up with various social burdens
imposed by the government, private firms strive to obtain benefits through political
connections, but do not need to bear the social burden, and as a rule, the government does not
intervene in the operations of private firms through the political channel. Thus, I expect:

H1b: Overall for private firms, manager political connection is negatively related to the
severity of firm tunneling.

2.3.2.2 Different types and levels of political connections and firm tunneling

Managers’ political connections in China can be categorized into two broad types: Officialtypes and CPC/CPPCC-type, with each being at either the local level or central level. These
two types of political connections are of very different natures and consequently have
different impacts on firm behavior, including tunneling activities.

Official-type political connection is where a firm’s managers are/were government or
military officers. The government (including military) officers take charge of routine decision
making and governance, such as resource allocations, fiscal grants, license issuance, industry
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restructure, monetary policy, municipal projects, and so forth. Although overall private firms’
political connection is hypothesized to be negatively related to tunneling in H1b, their
official-type connected managers may have rent seeking motivations. While they directly
bring many benefits to the firms such as industry access and bank loans through their political
network with government authorities, they often require some rewards, so it may prove costly
for firms to maintain these connections.

Similarly, official-type politically connected managers in SOEs may pursue personal rents for
the benefits they bring into the firms and cost the firms’ wealth to build their personal
relationships. However, it is more important whether the government intends to expropriate
the

SOEs

whenever

it

is

necessary

to

achieve

their

social

goals.

Official-type connected managers in SOEs usually keep their administrative position ranking
in line with the size and importance of the firm’s business and their political future depends
largely on how well they carry out the policies and instructions of the relevant local or central
governments, the controlling shareholders of publicly listed SOEs.

Furthermore, the higher the level of official-type political connections, the greater the
benefits these connections may bring to the firm, but in return, the larger rents required, and
consequently more possible expropriation. Thus,
H2a: For both private firms and SOEs, manager’s official-type political connection is
positively related to tunneling. This positive relationship is stronger when the political
connection is at the central level than at the local level.

CPC/CPPCC-type political connection is where a firm’s managers are/were members of the
Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
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(CPPCC). In contrast with government officers, members of the CPC and CPPCC have two
characteristics; first, many of them are not members of the communist party, particularly in
the CPPCC, second, many of them have expertise in science, technology, industry, and
business management. Although some of them are former veterans of government officers,
they, except for a few who hold contemporary positions in government agencies, actually do
not participate in routine and specific decision making as government officers do, and
therefore managers connected to CPC/CPPCC are less likely to bring direct benefits to the
firms so they have no bargaining power for personal rents and are unable to make effective
commitments to the government.

Instead, because the CPC and CPPCC are legislative and advisory bodies, managers with
connections to them are, to some extent, capable of preventing firms from adverse events
such as unfair treatment from related parties in legal disputes, market shares, access to
resources, and asset transactions. They are also able to raise unfair treatments in the CPC and
CPPCC that the government should deal with, which also protects these firms from tunneling.

To show participation in governance from multiple parties, diverse nationalities and all
classes of people, members of the CPC and CPPCC are positioned high in the political
hierarchy. They are entitled to the same remuneration and welfare as government officers in
the equivalent hierarchy, plus political privileges such as being immune from custody.
Members of the CPC/CPPCC are expected to demonstrate integrity and impartiality as
evidence that the government is being monitored effectively and because they enjoy social
and personal benefits, competition for the limited membership of the CPC or CPPCC can be
fierce. In fact, ceteris paribus, members who are guilty of misconduct may lose their
reputation and further nomination.
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To maintain their position and retain a good image, a manager who is a member of the
CPC/CPPCC is less likely to expropriate the firm’s assets. Furthermore, relative to
CPC/CPPCC members at the local level, those at the central level attract greater scrutiny,
either from the market, the media, or from within the organizations. Consequently, those at
the central level have even stronger incentives not to engage in wrongdoing such as tunneling.

H2b: For both private firms and SOEs, manager’s CPC/CPPCC-type political connection is
negatively related to tunneling. This negative relationship is stronger when the political
connection is at the central level than at the local level.

2.3.2.3 Founder-managers and firm tunneling

Founder-managers are those who were either founders or main executives when a firm was
first incorporated or spun-off for public listing. They were quite experienced with the firms’
establishment, IPO process, and operations as publicly listed firms. Founder-managers at
public SOEs were normally appointed by the state to lead these newly listed firms. In some
cases they were instructed by governments to set up new businesses to solve the legacies of
long term underperformance of SOEs and other social issues such as high unemployment and
pressure on the government’s fiscal budget. To encourage these managers to run the firms
appropriately, governments often granted them a certain amount of equity ownership. The
data shows that in SOEs, the average equity ownership is 0.35% for founder-managers and
0.07% for non-founder-managers, with the difference significant at the 1% level. The
performance of these firms has been linked to the reputation of founder-managers, including
their career concerns and personal benefits.
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Most of the listed private firms in China were originally family firms established by private
entrepreneurs who were most likely to be the largest equity owner. 8 The founders often
assume the position of chairman, CEO, or both, and still hold a large ownership stake, even
after the firms were publicly listed. Because founder-managers of private firms invest most of
their wealth into the firms, they have a stronger motivation in their firms’ long term survival
and continuous development, and are extremely desirous of passing profitable firms and
sustainable assets to their descendants.

Founder managers in both SOEs and private firms are most likely to be more painstaking
than non-founder-managers, indeed the relation between personal benefits and firm
performance is also stronger for founder-managers than non-founder-managers. Foundermanagers usually regard the firms as their life success and thus try hard to avoid having the
firms fail. This motivates them to take a longer term approach (Fahlenbrach, 2009) and
restrain the firms from tunneling.

Founder-managers can also be politically connected, but as I point out above, foundermanagers often have high monetary interests which are closely linked to firm performance.
The motivation for a sole founder-manager not to tunnel is stronger than the motivation to
tunnel, whereas a sole politically connected manager may not be so motivated because of the
interest and efforts of trade-off, i.e., the interest obtained from one unit effort is larger from a
founder’s perspective than from a politically connected manager’s perspective, and even if a
politically connected manager engages in tunneling activities, his incentive to tunnel is likely
to be reduced if he is also a founder-manager.
8

I find that, in sample firms, the ownership of the largest shareholder (which is often the founder) is 28.49% for

founder-manager firms and 21.19% for non-founder-manager firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level.
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H3: For both private firms and SOEs, firms with founder-managers have less tunneling than
firms without founder-managers, regardless of whether the managers are politically
connected or not.

2.3.2.4 Different impact of the Chairman’s and COE’s political connection on tunneling

So far in this chapter I have made no distinction between either the chairman’s or the CEO’s
political connections with respect to their impact on tunnelling, and while such a distinction
may be irrelevant for firms in Western countries where the chairman is usually not involved
in the day-to-day running of the firm (except for executive chairmen), the situation in
Chinese firms is quite different. Existing literature on the Chinese stock market has different
opinions as to who the top executive in a Chinese firm actually is; for example, Fan et al.
(2007) regard the CEO as the top executive, whereas Firth et al. (2006) consider the chairman
to be the top executive because they argue that the chairman is often involved in day-to-day
decision making in Chinese firms. Meanwhile Kato and Long (2006) also consider the
Chairman to be the top executive insofar that the chairman is paid a salary by the firm.
Furthermore, existing literature pays almost no attention to the possible different impact that
a chairman and CEO has on firm behavior. 9

9

One notable exception is Wu et al. (2012). These authors find that politically connected CEOs play a more

important role than politically connected chairmen in the operations in local SEOs, and politically connected
chairmen have greater influence than connected COEs in obtaining government subsidies in private firms. But
other than these, there is no distinct difference between chairmen and CEOs on firm value, government
subsidies and policy burden.
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In China, the chairman is the legal representative of a firm and in most cases is appointed by
the controlling shareholder. Given the highly concentrated ownership structure, the chairman
is more likely to be powerful and exert enormous influence on the daily operations of the firm.
Kato and Long (2006) argue that even when the chairman and the CEO are both responsible
for daily operations of the firm, the chairman is likely to be more powerful than the CEO.
The relative power of the chairman and the CEO can be proven by the following two facts;
first, founders in private firms, who are often the controlling shareholders, are more likely to
take the position of chairman rather than CEO, 10 second, it is widely regarded as a promotion
in SOEs when the CEO is appointed to become the chairman, and a demotion if the chairman
loses his chairmanship and becomes the CEO of the firm. Thus, I expect that,

H4: For both private firms and SOEs, the chairman’s political connection is more influential
than the CEO’s political connection on tunneling behavior.

2.4 Sample and data
2.4.1 Sample selection and data source

My initial sample consists of all non-financial A-share issuing firms listed on either the
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2010. I chose
2004 as the starting year because membership of the Chinese Communist Party was not
officially open to private entrepreneurs until late 2002, when the 16th National Congress of
the Communist Party amended its Party Constitution (Xinhua News Agency Nov. 18 2002).
The Chinese Communist Party was officially opened to private entrepreneurs to provide more
10

I find that, of the 1130 private firms with founder-managers, 1108 founders take the position of the chairman

and 502 founders take the position of the CEO, with some founders taking both positions.
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opportunity for private entrepreneurs to be selected as government officers. This also
signaled that the CPC and CPPCC would accept more private entrepreneurs as members. The
procedure from submission of application to official assessment and ratification normally
takes a couple of years, although it may vary among different applicants.

In the sample I exclude firms where the ultimate largest shareholder is a foreign entity, and
also firms cross-listed overseas (including Hong Kong) because foreign accounting rules may
affect the treatment of “other receivables” and some other accounting items used in this
study. 11 I then delete the observations of the first year of listing because Chinese firms
commonly engage in pre-IPO earnings management that results in unusually high levels of
various forms of related party transactions and fund transfers in the first year of listing. After
eliminating observation sets with missing data, the final sample consists of 1591 firms and
9499 firm-year observation sets, which is larger than those in most previous studies on
tunneling in the Chinese stock markets.

I obtain accounting and financial data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database, which is one of the most widely used databases for research on the
Chinese stock markets. I hand collect the information on manager political connection by
checking the “Directors and Senior Executives’ Profile” in annual reports. However, annual
reports rarely mention whether or not a manager is a founder, so I search the internet through
Google, Baidu, and Wikipedia. I consider a manager to be a founder-manager if any one of
those sources explicitly mentions so and no other source indicates otherwise.

11

My sample includes firms that also issue B-shares (in addition to A-shares), since these firms must abide

Chinese laws. I, however, exclude B-shares in this study.
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2.4.2 Measurement of variables
2.4.2.1 Tunneling

Three approaches have generally been used to measure tunneling in China: related party
transactions (Cheung et al., 2006), loan guarantees to related parties (Berkman et al., 2009),
and fund occupations (i.e., inter-corporate loans in Jiang et al., 2010). I do not use the first
two measurements because: (1) the issuance of any new loan guarantee was banned by the
CSRC in June 2000; and (2) the approach used by Cheung et al. (2006) requires an a priori
subjective judgment on whether a certain RPT is beneficial, expropriating, or neutral to the
listed firm. The limitation of such a subjective judgment is evident. For example, Cheung et
al. (2006) consider all asset sales by a listed firm to related parties to be expropriating; but it’s
obvious that the nature of such transactions depends on whether the prices paid are above,
below, or the same as in arms-length deals. Therefore, I follow Jiang et al. (2010) and use
fund occupation by controlling shareholders as a proxy for tunneling, which is the ratio of the
total amount of “other receivables” in the balance sheet to total assets.

“Other receivables” is an accounting item that includes receivables that are not part of
ordinary business transactions. These receivables are essentially interest free loans made by
listed firms to other parties where a large proportion of these funds are occupied for a long
period of time, and in many cases are never paid back to the listed firms (Jiang et al., 2010).
The advantage of this measurement is that, unlike the approach used by Cheung et al. (2006),
it is relatively easy to tell who the beneficiary of this particular form of tunneling is.

In addition, fund occupation through the “other receivables” account by controlling
shareholders and their affiliates is such a widespread tunneling practice in China that the
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CSRC has issued several rules or decrees aimed specifically at tackling this issue. However,
this practice remains prevalent because the rules are not enforced. For my sample firms the
balance of “other receivables”, on average, accounted for 6.00% of total assets (or 138
million RMB) in a private firm and 3.90% of total assets (or 227 million RMB) in a stateowned enterprise (SOE), which represents a heavy cost to the listed firms. Moreover these
figures are almost certainly underestimated since many of the affiliates cannot easily be
identified with controlling shareholders.

2.4.2.2 Manager political connection

Faccio (2006) defines a firm to be politically connected if one of the firm’s large shareholders
or top officers is a member of parliament, a minister, or the head of state, or closely related to
a top official. However, in the Chinese situation Chen et al. (2011), Fan et al. (2007) and
others extend Faccio (2006)’s original definition by considering China’s specific
circumstances and define a Chinese firm to be politically connected if a manager is a current
or former (1) government official; (2) military officer; (3) member of the Chinese People’s
Congress (CPC); and (4) member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC). Therefore I follow Chen et al. (2011) definition to identify politically connected
managers.

To examine the impact of these types of political connections on firm’s tunneling behavior I
categorize managers’ political connections into two broad types, namely official-type
connection (if a manager has the above (1) or (2) connection), and CPC/CPPCC-type
connection (if a manager has the above (3) or (4) connection). To test the impact of political
connections at different levels, I further classify all political connections into central level
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connections and local level connections (province or lower). Thus, there are up to six
different types of manager political connections in the formal tests.

2.4.2.3 Founder-manager

To remain consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Adams et al. (2005), I consider a
manager to be a founder-manager if she/he was a founder or a main executive when the firm
was first incorporated, or when it was spun-off.

2.4.2.4 Control variables

To control for other factors that may affect tunnelling, I include the following control
variables in multivariate regressions: a dummy variable indicating that the firm has
completed the non-tradable share reform (Reform), the difference between the controlling
shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights (Wedge), equity ownership by managers
(Mg shares), the size of the firm (Firm size), return on assets (ROA), leverage (Leverage),
sales growth (Growth), and percentage of independent directors (Independence). The
theoretical and empirical evidence for the impact of these variables on tunneling is relatively
well known so I only provide a brief discussion.

Before the non-tradable share (NTS) reform started in the middle of 2005, a high proportion
of listed firms’ outstanding shares were mainly held by blockholders, including controlling
shareholders, and were not tradable in the stock exchanges. Thus, controlling shareholders
were not too concerned about negative market reactions to their tunneling behavior, but after
NTS reform the controlling shareholders would have less incentive to tunnel listed firms
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because they must now balance their private benefits from tunneling with any loss from
negative market reactions. Therefore, I expect a negative impact of Reform on tunneling.

Controlling shareholders have more incentive to extract private benefits from the firm if there
is a divergence between their control rights and cash flow rights, while managers with a large
equity ownership are more concerned about firm performance and therefore are less likely to
engage in tunneling, ceteris paribus. Large firms are subjected to more public scrutiny and are
more likely to be located in developed areas with stronger institutional development. Thus, I
expect a negative association between firm size and tunneling. Tunneling is expected to have
an adverse impact on firm performance, so controlling shareholders must consider the tradeoff between private benefits from tunneling and returns from future growth. The potential
cost of tunneling for controlling shareholders is higher for firms with higher ROA and sales
growth so I expect that the impact of both ROA and sales growth on tunneling would be
negative.

While I expect a negative association between board independence and tunneling, the
relationship between leverage and tunneling is not as clear cut as it may appear. Friedman et
al. (2003) argue that debt represents a commitment by controlling shareholders to prop up the
firm when a moderately adverse shock occurs, but high leverage may lead controlling
shareholders to abandon or loot the firm in the case of a serious shock. The primary source of
debt financing in China is bank loans and state owned banks are the dominant players in the
banking sector. A high leverage could indicate government support (through state owned
banks), making a firm less concerned about negative market reactions to tunneling.
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I also include industry and year dummy variables in all the regression analyses. Industry
dummy variables are based on the one-digit industry codes published by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which classifies all listed firms into 13 broad industries (12
industries if the financial service industry is excluded). Detailed descriptions of main
variables used in this chapter are reported in Table 2.1. To minimize the influence of extreme
values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.

2.4.3 Descriptive statistics

Panel A in Table 2.2 reports the distribution of firms with political connections and firms
with founder-managers by year, for private firms and for SOEs, respectively. The data shows
that a total of 9499 firms (or firm-year observations) consists of 3416 (or 35.96%) firms
where a private entity is the ultimate largest shareholder, and 6083 (or 64.04%) firms where
the state or a government agency is the ultimate largest shareholder. The proportion of private
firms in my sample is higher than in many previous studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Peng et
al., 2011), probably because my sample covers a more recent period and private firms
accounted for a larger proportion of all newly listed firms during this period.

Across the whole sample period, about 36.50% of private firms and 35.23% of SOEs are
politically connected. On a year-by-year basis the percentage of politically connected firms is
relatively stable; this is why I am unable to test how changes in political connections affect
firm tunnelling activities.

Regarding the percentage of firms with founder-managers, it is higher in private firms
(33.08%) than in SOEs (14.68%). Also, the percentage of founder-manager firms is much
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higher than in the US (about 11%, see Anderson and Reeb, 2003 and Adams et al., 2005).
This significant difference clearly reflects the fact that the Chinese stock markets are in their
early stage of development. The data also shows that the percentage of private firms with
founder-managers is rising steadily while the percentage of SOEs with founder-manager is
declining. There are two possible explanations for this, the increasing number of newly listed
private firms (which often have a founder-manager) and/or the promotion or retirement of
founder-managers in SOEs.

Panel B in Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics of tunneling measured by “other
receivables”, a proxy for fund occupation by controlling shareholders. The data shows that
almost all sample firms report “other receivables” in their balance sheets, with the balance
representing 6.00% of total assets (or 138 million RMB) for privately controlled firms and
3.90% of total assets (or 227 million RMB) for SOEs. These occupied funds are charged very
low interest, even zero, and in many cases they are never paid back, which could have
significant adverse economic consequences for the listed firms (Jiang et al., 2010).
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Table 2.1 Descriptions of main variables used in the analyses

Variable
Dependent variables
Tunneling
Key independent
variables
Political connection
Official PC
CPC/CPPCC
Dual PC
Local PC
Central PC
Chair PC
CEO PC
Founder
Control variables
Reform
Wedge
Mg shares
Firm size
ROA
Leverage
Growth
Board independence
(Independence)
Duality
Instrumental
variables
Unemployment
Log GDP
Savings ratio

Description
Total amount of “other receivables” / total assets (Jiang et al., 2010)
Dummy variable that equals 1 if either (or both) the Chairman or the CEO is a current or former
government official, military officer or member of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if either (or both) the Chairman or the CEO is a current or former
government official or military officer and neither of them is a member of the CPC or CPPCC; zero
otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if either (or both) the Chairman or the CEO is a current or former
member of the CPC or CPPCC and neither of them is a current or former government official or
military officer; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has both official-type PC and CPC/CPPCC-type PC; zero
otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has only local level (provincial or lower) political
connection
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has central level political connection
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman has political connection; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO has political connection; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the Chairman or the CEO is a founder or a main executive when
the firm was first incorporated (including when spun-off); zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has completed the non-tradable share reform at the end
of the year; zero otherwise
The difference between the ultimate largest shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights.
Number of shares held by top executives / total number of shares outstanding
Natural logarithm of total assets
Net income / total assets
Total liabilities / total assets
(Total sales this year – total sales last year) / total sales last year
Number of independent directors / total number of directors
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the Chair and the CEO is the same person; zero otherwise
Registered unemployment rate in the province in which a firm is headquartered
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the province in which a firm is headquartered
Total domestic deposits in financial institutions / total GDP in the province in which a firm is
headquartered
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of manager political connection, founder status, and overall level of tunneling
This table presents the descriptive statistics of manager political connection and founder-managers for private firms and SOEs. Panel A reports sample breakdown across years. Panel B
reports the overall level of tunneling across years. The definitions of Political connection, Founder, and Tunneling are reported in Table 1. Proportion is calculated by dividing the number of
firms with political connection or founder-manager by the total number of firms in that category. For example, there are 339 private firms in 2004 of which 119 have political connections.
Therefore, the proportion of political connection is 119/339=35.10%.
Panel A: The proportion of political connection and founder-manager firms by year
Year

Private Firms
# of
firms

2004

339

2005

400

2006

429

2007

474

2008

538

2009

596

2010

640

Total

3416

Political
connection
(proportion)
119
(35.10%)
140
(35.00%)
152
(35.43%)
172
(36.29%)
192
(35.69%)
228
(38.26%)
244
(38.13%)
1247
(36.50%)

Panel B: Tunneling by year

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
Founder
(proportion)
84
(24.78%)
113
(28.25%)
121
(28.21%)
141
(29.75%)
193
(35.87%)
225
(37.75%)
253
(39.53%)
1130
(33.08%)

# of
firms
842
878
850
849
884
886
894
6083

Political
connection
(proportion)
305
(36.22%)
310
(35.31%)
296
(34.82%)
305
(35.92%)
319
(36.09%)
310
(34.99%)
298
(33.33%)
2143
(35.23%)

Founder
(proportion)
133
(15.80%)
143
(16.29%)
131
(15.41%)
130
(15.31%)
131
(14.82%)
120
(13.54%)
105
(11.74%)
893
(14.68%)

Private firms

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)

# of firms
reporting
tunneling

Mean

Median

# of firms
reporting
tunneling

Mean

Median

339

0.112

0.047

842

0.065

0.029

400

0.108

0.039

878

0.062

0.026

429

0.101

0.033

850

0.055

0.020

474

0.052

0.021

848

0.030

0.013

536

0.036

0.015

881

0.025

0.011

596

0.030

0.012

885

0.020

0.009

639

0.025

0.011

894

0.019

0.008

3413

0.060

0.019

6078

0.039

0.014
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Panel B also reveals three clear patterns. First, on average, private firms report more
tunneling than SOEs, either on an aggregated base or on a year-by-year base. Second, during
the sample period, the severity of tunneling is on the decline, suggesting that enhancement in
laws and regulations have had some effects in reducing tunneling. Nonetheless, at the end of
2010, “other receivables” still represents 2.50% of total assets in private firms and 1.90% in
SOEs. Third, the difference in tunneling between private firms and SOEs has also narrowed.
For example, at the end of 2004, “other receivables” represented 11.20% of total assets for
private firms and 6.50% for local SOEs, with a difference of 4.70%. At the end of 2010 this
difference narrows to 0.60%, which may suggest that relevant laws and regulations have had
a larger effect on private firms than on SOEs.

Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics that are broken down by manager political
connection and founder status. Private firms without politically connected managers report
tunneling that represents 7.00% of total assets, which is significantly higher than the 4.10%
reported by those private firms with connected managers. In contrast, SOEs with politically
connected managers report significantly more tunneling than those SOEs without connected
managers (4.40% vs. 3.70%, significant at the 1% level). Private firms without foundermanagers report tunneling that represents 7.40% of total assets, which almost triples the
reported tunneling (2.50%) for those with founder-managers. SOEs with founder-managers
also report significantly less tunneling than those without founder-managers, but the
difference is smaller than in private firms. The above statistics provide initial evidences that
coincide with my hypotheses 1a, 1b and 3.

A manager is more likely to be politically connected if they are a founder-manager, which
can be observed in both private firms and SOEs. For both private firms and SOEs, the
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divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights is
smaller if a firm has a politically connected or founder-manager. These firms are also
significantly larger. Firms with founder-managers have significantly lower leverage than
those without, which may imply they take less risk. What is also notable is that private firms
with politically connected managers have a leverage ratio of 0.52, which is only slightly
higher than half the leverage ratio for those without connected managers. This is certainly
worth further investigation. There is no significant difference in performance (either ROA or
sales growth) between firms with/without politically connected managers or foundermanagers. One exception is that SOEs with founder-managers have marginally higher ROA
than SOEs without founder-managers, which may imply that the former are more concerned
about firm performance than the latter. Finally, private firms with founder-mangers have a
significantly higher percentage of independent directors, which indicates that the internal
corporate governance in these firms is better.

To summarize, firms with and without politically connected managers or founder-managers
differ significantly in their tunneling behavior. They also differ significantly in size and
capital structure. I next formally examine how these factors affect firm tunneling behavior.
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Table 2.3 Univariate analyses on mean differences for main variables
Variables include Tunneling, Political connection, Founder, and other firm characteristics. The definitions of these variables are reported in Table 1. P-values using the two-tailed t-test (MannWhitney-Wilcoxon test) are reported in parentheses below the differences in means. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Private firms

Tunneling

PC firms

Non-PC firms

(1)

(2)

0.041

0.070

Political
Connection
Founder

0.416

0.224

Reform

0.803

0.757

Wedge

0.086

0.092

Mg shares

0.034

0.027

Total assets
(billion)

3.230

1.780

ROA

0.075

0.049

Leverage

0.520

1.024

Growth

0.270

0.238

Independence

0.363

0.363

No. of firms

1247

2169

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)

Difference in
means

Founder
firms

Non-founder
firms

Difference in
means

(1) –(2)
-0.029***
(0.000)

(3)

(4)

0.025

0.074

0.516

0.302

(3) – (4)
-0.049***
(0.000)
0.214***
(0.00)

0.192***
(0.000)
0.046***
(0.001)
-0.006**
(0.032)
0.007**
(0.018)
1.450***
(0.000)
0.026
(0.760)
-0.504***
(0.000)
0.032*
(0.100)
0.000
(0.568)
─

0.869

0.734

0.073

0.097

0.079

0.009

2.940

2.050

0.102

0.044

0.440

1.006

0.255

0.247

0.368

0.361

1003

2413

0.135***
(0.000)
-0.024***
(0.000)
0.070***
(0.000)
0.890***
(0.000)
0.058
(0.263)
-0.566***
(0.000)
0.008
(0.368)
0.007***
(0.002)
─

PC firms

Non-PC firms

(5)

(6)

0.044

0.037

0.190

0.123

0.706

0.712

0.030

0.045

<0.001

0.001

6.830

5.260

0.021

0.088

0.538

0.541

0.234

0.232

0.353

0.353

2143

3940

Difference in
means

Founder
firms

Non-founder
firms

Difference in
means

(5) –(6)
0.007***
(0.001)

(7)

(8)

0.031

0.041

0.456

0.335

(7) – (8)
-0.010***
(0.000)
0.121***
(0.000)

0.700

0.711

0.032

0.041

0.003

0.001

6.450

5.710

0.095

0.059

0.500

0.547

0.228

0.233

0.353

0.353

893

5190

0.067***
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.322)
-0.015***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.006)
1.570***
(0.002)
-0.067
(0.106)
-0.003
(0.350)
0.002
(0.452)
0.000
(0.593)
─

-0.011
(0.246)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.740*
(0.076)
0.036*
(0.091)
-0.047***
(0.000)
-0.005
(0.371)
0.000
(0.768)
─
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2.5 Multivariate results
2.5.1 Impact of political connection on tunneling

Table 2.4 reports the results of OLS regressions of tunneling on manager political connection.
I run two sets of regressions, one for private firms, reported in columns (1) to (4), and the
other for SOEs, reported in columns (5) to (8). In each of the regressions, the dependent
variable is Tunneling measured by the ratio of “other receivables” to total assets. I use four
specifications for each set of regressions. First, I only control Reform in columns (1) and (5),
without considering other control variables. I then add control for wedge – the divergence
between controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights, as well as year and
industry effects, in columns (2) and (6). I further include manager equity ownership and firm
leverage in columns (3) and (7). Existing literature indicates there is a strong association
between firm tunneling and these three factors. Finally, I include more other control variables
in columns (4) and (8). The p-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors
adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White (1980).

Throughout columns (1) to (4), the coefficient of Political connection is negative and
significant at least at the 5% level. The results indicate that private firms with politically
connected managers have significantly less tunneling than those without connected managers,
which confirms the univariate results reported in Table 2.3. In contrast, the coefficient of
Political connection in columns (5) to (8) is positive and significant at the 1% level, which
indicates that SOEs with politically connected managers have significantly more tunneling
than those SOEs without connected managers. These results are also consistent with the
univariate results in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.4 Impact of manager political connection on firm tunneling behavior
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of manager political connection on firm tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key independent variable is
Political connection. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for private firms and columns (5) to (8) report the results for SOEs. The definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. P-values
based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Tunneling

Constant
Political connection
Reform

(1)
0.141***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.094***
(0.000)

Wedge

(2)
0.120***
(0.000)
-0.020***
(0.000)
-0.107***
(0.000)
0.042**
(0.022)

Mg shares

Private firms

(3)
0.121***
(0.000)
-0.019***
(0.000)
-0.098***
(0.000)
0.063***
(0.001)
-0.084***
(0.000)

Firm size
ROA
0.003**
(0.049)

Leverage
Growth
Independence
Year effect
Industry effect
No. of Obs.
R-squared
F-value

No
No
3416
0.139
124.73***

Yes
Yes
3416
0.190
19.01***

Yes
Yes
3416
0.208
21.25***

(4)
0.643***
(0.000)
-0.006**
(0.050)
-0.082***
(0.000)
0.021*
(0.094)
-0.100***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003**
(0.025)
-0.006
(0.104)
-0.004
(0.907)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.269
20.27***

(5)
0.072***
(0.000)
0.007***
(0.001)
-0.049***
(0.000)

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
(6)
(7)
0.073***
0.050***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.007***
0.007***
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.081***
-0.070***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.036***
0.034***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.004
(0.929)

0.052***
(0.000)

No
No
6083
0.090
160.24***

Yes
Yes
6083
0.143
27.91***

Yes
Yes
6083
0.199
27.43***

(8)
0.304***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.000)
-0.055***
(0.000)
0.026***
(0.006)
-0.024
(0.538)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.057***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.598)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.251
26.77***
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Overall, the results in Table 2.4 confirm H1a and H1b. That is, manager political connection
is negatively related to firm tunneling in private firms, but is positively related to tunneling in
SOEs. Private firms seek political connections to protect themselves from disadvantage in the
competition for resources while they have less responsibility to fulfill social goals. Manager
political connection in SOEs is a tool for their parent corporations to obtain feedback and for
the government to fulfill social goals.

The coefficients of control variables are generally in line with my expectations. Tunnelling
by controlling shareholders has been significantly reduced since the completion of NTS
reform, indicating a better alignment between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders after the NTS reform. Large firms (Firm size), better performing (ROA), high
growth (Growth) and manager equity ownership (Mg shares) have less tunneling. However,
firm leverage (Leverage) is positively and significantly related to tunneling. This result
contradicts the prediction by Friedman et al. (2003), who argue that debt may act as a
commitment by controlling shareholders to prop up the firms when needed. Consistent with
some existing studies (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002), I find a strong positive
link between controlling shareholder’s excess control rights and tunneling.

2.5.2 Impact of the type and level of political connection on tunneling

So far I classify political connection into official-type and CPC/CPPCC-type, at either local
or central hierarchy. In fact a firm’s political connection can be both official-type and
CPC/CPPCC-type (Dual-type), because a CEO may be official-type connected and a
chairman may be CPC/CPPCC-type connected in a firm, or vice versa. I expect that firms
with managers who have different type of political connections have different incentive for
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tunneling. The test results are reported in Table 2.5. As in Table 2.4, I run a set of regressions
for private firms and SOEs, respectively.

I first analyze the results for private firms. Column (1) of Table 2.5 contains only private
firms with managers who have official-type political connection and private firms without
politically connected managers. The coefficient of either Local official PC or Central official
PC is positive but insignificant, which indicates that official-type political connection has no
significant impact on tunneling in private firms. Column (2) contains only private firms with
managers who have CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and private firmswithout
politically connected managers. Both of the coefficients of Local CPC/CPPCC and Central
CPC/CPPCC are negative and significant, which indicates that this type of political
connection significantly reduces firm tunneling. The coefficient of Central CPC/CPPCC is
much larger than Local CPC/CPPCC (-0.012 vs. -0.006), which suggests that the higher the
level of CPC/CPPCC-type connections, the greater the impact it has in reducing firm
tunneling.

Column (3) of Table 2.5 contains only private firms with Dual-type political connections and
private firms without political connected managers. Both of the coefficients of Local dual PC
and Central dual PC are insignificant. This is not surprising since official-type and
CPC/CPPCC-type connections have an opposite impact on tunneling and offset each other.
However, both of these two coefficients are negative, the same sign as those of Local
CPC/CPPCC and Central CPC/CPPCC, which suggests that in private firms, CPC/CPPCCtype political connections have a greater impact on tunneling than official-type political
connections. This can be confirmed by the results in Table 2.4, where overall manager
political connection has a significantly negative impact on tunneling in private firms. Column

71

(4) contains all the private firms. The sign and significance of the coefficient of each of these
six types of political connections generally confirms those in columns (1) to (3), with the
exception of Central dual PC, which becomes significant in the full sub-sample regression.

Columns (5) to (8) report the results for SOEs. The results show that manager official-type
political connection significantly increases tunnelling, and this positive impact is significantly
greater if the connection is at the central level than at the local level (0.024 vs. 0.009 in
column (5) and 0.023 vs. 0.008 in column (8), all significant at the 1% level). The coefficient
of Central CPC/CPPCC is -0.004 and is significant at the 5% level, which indicates that
manager CPC/CPPCC-type political connection at the central level significantly reduces
tunnelling at SOEs, while CPC/CPPCC-type political connection at the local level has a
negative but insignificant impact on tunnelling in SOEs.

Overall, the regression results in Table 2.5 partially confirm H2a and H2b. Manager officialtype political connection has a positive impact on tunneling, but this positive impact is
significant only in SOEs. Manager CPC/CPPCC-type political connection has a negative
impact on tunneling, but this negative impact is more significant in private firms than in
SOEs. With both types of political connections, those at the central level are more influential
than those at the local level, with respect to their impact on firm tunneling. Managers with
official-type political connection have an incentive to seek rent because they are can bring
benefit to the firms. They also expect political promotion by satisfying governmental
requirements. Managers with CPC/CPPCC-type political connection cannot bring direct
benefits to the firms, but they have the incentive and ability to protect the firm from adverse
events such as tunnelling. The incentive for managers with a central level of connection is
higher than for managers with local levels of connection.
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Table 2.5 Impact of manager political connection type and connection level on firm tunneling behavior
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of different types of manager political connections on firm tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key
independent variables are three types of political connections, namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Both PC. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for private firms and columns (5) to (8) report
the results for SOEs. Columns (1) and (5) contain only those firms with managers who have official-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (2) and (6)
contain only those firms with managers who have CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (3) and (7) contain only those firms with managers
who have both official-type and CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (4) and (8) contain all private firms and all SOEs, respectively. The
definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Tunneling

Constant
Local official PC
Central official PC

Official PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(1)
0.745***
(0.000)
0.003
(0.643)
0.016
(0.380)

Local CPC/CPPCC
Central CPC/CPPCC

Private firms
CPC/CPPCC firms
Dual PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(2)
(3)
0.617***
0.743***
(0.000)
(0.000)

-0.006**
(0.043)
-0.012***
(0.005)

Local dual PC
Central dual PC
Reform
Wedge
Mg shares
Firm size
ROA
Leverage

-0.083***
(0.000)
0.056**
(0.020)
-0.119***
(0.000)
-0.030***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002*

-0.083***
(0.000)
0.023*
(0.097)
-0.098***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002**

-0.014
(0.181)
-0.001
(0.964)
-0.082***
(0.000)
0.032*
(0.081)
-0.112***
(0.000)
-0.031***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002*

All private firms
(4)
0.659***
(0.000)
0.005
(0.406)
0.020
(0.250)
-0.008**
(0.026)
-0.011***
(0.005)
-0.013
(0.217)
-0.015*
(0.098)
-0.046***
(0.000)
0.017
(0.165)
-0.104***
(0.000)
-0.026***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003**

Official PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(5)
0.306***
(0.000)
0.009***
(0.001)
0.024***
(0.000)

-0.058***
(0.000)
0.024**
(0.019)
-0.042
(0.271)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.007)
0.053***

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
CPC/CPPCC firms
Dual PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(6)
(7)
0.288***
0.289***
(0.000)
(0.000)

-0.003
(0.511)
-0.004**
(0.046)

-0.048***
(0.000)
0.022**
(0.028)
-0.057**
(0.023)
-0.011***
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.001)
0.054***

0.011**
(0.022)
0.021**
(0.011)
-0.052***
(0.000)
0.024**
(0.028)
-0.082***
(0.001)
-0.011***
(0.000)
-0.014***
(0.000)
0.052***

All SOEs
(8)
0.302***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.572)
-0.004*
(0.057)
0.010*
(0.064)
0.021**
(0.011)
-0.055***
(0.000)
0.026***
(0.006)
-0.018
(0.631)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.056***
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Growth
Independence
Year effect
Industry effect
No. of Obs.
R-squared
F-value

(0.052)
-0.008**
(0.047)
-0.002
(0.961)
Yes
Yes
2450
0.283
18.04***

(0.027)
-0.007*
(0.060)
0.007
(0.857)
Yes
Yes
3013
0.279
17.53***

(0.066)
-0.009**
(0.021)
0.001
(0.977)
Yes
Yes
2281
0.287
16.22***

(0.023)
-0.008**
(0.021)
-0.014
(0.714)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.251
16.92***

(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.019
(0.259)
Yes
Yes
5394
0.255
23.29***

(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.023
(0.214)
Yes
Yes
4442
0.242
18.94***

(0.000)
-0.008***
(0.000)
0.028
(0.204)
Yes
Yes
4127
0.238
19.10***

(0.000)
-0.008***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.636)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.254
22.83***
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2.5.3 Impact of founder-manager and the interactive impact between political
connection and founder-manager on tunnelling

Based on my earlier analysis in Section 2.3.2.3, I next examine the effect of foundermanagers and the interactive effect of founder-managers with political connection on firm
tunneling.

Table 2.6 reports the results of regression of tunneling on firm founder status and its
intertwining with either Official-type, CPC/CPPCC-type, or Dual-type political connection.
The sample of firms in each column in Table 2.6 is defined the same as equivalent columns in
Table 2.5, as shown by the title of each column.

On the left side, regarding private firms, the coefficients of the stand-alone variables of
Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC are consistent with those in Table 2.5, that is, only
CPC/CPPCC-type political connection has a significantly negative impact on tunneling. In
every column the coefficient of Founder is negative and significant at the 1% level, which
confirms my expectation that private firms with founder-managers have significantly less
tunneling than those without. The coefficients of the interactions between the type of political
connection and founder-manager are all negative. These results indicate that when a firm has
a politically connected manager who is also a founder, there is less tunnelling than in those
firms with politically connected but non-founder managers, regardless of the type of political
connection.

However, of these three interactions, only the coefficient of CPC/CPPCC*Founder is
significant. The results in columns (4) and (5) of all private firms are consistent with those in
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columns (1) to (3), and support my expectation that the CPC/CPPCC-type of political
connection is the main driver of the overall impact of political connection on tunneling in
private firms.

On the right side, regarding SOEs, the coefficient of Founder is negative and significant at
the 5% level in every column, which indicates that SOEs with a founder-manager have
significantly less tunnelling than those without. The coefficients of the stand-alone variables
of Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC also confirm the results in Table 2.5. The
coefficients of all three interactions between the type of political connection and foundermanager are negative, but only Official PC*Founder is insignificant, which indicates that
founder-managers do not significantly reduce tunnelling in those SOEs that have official-type
political connection, because official-type political connection leads to significant tunneling
in SOEs. Of particular interest is the interaction term Dual PC*Founder.

The coefficient of the stand-alone variable Dual PC is positive and significant, thus the
negative and significant coefficient of Dual PC*Founder suggests that founder-managers
have a strong reductive impact on tunnelling in SOEs.
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Table 2.6 Interactive impact of manager political connection type and founder status on firm tunneling behavior
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of manager political connections type, founder status, and interaction between political connection type and founder status on firm
tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key independent variables are three types of political connections (namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC), Founder,
and interactions between Political connection and Founder. Columns (1) to (5) report the results for private firms and columns (6) to (10) report the results for SOEs. Columns (1) and (6)
contain only those firms with managers who have official-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (2) and (7) contain only those firms with managers who
have CPC/CPPCC-type political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (3) and (8) contain only those firms with managers who have both official-type and CPC/CPPCCtype political connection and firms without connected managers. Columns (4) and (5) and columns (9) and (10) contain all private firms and all SOEs, respectively. The definitions of all
variables are reported in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Dependent variable: Tunneling

Constant
Political connection
(PC)
Official PC

Official PC vs.
Non-PC
(1)
0.730***
(0.000)
<0.001
(0.953)

CPC/CPPCC

CPC/CPPCC vs.
Non-PC
(2)
0.604***
(0.000)

-0.013***
(0.004)

Dual PC
Founder

-0.023***
(0.000)

-0.023***
(0.000)

Private firms
Dual PC vs.
Non-PC
(3)
0.721***
(0.000)

-0.012
(0.243)
-0.022***
(0.000)

PC * Founder
Official PC *Founder

-0.021
(0.139)

CPC/CPPCC*Founder

-0.021***
(0.000)

Dual PC * Founder
Reform
Wedge

-0.081***
(0.000)
0.059**

-0.080***
(0.000)
0.017

<-0.001
(0.994)
-0.079***
(0.000)
0.037

All private firms

All private firms

(4)
0.625***
(0.000)
-0.009**
(0.038)

(5)
0.619***
(0.000)

-0.024***
(0.000)
-0.016***
(0.006)

-0.079***
(0.000)
0.025

Official PC vs.
Non-PC
(6)
0.304***
(0.000)

<0.001
(0.943)
-0.014***
(0.003)
-0.013
(0.192)
-0.025***
(0.000)

0.011***
(0.000)

-0.021
(0.119)
-0.021***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.961)
-0.078***
(0.000)
0.026

<-0.001
(0.985)

-0.005**
(0.047)

-0.058***
(0.000)
0.024**

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
CPC/CPPCC vs.
Dual PC vs.
All SOEs
Non-PC
Non-PC
(7)
(8)
(9)
0.289***
0.288***
0.303***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.009***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.414)
-0.005**
(0.023)

-0.008*
(0.072)
-0.048***
(0.000)
0.022**

0.015**
(0.039)
-0.005**
(0.033)

-0.018*
(0.058)
-0.052***
(0.000)
0.025**

-0.005**
(0.042)
-0.002
(0.564)

-0.055***
(0.000)
0.027***

All SOEs
(10)
0.301***
(0.000)
0.011***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.541)
0.016**
(0.029)
-0.005**
(0.041)
<-0.001
(0.949)
-0.008*
(0.097)
-0.016*
(0.073)
-0.055***
(0.000)
0.026***
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Mg shares
Firm size
ROA
Leverage
Growth
Independence
Year effect
Industry effect
No. of Obs.
R-squared
F-value

(0.014)
-0.084***
(0.000)
-0.029***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002*
(0.052)
-0.008**
(0.045)
0.005
(0.908)
Yes
Yes
2450
0.287
18.13***

(0.375)
-0.072***
(0.000)
-0.024***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.027)
-0.007*
(0.060)
0.010
(0.797)
Yes
Yes
3013
0.284
17.79***

(0.127)
-0.077***
(0.000)
-0.030***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002*
(0.063)
-0.009**
(0.019)
0.004
(0.932)
Yes
Yes
2281
0.292
16.58***

(0.171)
-0.072***
(0.000)
-0.024***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.025)
-0.006*
(0.098)
<0.001
(0.989)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.274
19.98***

(0.159)
-0.072***
(0.000)
-0.024***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003**
(0.024)
-0.006
(0.101)
-0.002
(0.965)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.275
17.96***

(0.020)
-0.029
(0.465)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.007)
0.053***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.019
(0.276)
Yes
Yes
5394
0.254
22.42***

(0.031)
-0.047*
(0.069)
-0.011***
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.001)
0.054***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.024
(0.187)
Yes
Yes
4442
0.242
18.28***

(0.019)
-0.068***
(0.010)
-0.011***
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.000)
0.052***
(0.000)
-0.008***
(0.000)
0.028
(0.185)
Yes
Yes
4127
0.238
18.29***

(0.004)
-0.009
(0.824)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.056***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.603)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.252
24.95***

(0.006)
-0.006
(0.868)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.056***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.628)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.253
22.00***
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Table 2.7 reports the results of regression of tunneling on manager’s founder status and its
intertwining with either local level or central level political connection.

Columns (1) to (3)

report the regression results for private firms and columns (4) to (6) report the results for
SOEs.

The coefficient of Central PC is negative and significant in columns (1) to (3), but the
coefficient of Local PC is insignificant. In columns (4) to (6), although all the coefficients of
Central PC and Local PC are positive and significant at the 1% level, the former are about
double the magnitude for the latter. These results confirm the results in Table 2.5 where
manager political connections at the central level have a greater impact on tunneling than
connections at the local level. For both private firms and SOEs, the coefficient of the standalone variable Founder and the coefficient of the interaction term Central PC*Founder are
negative and significant, while the coefficient of Local PC*Founder is insignificant. These
results indicate that the negative relation between founder-manager and tunneling is stronger
in firms with centrally connected managers than in firms with locally connected managers
only.

Thus, the results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 confirm H3 that, for both private firms and SOEs,
those firms with founder-managers have significantly less tunneling than those without. The
negative effects of founder-managers on tunneling are also observed in politically connected
firms. Founder managers have a special incentive to maintain the firm’s long term
development and survival. The tradeoff between interest and effort is greater from a founder
manager’s perspective than from a politically connected manager’s perspective.
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Table 2.7 Interactive impact of manager political connection level and founder status on firm tunneling behavior
This table presents OLS regression results of the impacts of manager political connections level, founder status, and interaction between political connection level and founder status on firm
tunneling behavior. The dependent variable is Tunneling and the key independent variables are two levels of political connections (namely Local PC and Central PC), Founder, and interactions
between Political connection and Founder. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for private firms and columns (4) to (6) report the results for SOEs. Columns (1) and (4) test the stand-alone
impacts of Political connection level on tunneling. Columns (2) and (5) include the interaction terms between Political connection level and Founder. Columns (3) and (6) also include the standalone Founder variable. The definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Constant
Local PC
Central PC

(1)
0.641***
(0.000)
-0.004
(0.246)
-0.009**
(0.035)

Private firms
(2)
0.640***
(0.000)
<0.001
(0.981)
-0.013**
(0.032)

-0.082***
(0.000)
0.020
(0.269)
-0.101***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003**
(0.025)
-0.006*
(0.100)
-0.003
(0.924)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.269
19.51***

0.008
(0.293)
-0.011**
(0.015)
-0.081***
(0.000)
0.023
(0.213)
-0.096***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003**
(0.024)
-0.006*
(0.096)
-0.005
(0.886)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.270
18.41***

Founder
Local PC*Founder
Central PC*Founder
Reform
Wedge
Mg shares
Firm size
ROA
Leverage
Growth
Independence
Year effect
Industry effect
No. of Obs.
R-squared
F-value

(3)
0.624***
(0.000)
-0.005
(0.281)
-0.017***
(0.003)
-0.023***
(0.000)
-0.009
(0.145)
-0.029***
(0.000)
-0.079***
(0.000)
0.026
(0.153)
-0.072***
(0.000)
-0.024***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003**
(0.024)
-0.006*
(0.095)
-0.002
(0.949)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.274
18.63***

(4)
0.305***
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.001)

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
(5)
0.304***
(0.000)
0.007***
(0.003)
0.014***
(0.000)

-0.055***
(0.000)
0.026***
(0.006)
-0.026
(0.492)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.057***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.010
(0.593)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.251
25.86***

-0.006
(0.160)
-0.012***
(0.009)
-0.055***
(0.000)
0.027***
(0.005)
-0.021
(0.589)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.057***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.617)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.251
24.16***

(6)
0.304***
(0.000)
0.007***
(0.006)
0.014***
(0.000)
-0.005**
(0.043)
-0.001
(0.799)
-0.007*
(0.085)
-0.055***
(0.000)
0.027***
(0.004)
-0.010
(0.803)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.008)
0.056***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.001
(0.792)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.252
23.39***
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2.5.4 Difference between the chairman’s and the CEO’s political connection on
tunneling

I hypothesize in Section 2.3.3.4 that the chairman’s political connection is more influential on
firm tunneling than the CEO’s political connection, and in this section I formally test this
hypothesis. The results for private firms are reported in columns (1) to (3) and the results for
SOEs are reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table 2.8.

The sample in Column (1) of Table 8 contains private firms where the chairman is politically
connected (regardless of the type of connection) and private firms without political
connection. The sample in Column (2) contains private firms where the CEO is politically
connected and private firms without political connection. In 735 of the 3416 private firms the
chairman and CEO is the same person. Thus, as general practice, I introduce a new control
variable Duality which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the chairman and the
CEO is the same person. The coefficient of Chair PC in column (1) is negative and
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of CEO PC in column (2) is positive but
insignificant. The results in column (3), which contains all private firms, are consistent with
those in columns (1) and (2).

Recall the results in Table 2.4 where the chairman’s and CEO’s political connections are
aggregated into a single variable Political connection; the coefficient of Political connection
in column (4) in Table 2.4 is negative and significant. Thus, I can conclude that for private
firms, the overall impact of manager political connection on tunneling is negative and almost
certainly driven by the chairman’s political connection because the CEO’s political
connection has an opposite (although insignificant) impact.
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The samples in columns (4) to (6) are similarly designed as those in columns (1) to (3)
respectively, except that private firms are replaced by SOEs. The coefficient of Chair PC in
column (4) and (6) is positive and significant at the 1% level, but the coefficient of CEO PC
is negative but insignificant. In Table 2.4 the coefficient of Political connection is positive
and significant for SOEs, so for SOEs, the overall impact of manager political connection on
tunneling is also almost certainly driven by the chairman’s political connection.

Thus, the results in Table 2.8 support H4 that, for private firms and SOEs, the chairman’s
political connection is more influential than the CEO’s political connection, with respect to
their impacts on firm tunneling. In the Chinese context, chairmen are not only (the
representatives) controlling shareholders, they are also involved in routine decision making,
so the chairmen, not CEOs, are the top executives and wield the most power.

2.6 Robustness checks

The preceding analyses provide evidence on the relation between manager political
connection and firm tunneling. There is a potential endogeneity problem particularly for
firms with severe tunneling, because they are more likely to appoint politically connected
managers to mitigate the adverse impact of tunneling on firm performance and stock market
reactions. In this section, I address the potential endogeneity concern and then test the
sensitivity of my results with alternative model specifications.
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Table 2.8 Different impact of the chairman’s political connection and the CEO’s political connection on firm tunneling behavior
This table presents OLS regression results of the different impacts of the Chairman’s political connection and the CEO’s political connection on firm tunneling behavior. The dependent
variable is Tunneling and the key independent variables are Chair PC and CEO PC. Chair PC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman has political connection. CEO PC is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the CEO has political connection. The definitions of all other variables are reported in Table 1. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for private firms and columns (4) to
(6) report the results for SOEs. P-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Tunneling

Constant
Chair PC

Chair PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(1)
0.630***
(0.000)
-0.008**
(0.015)

CEO PC
Duality
Reform
Wedge
Mg shares
Firm size
ROA
Leverage
Growth
Independence
Year effect
Industry effect
No. of Obs.
R-squared
F-value

-0.005
(0.250)
-0.080***
(0.000)
0.021
(0.253)
-0.096***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.025)
-0.006
(0.112)
0.001
(0.985)
Yes
Yes
3282
0.267
18.54***

Private firms
CEO PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(2)
0.701***
(0.000)
0.006
(0.155)
-0.005
(0.272)
-0.080***
(0.000)
0.028
(0.215)
-0.090***
(0.000)
-0.028***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.037)
-0.006
(0.136)
0.009
(0.824)
Yes
Yes
2721
0.281
18.56***

All private firms
(3)
0.642***
(0.000)
-0.007**
(0.038)
0.002
(0.707)
-0.005
(0.257)
-0.082***
(0.000)
0.021
(0.241)
-0.094***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003**
(0.025)
-0.006
(0.103)
-0.001
(0.975)
Yes
Yes
3416
0.270
18.92***

Chair PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(4)
0.295***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.000)
0.006*
(0.091)
-0.056***
(0.000)
0.028***
(0.004)
-0.077***
(0.002)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.056***
(0.000)
-0.008***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.611)
Yes
Yes
5867
0.252
24.91***

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
CEO PC firms
vs. Non-PC firms
(5)
0.280***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.422)
0.009**
(0.014)
-0.053***
(0.000)
0.023**
(0.023)
-0.052
(0.189)
-0.011***
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.046***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.002
(0.917)
Yes
Yes
4776
0.240
20.86***

All SOEs
(6)
0.300***
(0.000)
0.009***
(0.000)
-0.004
(0.141)
0.007*
(0.063)
-0.055***
(0.000)
0.026***
(0.006)
-0.033
(0.409)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.056***
(0.000)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.008
(0.690)
Yes
Yes
6083
0.252
24.86***
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2.6.1 Endogeneity of political connection

One general practice used to solve the endogeneity problem is the instrumental variable (IV)
approach. An appropriate IV needs to satisfy two conditions. First, the IV needs to be
exogenous in the main regressions, and second the IV must be correlated to the endogenous
variable, conditional on other covariates. I use three IVs in this study; the first IV is the
registered unemployment rate (Unemployment) in the province where a firm is headquartered,
the second IV is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (Log GDP) in the province where a
firm is headquartered, and the third IV is the ratio of total domestic deposits in financial
institutions to total GDP (Savings ratio) in the province where a firm is headquartered. These
IVs are obtained directly from the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China
(NBSC) or calculated based on the data from the NBSC.

All these three IVs are related to the availability of capital, in that it is easier for a firm to
obtain external financing if it is located in regions with a lower unemployment rate, higher
GDP per capita, and a higher savings to GDP ratio. Thus, firms in these regions have fewer
incentives to establish political connection. Furthermore, governments (the controlling
shareholders of SOEs) in these regions have less political and social pressure (e.g., redundant
workers and social unrest) to intervene into the operations of SOEs by appointing politically
connected managers. I, however, do not expect these three IVs to have a significant impact on
firm tunneling. 12 Thus, all these three IVs satisfy the two conditions for an appropriate IV.

12

In unreported results, I run regressions of firm tunneling on these three IVs. After controlling for other factors,

none of these three IVs has significant impact on tunneling, either in private firms or in SOEs.
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I use the regressions in Table 2.6 as examples for this robustness test and the results are
arranged in Table 2.9. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) model is applied. In the first stage,
I run probit regressions of manager political connection type on these three IVs. All the
control variables used in the main regressions in Table 2.6 are also included in the first stage.
In the second stage the predicted values from the first stage are used as the key independent
variable, as well as other control variables. In Table 2.9, columns (1) to (3) and columns (5)
to (7) report the results of the first stage for private firms and SOEs, respectively. Columns (4)
and (8) report the results of the second stage for private firms and SOEs, respectively.

In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variables are dummies of Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and
Dual PC. It can be seen from the negative and significant coefficients, that Unemployment,
Log GDP, and Savings ratio impact the probability of a firm establishing political connection,
which satisfies the IV selection criteria. In column (4), the dependent variable is Tunneling
and the key independent variables, namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC, are the
predicted values (labeled “instrumented”) from the first stage regressions. If I compare the
results in column (4) with the corresponding results in column (5) in Table 2.6, it is obvious
that the coefficients are of the same sign but are either larger or more significant than those in
Table 2.6. For example, the coefficient of CPC/CPPCC in column (4) in Table 2.9 is -0.172,
while the coefficient of CPC/CPPCC in column (5) in Table 2.6 is -0.014. A similar
comparison can be made between the SOEs in Table 2.6 and the SOEs in Table 2.9. Thus,
the results from the 2SLS regressions confirm the results in Table 2.6.
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Table 2.9 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) analyses of impact of manager political connection type, founder status, and their interaction on firm tunneling behavior
This table presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) regressions of the impacts of manager political connection type, founder status, and their
interaction on firm tunneling behavior. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for private firms and columns (5) to (8) report the results for SOEs. Columns (1) to (3) and columns (5) to (7) report
the results of the first stage, in which probit regressions are used. The dependent variables in the first-stage regressions are three types of political connections, namely Official PC, CPC/CPPCC,
and Dual PC. Columns (4) and (8) report the results of the second stage, in which OLS regressions are used. The dependent variable in the second-stage regressions is Tunneling. I use three
instrumental variables (IVs) in the first stage. These IVs are Unemployment, Log GDP, and Savings ratio. The definitions of these three IVs and of all other variables are reported in Table 1. Pvalues based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using White (1980) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Constant
Official PC
(Instrumented)
CPC/CPPCC
(Instrumented)
Dual PC
(Instrumented)

Official PC
(1)
-0.390
(0.690)

Private firms
1st stage
Dependent variables
CPC/CPPCC
Dual PC
(2)
(3)
-5.445***
-4.204***
(0.000)
(0.000)

0.238***
(0.000)
-0.326***
(0.000)
0.779***
(0.001)
-0.131
(0.235)
0.091
(0.809)

-0.232***
(0.000)
-0.133**
(0.021)
-0.132
(0.468)
0.261***
(0.003)
1.052***
(0.000)

Founder
Official PC * Founder
(Instrumented)
CPC/CPPCC * Founder
(Instrumented)
Dual PC * Founder
(Instrumented)
Unemployment
Log GDP
Savings ratio
Reform
Wedge

-0.085
(0.182)
-0.221**
(0.014)
0.138***
(0.002)
-0.039
(0.774)
0.983**
(0.046)

Official PC
(5)
-4.059***
(0.000)

State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
1st stage
Dependent variables
CPC/CPPCC
Dual PC
(6)
(7)
0.729
-2.743***
(0.279)
(0.000)

0.110***
(0.000)
0.173***
(0.000)
0.186
(0.121)
-0.011
(0.852)
1.711***
(0.000)

-0.190***
(0.000)
-0.201***
(0.000)
-0.439***
(0.007)
0.016
(0.842)
0.208
(0.511)

2nd stage
Tunneling
(4)
0.727***
(0.000)
0.046*
(0.064)
-0.172***
(0.006)
-0.131**
(0.038)
-0.096***
(0.000)
-0.290***
(0.006)
-0.244***
(0.000)
-0.321*
(0.068)

-0.076***
(0.000)
0.013
(0.509)

0.085**
(0.045)
-0.174***
(0.007)
0.170
(0.423)
0.017
(0.877)
1.542***
(0.005)

2nd stage
Tunneling
(8)
0.302***
(0.000)
0.108***
(0.000)
-0.004
(0.870)
0.107**
(0.042)
-0.039***
(0.009)
0.023**
(0.035)
-0.051*
(0.063)
0.158**
(0.048)

-0.055***
(0.000)
0.027***
(0.006)
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Mg shares
Firm size
ROA
Leverage
Growth
Independence
Year effect
Industry effect
No. of Obs.
Wald Chi2
Pseudo R squared
Log pseudo likelihood
R-squared
F-value

-1.568*
(0.071)
0.025
(0.432)
-0.006
(0.813)
-0.077**
(0.029)
-0.002
(0.971)
0.175
(0.761)
Yes
Yes
3416
100.08***
0.054
-926.600

0.929***
(0.001)
0.342***
(0.000)
-0.034
(0.522)
-0.153
(0.145)
0.003
(0.936)
0.591
(0.215)
Yes
Yes
3416
320.98***
0.094
-1733.162

1.080
(0.141)
0.203***
(0.000)
0.022**
(0.036)
-0.180**
(0.041)
0.023
(0.599)
-1.714*
(0.071)
Yes
Yes
3416
47.43***
0.051
-477.534

-0.118***
(0.000)
-0.029***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.002**
(0.043)
-0.005
(0.106)
-0.037
(0.336)
Yes
Yes
3416

0.286
19.37***

-9.940**
(0.049)
0.042**
(0.012)
-0.042
(0.174)
-0.021
(0.698)
-0.015
(0.631)
0.682*
(0.058)
Yes
Yes
6083
183.22***
0.030
-3244.636

2.107
(0.112)
0.052**
(0.017)
0.022
(0.405)
-0.025
(0.776)
<-0.001
(0.997)
-0.787
(0.104)
Yes
Yes
6083
38.74***
0.015
-1706.715

-19.132***
(0.001)
0.129***
(0.000)
0.002
(0.821)
-0.036
(0.690)
-0.015
(0.797)
-1.656**
(0.031)
Yes
Yes
6083
80.31***
0.031
-809.206

-0.023
(0.696)
-0.012***
(0.000)
-0.006***
(0.009)
0.056***
(0.000)
-0.008***
(0.000)
0.006
(0.761)
Yes
Yes
6083

0.253
22.31***
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I argue that political connection has different impacts in private firms and SOEs. Therefore,
the potential endogeneity problems could be also different in these two types of firms.
Specifically, for private firms, managers establish CPC/CPPCC-type connection if their firms
perform well, indicating these firms have less severe tunneling. While for SOEs,
governments appoint politically connected managers to mitigate adverse impact of tunneling
on firm performance and stock market reactions. I therefore use the propensity score
matching (PSM) approach to address such an endogeneity concern. In untabulated results, the
impacts of Official PC, CPC/CPPCC, and Dual PC are largely consistent with those reported
in Table 2.5. Manager CPC/CPPCC-type connection (central and local combined) has a
negative and significant impact on tunneling in private firms (coef. = -0.009, p = 0.042) and
manager official-type connection (central and local combined) has a positive and significant
impact on tunneling in SOEs (coef. = 0.014, p = 0.000).

2.6.2 Alternative regression specifications

In the main analyses the divergence (Wedge) between the controlling shareholder’s control
rights and cash flow rights is a continuous variable measured by the difference. As a
robustness test, I replace this continuous variable with a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if a divergence exists and zero otherwise. my main results remain unchanged with this
alternative definition. Literature finds that institutional development is an important factor
that affects controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior, so to control for the variations in
institutional development in different regions I add a dummy variable for each province
where a firm is headquartered. Again, the main results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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2.7 Conclusions

To fill a gap in the literature, I investigate whether and how managers’ political connection
status and founder status affect firm tunneling behaviour, using a sample of 9499 firm-year
observations of publicly listed firms over the period of 2004–2010. I find that both manager
political connection and founder status have a significant impact on firm’s tunneling behavior.
For private firms overall manager political connection is negatively related to firm tunneling.
This negative relation is almost entirely driven by manager’s CPC/CPPCC-type political
connection, and this negative relation is stronger for political connections at the central level
than at the local levels. In contrast, for SOEs, overall manager political connection is
positively related to firm tunneling. This positive relation is almost entirely driven by
manager’s official-type connection, and this positive relation is greater for political
connections at the central level than at the local levels.

These results indicate that manager political connection in private firms is more likely to
compete for resources and protect firms from adverse events. Manager political connection in
SOEs is more likely to be formed to fulfill the social goals of governments. Official-type
connected managers may have a rent seeking incentive, while CPC/CPPCC-type connected
managers are better able to prevent firms from tunneling. The motivation and capabilities are
more powerful if the political connection is at the central level.

I also find that for both private firms and SOEs, firms with founder-managers have more
resistance to tunneling than those without because founder-managers have higher monetary
interests than non-founder-managers, and the interest and effort required for a tradeoff is
greater from a founder-manager’s perspective than from a politically connected manager’s
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perspective. Therefore, if a politically connected manager is also a founder, the possibility of
tunneling due to political connection, if it exists, is also reduced. The incentive for a
politically connected founder-manager to tunnel is weaker than a politically connected nonfounder-manager.

Finally, I test the impact of the chairman’s and the CEO’s political connection on firm
tunneling. I generate evidence that the chairman’s political connection has a significantly
greater impact on tunneling than the CEO’s political connection. Thus the results support the
notion that the chairman, rather than the CEO, is the top executive in Chinese firms. This
finding may have important implications for research regarding the behavior of top
executives in the Chinese context.
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Chapter Three Cost of borrowing in family firms:
The role of corporate opacity

3.1 Introduction

In recent years a small but growing body of literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Ellul et al.,
2007; Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011) has explored the impact of family
ownership on the shareholder-debtholder agency problem. Empirical evidence has been
inconclusive so far. In particular, one question remains largely unaddressed. Are family firms,
at least within a country, heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder-debtholder agency
conflict and hence the cost of debt?

Many existing studies seem to assume that family owners are a homogeneous group of
blockholders, so that they have similar characteristics of agency issues. Yet this assumption
ignores some other studies documenting different incentives among family firms and how
these differences affect the agency conflicts between family blockholders and outside
investors (e.g., Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Chen et al., 2014; Lins et al., 2013).
Therefore, it is sensible to examine the firm-level difference in shareholder-debtholder
agency conflicts among family firms.

In this chapter, I focus on one firm-level factor that is well-known to be associated with
agency conflicts and yet largely ignored in the examination of the impact of family ownership
on the cost of debt. This particular factor is corporate information opacity, which plays a
central role both in determining the extent of agency conflicts between shareholders,
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managers, and creditors and in designing the mechanisms to mitigate them (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Bushman et al., 2004).

Controlling families' large undiversified equity positions provide them with greater incentives
and abilities for both monitoring and expropriating (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997; Burkart et al., 2003). This can lead to either positive or negative impact of
family control on a firm's cost of debt, depending on whether family owners’ entrenchment
incentive dominates their alignment incentive. However, controlling families' incentive per se
is not directly observable.

Opaque corporate information leads outside investors to perceive that controlling
shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors, compared to when information
is more transparent (Fan and Wong, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2004; Francis et al.,
2005b; Anderson et al., 2009). Wang (2006) argues that greater information asymmetry
between controlling families and other investors is one source of entrenchment for the
controlling families. Thus, opaque information deters outside investors from investing in the
firms and increases the cost of external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984; La Porta et al.,
2000). In contrast, more transparent information restrains controlling families from
opportunistic behavior because when information is transparent their appropriation of private
benefits is more likely to be detected by outside investors. The analysis above thus implies
that as corporate information opacity increases, either the controlling families' positive
(entrenchment) effect on the cost of debt is intensified or the negative (alignment) effect is
weakened.
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In this chapter I examine how corporate information opacity affects the impact of family
control (i.e., the interactive impact of corporate opacity and family control) on the cost of
external debt financing, using a sample of 3320 firm-year observations of privately (i.e.,
nonstate) controlled but publicly listed firms in China between 2004 and 2010. I follow the
approach in Anderson et al. (2009) to measure corporate opacity with a comprehensive index
that consists of four components based on stock trading information and analyst coverage.
My univariate statistics and multivariate results show that family firms in China on average
pay a substantially lower cost of debt relative to nonfamily firms, which I attribute to the fact
that family firms overall are significantly less opaque than nonfamily firms.

My findings suggest that for controlling families in China as a whole, their alignment
incentives seem to dominate their entrenchment incentives. I further find that family control
reduces the cost of debt only in those firms with relatively less opaque information. In the full
sample the interaction between family ownership/control and corporate opacity is positive
and significant, which suggests that the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt
becomes weaker as corporate opacity increases. The results confirm my analysis that
corporate opacity plays a moderating role in the relationship between family control and the
cost of debt.

My research design allows us to dig even deeper into the drivers of the moderating role of
corporate opacity. One important feature of the institutional environment in China is the wide
regional disparity in economic development and institutional efficiency.

13

13

Such a cross-

For instance, in a 2006 report the World Bank surveys investment climate of 120 cities (and 12,400 firms)

across 30 provinces (i.e., all provinces excluding Tibet) in China and finds a wide cross-region variation in
investment climate. For example, per capita GDP in Southeast China averages more than 150% above Central
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region disparity in institutional environment allows us to examine whether and how the
moderating impact of corporate opacity is further influenced by external institutions, which
affect outside investors’ perception about controlling families’ incentives and capabilities to
engage in expropriation activities (La Porta et al., 2000; Ellul et al., 2007; Boubakri and
Ghouma, 2010). At the same time, because business laws, culture, and social norms are
basically the same across China; thus, compared to other multinational studies, my singlecountry setting enables us to better disentangle the impact of institutional efficiency from that
of other external country-level factors.

I conjecture that corporate opacity, as an indicator of controlling shareholder’s
alignment/entrenchment incentives, plays a greater moderating role in the relationship
between family control and the cost of debt when external institutions are relatively weaker.
The empirical evidence supports my expectation in that the interaction between family
ownership and corporate opacity is significant only for firms located in provinces with
weaker institutions. The finding is consistent with the notion that perceived expropriation by
controlling families, which is severer when external institutions are weaker (Claessens et al.,
2002; Lins et al., 2003), motivates creditors to demand more transparent information in order
for better monitoring, causing the impact of family control on the cost of debt to be more
sensitive to corporate opacity.

and Southwest China. Firms at the 10th percentile of cities spend an average 36 days per year in interacting with
major bureaucracies, compared to 87 days for firms at the bottom 10th percentile cities. Fan et al. (2011) largely
confirm the inequality in economic and market development as well as government efficiency at the province
level.
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In addition to external institutions, I also consider two other factors that the literature finds to
be related to the controlling shareholders’ alignment/entrenchment incentives. Prior studies
find that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate outsider investors
when the divergence of controlling shareholders' control rights from cash flow rights
(control-ownership wedge) is larger (Johnson et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Lin et al.,
2011) and for Chinese private firms when they are not politically connected (Ma et al., 2013).
I find that the negative impact of family control on debt cost is more likely to be weakened
with increasing corporate opacity when the controlling families' moral hazard of
expropriation is higher, i.e., when control-ownership wedge is higher and when a firm is not
politically connected.

My findings are robust to alternative measures of corporate opacity. Two alternative
measures are used in the robustness check. They are discretionary accruals and external
auditor identity (i.e., whether the external auditor is a large auditor), both of which are well
documented in the literature as plausible opacity measures (e.g., Francis et al., 2005;
Armstrong et al., 2010) and which the management of the firm initiate and have great control
over. My findings are also robust to controlling for the endogeneity concerns about family
ownership and the relationship between information disclosure and cost of capital (Nikolaev
and van Lent, 2005). I apply the instrumental variable (IV) approach and estimate two-stage
least squares regressions.

The IVs include Personal name, Multiple founders, Personal name*Opacity index, and
Multiple founders*Opacity index, where Personal name is a dummy variable indicating that
the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains at least part of the personal name(s) of the
founder(s) and Multiple founders is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has more than
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one founder (from different families). Prior studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2009; Fahlenbrach,
2009) find that both Personal name and Multiple founders are correlated to family ownership;
but no evidence suggests that they have an impact on a firm’s cost of debt. The results show
that my findings are not driven by the endogeneity of family control.

My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by examining the impact of
family control on debt costs, this study helps to enhance our understanding of an important
aspect of family firm behavior, debt financing. This is particularly relevant for the Chinese
market because existing studies focusing on Chinese family firms are limited (Cheng, 2014),
particularly in the field of the impact of family control on shareholder-debtholder conflict,
despite the importance of family firms to the overall Chinese economy. The implication from
this study that family owners should be viewed as a heterogeneous group of blockholders
with firm-level difference in the relative dominance of the alignment or entrenchment
incentive also contributes to the small but growing literature about family control on
shareholder-debtholder agency problems.

Second, I identify a channel through which family firms can directly benefit from a lower
cost of debt, and more importantly, unlike those country-level factors, corporate opacity can
be influenced by firm-level corporate governance. Anderson et al. (2003) find that family
firms pay lower costs of debt than nonfamily firms but they treat all family firms universally
and do not show how or when. Ellul et al. (2007), on the other hand, find that family firms
originating from countries with a high level of investor protection benefit from a lower cost
of debt than nonfamily firms. However, it is obvious that country-level legal institutions are
beyond the control of individual firms. I instead focus on firm-level corporate opacity, which
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is heavily influenced by internal corporate governance (Fan and Wong, 2002; Leuz et al.,
2003; Lang et al., 2004; Francis et al., 2005b; Wang, 2006; Anderson et al., 2009).

I provide clear evidence that family firms can benefit from a lower cost of debt by reducing
corporate opacity. I further show that corporate opacity plays a particularly important role in
reducing the cost of debt for family firms in an environment with weak external legal
institutions, which is exactly when family firms are more likely to suffer from a higher cost
of debt (Ellul et al., 2007). My study also provides important complementary evidence to
prior literature that mainly uses either U.S. or multinational data.

Third, I generate direct evidence that corporate opacity appears to be substantially more
important than some other factors examined by prior studies (e.g., control-ownership wedge,
external institutions, and a firm's political connection) in explaining the relationship between
family control and the cost of debt. This finding has important implications for family firms.
For example, family firms commonly use various control-enhancing mechanisms to exercise
effective control over firms with a relatively small equity ownership, which results in excess
control rights over cash flow rights, not only in developing countries but also in developed
countries such as the U.S. (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; villalonga and
Amit, 2009).

Prior studies find that wide control-ownership wedges would cause family firms to pay
higher costs of debt because of perceived high expropriating potential (Boubakri and Ghouma,
2010; Lin et al., 2011). But I find that, even with wide control-ownership wedges, family
firms can still benefit from lower costs of debt if corporate information is relatively less
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opaque. In other words, family firms do not have to sacrifice those important controlenhancing structures to benefit from lower costs of debt.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related literature and
presents my hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the sample and data. Section 3.4 reports the
main empirical results. Section 3.5 tests the robustness of the results to different opacity
measures and to various model specifications. Finally, Section 3.6 sets forth conclusion.

3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

The presence of a dominant and powerful family blockholder reshapes a firm's agency
problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000). The literature so far has provided
only limited direct theoretical analysis on how controlling families' unique positions and
incentives affect the firms' cost of debt. Furthermore, empirical evidence has been
inconclusive so far. In this section I first review some existing studies. I then rely on related
literature to develop my hypotheses on how corporate information opacity affects the
relationship between family ownership/control and the cost of debt.

3.2.1 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship between Family Ownership and Cost of
Debt

Anderson et al. (2003), using a sample of S&P 500 firms, find that family firms on average
pay 32 basis points lower than nonfamily firms on debt financing. The authors attribute
family firms’ lower debt cost to families’ interest in the firms’ long-term survival and the
families’ concern for their reputation, which give families strong incentives to alleviate
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agency conflict between large shareholders and debtholders. However, the conclusion in
Anderson et al. (2003) may not be automatically generalized to China for the following
reason.

The sample firms in Anderson et al. (2003) are based in the U.S., which is widely considered
as having one of the strongest investor protection and creditor rights; while China has a
considerably weaker institutional environment than the U.S. The literature (e.g., Claessens et
al., 2002; Lins et al., 2003) has found that the incentives and capabilities of controlling
shareholders in extracting private benefits of control largely depend on external investor
protection of the country in which a firm is located. Controlling families’ concentrated
ownership and dominant positions may give them both incentives and capabilities to abuse
their control and to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors (e.g., Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Johnson et al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2008); but on the other hand, families’
strong interest in the long-term survival of their firms motivates them to take a long-term and
low-risk approach (Anderson et al., 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Achleitner et al., 2014).

The analysis suggests that, compared to nonfamily blockholders, family ownership/control
can either exacerbate or alleviate the shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts and hence to
increase or reduce debt cost, depending on external institutions. Consistent with this view,
Ellul et al. (2007) find that family firms in high-investor-protection countries benefit from
lower debt cost but suffer from higher debt cost in low-investor-protection countries.

In this chapter I first perform an initial test to see if family firms still enjoy a lower cost of
debt relative to nonfamily firms in China, a country characterized by weak external
institutions. I then develop my hypotheses on the moderating role of firm-level corporate
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information on the relationship between family control and cost of debt. Finally, I
hypothesize and test how the moderating role of corporate information is further influenced
by controlling families’ moral hazard.

3.2.2 Hypothesis development
3.2.2.1 Corporate opacity and the relationship between family control and firms' cost of
debt

Economic theory suggests that the relationship between family control and a firm's cost of
debt can be affected by the relative opacity of the firm's information. It is well established
that accounting and financial information can be used to mitigate the agency conflicts
between shareholders, managers, and creditors (Smith and Warner, 1979; Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986; Bushman and Smith, 2001). With respect to external debt financing, the
literature suggests that corporate information plays two crucial roles in mitigating agency
conflicts between shareholders, managers, and creditors.

First, corporate information plays a formal and explicit role in the negotiation and setting of
debt contracts. Creditors often require the inclusion in debt contracts certain clauses and
covenants which are based on accounting and financial information supplied by the
borrowing firms (Smith and Warner, 1979; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Transparent
corporate information not only allows creditors to assess the borrowing firms' ability to repay
the debt, but also enables creditors and borrowing firms to design clauses and covenants of
debt contracts that alleviate potential conflicts between debt-contracting parties. In other
words, more efficient debt contracts are possible when borrowing firms are committed to a
more transparent information environment (Armstrong et al., 2010). Therefore, relatively
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transparent corporate information reduces lenders' demand for monitoring and the extent of
the bonding mechanism (e.g., clauses and covenants of debt contracts), which in turn lowers
the costs of debt.

With respect to the cost of debt for my sample of Chinese family firms, a second and possibly
more important role of corporate opacity is in informal debt contracting, specifically in
establishing the reputation of the controlling families and the working relationship between
borrowing firms and creditors. Although debt contracts between firms and creditors are
formal and explicit, informal contracts, which often comprise implicit multi-period
relationships, also play an important role in mitigating agency problems (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986; Armstrong et al., 2010).

The importance of informal debt contracts is even more significant in countries with weak
formal institutions, where legal enforcement of formal contracts is less effective and efficient
(Armstrong et al., 2010). Armstrong et al. (2010) suggest that informal debt contracts rely
more generally on borrowing firms' commitment to transparent information but less on the
effectiveness of the regulatory and legal system. Therefore, this implies that when family
firms have less commitment to transparent information (i.e., when corporate information is
relatively more opaque), the costs of informal debt contracting (e.g., negotiation, design,
monitoring, and enforcement) are higher, compared to when corporate information is less
opaque. Consequently, the costs of debt also increase as corporate opacity increases.

Taken together, the abovementioned analysis suggests that relatively opaque corporate
information increases not only the costs of formal debt contracting, but also the costs of
informal debt contracting. This implies that the relationship between family control and the
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cost of debt is affected by the relative opacity of corporate information. As corporate opacity
increases, creditors demand higher returns from their investment to cover at least partially
higher costs of both formal and informal debt contracting. Thus, relatively opaque corporate
information will either weaken the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt.
Therefore, I state the first hypothesis as follows:

H1: The negative relationship between family control and the cost of debt becomes weaker as
corporate opacity increases.

3.2.2.2 Dominant shareholder moral hazard and the impact of corporate opacity on the
relationship between family control and firms' cost of debt

I have theoretically inferred that family firms’ alignment incentives dominate their
entrenchment incentives when corporate information is relatively less opaque. However, it is
reasonable to assume that the relative dominance of these two types of incentive is impacted
by some important factors, and outside investors will adjust their perception accordingly. For
example, a large wedge of control rights and cash flow rights is viewed as a signal that
controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2011). A weak institutional
environment is also likely to foster firms’ expropriation behavior (La Porta et al., 2000; Dyck
and Zingales, 2004).

If creditors perceive a higher probability of opportunistic and expropriating behavior by
controlling families, they have a greater incentive to monitor the controlling families more
closely in order to protect their investments in the firms. In this process, creditors may
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demand more transparent information and accordingly set debt-contracting terms more
sensitive to the transparency of corporate information. Because corporate information is
perceived to be more opaque and less credible when controlling families are more likely to
expropriate outside investors (Leuz et al., 2003), creditors may require higher returns on their
lending to compensate for the higher risk.

On the other hand, when controlling families' perceived probability of expropriation is low,
creditors are less concerned about being expropriated. Therefore, creditors have a lower
demand for transparent information; consequently their lending terms, including the required
returns, are likely to be less tied to the transparency of corporate information. In other words,
corporate information opacity matters more when potential agency conflicts between
controlling families and creditors are more severe. Formally, the second hypothesis is:

H2: The impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and the cost
of debt is stronger when the perceived expropriation potential by controlling shareholders is
greater.

3.3 Sample, data, and statistics
3.3.1 Sample selection and data sources

The initial sample consists of all privately controlled (i.e., the ultimate largest shareholder is
not a state-owned enterprise or a government agency) nonfinancial A-share issuing firms
listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2004
and 2010. There were substantial changes in accounting standards in 2003; therefore, I
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choose 2004 as my sample beginning year mainly to maintain certain consistence in the
treatment of accounting items used in my analysis.

I first exclude firms in which the ultimate largest shareholder is a foreign entity and firms that
are cross-listed overseas, as foreign accounting rules may affect the treatment of some
accounting items used in this study. I then delete observations for the first year of public
listing, as an IPO may affect at least three of the four components of the corporate opacity
index used in this study: analyst coverage, trading volume, and stock return volatility (Rajan
and Servaes, 1997; Cliff and Denis, 2004; Ellis, 2006). After deleting observations with
missing data, the final sample consists of 705 firms and 3320 firm-year observations.

I obtain accounting and financial data from the China Securities Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database. Compiled by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology
Company Ltd., CSMAR is one of the most widely used databases for research on the Chinese
stock market. Data used to construct the corporate opacity index is also from CSMAR. I
winsorize all continuous variables used in the multivariate tests at the 1% and 99% level to
minimize the impact of outliers.

3.3.2 Measurement of variables
3.3.2.1 Cost of debt

Some prior studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Ellul et al., 2007; Boubakri and Ghouma,
2010) measure the cost of debt as the spread between corporate bond yield and a benchmark
(e.g., U.S. treasury yield or LIBOR). The corporate bond market, however, is underdeveloped
in China and many other emerging economies. Therefore, I follow Pittman and Fortin (2004),
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Kim et al. (2011), and Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2011) to measure a firm's cost of
debt as its interest expense for the year divided by the average short-term and long-term debt
during the year.

14

Chinese public firms do not always explicitly disclose interest expense in their income
statements; rather they integrate interest expense into an accounting item called "financial
expense", which includes interest expense, interest income, profit and loss on foreign
exchanges, and various fees and charges by financial institutions. Most firms disclose the
breakdown of “financial expense” in the notes to income statements. I therefore manually
collect the data of interest expense by checking the notes and drop those firm-year
observations that do not disclose interest expense either in the income statements or in the
notes to the income statements.

3.3.2.2 Key independent variables
3.3.2.2.1 Family firms

Despite the extant literature on family firms, there is no universally accepted definition of
family firms (See Prencipe et al. (2014) for an extensive review). Because of concentrated
ownership in many European and East Asian countries, researchers commonly apply a
minimum threshold for the largest shareholders' ownership to ensure effective control (Fan
and Wong, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). In this study, I use a dummy variable (Family
dummy) to denote a family firm if: (1) the founder and members of the founding family

14

Using interest expenses as the proxy for cost of debt may itself subject to management’s “opacity decision”. I

address this issue in the robustness test in section 4.5.
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(either by blood or through marriage) hold at least 20% of the firm's control rights; and (2)
the founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder. 15

In addition to the criteria above I also apply some other rules in determining a family firm,
given the unique characteristics of the Chinese markets. First, unlike in the U.S., where
almost all family firms are in the hands of second or later generations (Ellul et al., 2007),
founders are still in control in the vast majority of publicly listed family firms in China.
While Fan et al. (2012) define such firms as entrepreneurial firms, I still regard these firms as
family firms to maintain consistence with most other studies. Second, if a firm is established
by more than one family, I regard the family with the largest control rights as the controlling
family.

Third, natural persons were not allowed to own or control a business until some years after
the start of the economic reform; until then many businesses were registered as village and
town enterprises (VTEs) even they were founded and controlled by natural persons. These
firms were later re-registered as private enterprises when it's permitted by the new laws. In
those cases these firms are regarded as family firms if they meet the two criteria of my family
firm definition (i.e., ultimate largest shareholder with at least 20% control rights). In some
other cases, managers of VTEs later become the controlling shareholders through
management buyouts. I view these firms as nonfamily firms even if the controlling
15

Of the 3320 firm-year observations, 1092 satisfy the definition of family firms. If I relax the definition by

removing the 20% threshold for control rights, the number of family firms increases to 1210. As an additional
test, I run all regressions using this alternative definition. My main results remain qualitatively unchanged. If I
remove the second criterion, the number of family firms remains the same. In other words, when the founding
family holds at least 20% of control rights, no other blockholders hold more than 20% control right. This also
implies that concentration of equity ownership is even higher in family-controlled firms.
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shareholders have more than 20% of control rights, to be consistent with prior literature (e.g.,
Ellul et al., 2007; Fahlenbrach, 2009).

As in prior literature, I also use a continuous variable (Family ownership) to measure family
ownership, which is the fractional equity ownership of the founding family if a firm is
classified as a family firm and zero for all nonfamily firms.

3.3.2.2.2 Corporate opacity

Following Anderson et al. (2009), I develop a corporate opacity index that ranks the relative
opacity of each firm-year observation. My corporate opacity index consists of four
components, namely, trading volume, analyst coverage, proportion of zero-return trading
days, and stock return volatilities. The intuitions drawn from these corporate information
opacity proxies are well known. I provide a brief elaboration on them.

Investors are more willing to buy or to sell a company's shares when there is less information
asymmetry. Thus, trading volume is an inverse proxy for information opacity (Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000). I measure trading volume as the average daily number of shares traded
divided by the average total number of shares outstanding during the year. Financial analysts
play an important role as informational intermediaries between the firm and the market (Lang
et al., 2004). The larger the number of financial analysts following a firm, the more intensive
the firm's financial information is under market scrutiny. I measure analyst coverage as the
natural logarithm of the number of financial analysts following the firm.

112

The third proxy for corporate opacity is the proportion of zero-return trading days over the
year. Lesmond et al. (1999) argue that the incidence of zero daily return is a liquidity measure
that captures the relative value of information signals to the trading costs. They find that the
proportion of zero-return trading days for NYSE/AMEX stocks is highly correlated to the
bid-ask spread, a well-known proxy for information asymmetry. More recently Bekaert et al.
(2007) suggest that this measure is particularly useful for emerging markets where detailed
transaction data is often not available and is of relatively poor quality. The final proxy for
information opacity is the volatility of daily stock returns. Lang and Lundholm (1993)
suggest that the level of stock price volatility is negatively related to information asymmetries
between the firm and investors. I measure volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock
returns (dividend adjusted) during the year.

To construct the corporate opacity index, I first calculate the abovementioned four individual
components of opacity. I next rank each of these four components into deciles, with a value
of 9 representing the most opaque firms and a value of 0 representing the least opaque firms.
As a result, I obtain a new set of variables, Rankvolume, Rankanalyst, Rankzeroreturn, and
Rankvolatility. I then sum these four components and divide it by a factor of 36, which is the
maximum possible value. This process yields a corporate opacity index that ranges from 0 to
0.9, with higher values indicating greater information opacity.
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
36

3.3.2.3 Control variables

Firm characteristics other than ownership structure and corporate opacity may also affect a
firm's cost of debt. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Anderson et
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al., 2003; Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Lin et al., 2011), I include a set of firm characteristics as
control variables in the regressions. These control variables are firm size, the ratio of fixed
assets, debt ratio, a dummy indicating negative equity, current ratio, operating cash flows,
sales growth, board size, and the ratio of outside directors. Theoretical and empirical
evidence on the impacts of these variables on the cost of debt is relatively well-known.
Detailed descriptions of all variables used in this study are provided in Table 3.1. To
minimize the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% level.

I also include year and industry dummy variables in the multivariate OLS analyses. Industry
dummy variables are based on the classification system published by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which classifies all listed firms into 13 broad industries (12
industries if the financial service industry is excluded).

3.3.3 Descriptive statistics

Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.2 report the distribution of family firms and nonfamily firms
by year and industry, respectively. Panel A shows that the number and percentage of family
firms rose steadily, except for a small drop in percentage term between 2005 and 2006. In
2004, the Chinese government established the Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SMEB)
under the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. A large proportion of all IPOs on the SMEB were
family firms. Family firms represented about 32.9% of all firm-year observations in the
sample. The percentage of family firms increased to 42.7% as of the end of 2010, from about
22.5% in 2004. This highlights the importance of studying the relationship between family
firms and the cost of debt.
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Panel B shows a significant variation in the number and the percentage of family firms across
industries. The manufacturing industry had by far the largest number of family firms,
reflecting the fact that it also represented the largest industry by the total number of listed
firms. Also notable was the fact that there was no family firm in the power, gas, and water
supply industry. This is not surprising, given that this is a highly regulated industry
monopolized by newly privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics, broken down by family firms and nonfamily firms.
Family firms on average pay a significantly lower cost of debt (0.577 percentage points or
about 10% lower) than nonfamily firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level. The
opacity index is 0.427 for family firms and 0.446 for nonfamily firms, with a difference of
0.019 or about 4.5%, which is also significant at the 1% level.

Family firms are, on average, significantly larger than nonfamily firms. Compared with
nonfamily firms, family firms have a significantly lower PPE ratio, which may imply that
family firms invest more in R&D and are more interested in the long-term growth of the
firms than nonfamily firms. Family firms have a significantly lower debt ratio but a higher
current ratio relative to nonfamily firms, indicating that family firms prefer a low-risk capital
structure and are more concerned about their ability to service short-term debt. Family firms
also have a higher ratio of outside directors than nonfamily firms, which may imply that
family firms have better internal corporate governance. I do not find a significant difference
in cash flow performance, sales growth, and board size between family and nonfamily firms.

To summarize, family firms and nonfamily firms differ significantly in their cost of debt and
corporate opacity. They also differ in firm size, capital structure, investment, and internal
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corporate governance. I next formally assess how these factors affect the difference in the
cost of debt between these two groups of firms.
Table 3.1 Descriptions of main variables used in the analyses

Variable
Dependent variables:
Cost of debt
Key
independent
variables:
Family ownership
Family dummy
Opacity index

Trading volume
Analyst coverage
Zero-return days
Stock return volatility
Borrowing
firm
characteristics:
Firm size
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
ROA
Sales growth
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors
Wedge
Political connection
Institutional variables:
Market development
Property protection
Instrumental variables
Personal name
Multiple founders

Description
Interest expense for the year divided by the average of short-term and long-term debt during
the year
The fractional equity ownership by the family if a firm is classified as a family firm; zero for all
nonfamily firms
A dummy variable that equals 1 if both of the conditions are met: (1) the founder and his
family members hold at least 20% of the firm’s control rights; and (2) the founding family (all
family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder.
An opacity index constructed to measure corporate information opacity. The opacity index
ranks four components, trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-return trading days, and stock
return volatility in deciles (from 0 to 9) and divides the sum of the four components by 36,
resulting in an opacity index between 0 and 0.9. A higher value of opacity index indicates that
a firm’s information is more opaque
Average daily number of shares traded during the year divided by the average number of
total shares outstanding during the year
The number of equity analysts following each firm
Proportion of zero daily returns over the number of trading days during the year
Standard deviation of daily stock returns (dividend-adjusted) during the year
The natural logarithm of total assets
Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets
The sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets
Current assets divided by current liabilities
Operating cash flow divided by total assets
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets
Total sales revenues in the current year minus total sales revenues in last year divided by
total sales revenues in the last year
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports negative equity; zero otherwise
The natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board
The number of outside directors divided by total number of board directors
The difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights
A dummy variable that equals 1 if either the Chairman or the CEO is politically connected;
zero otherwise
An index that measures the overall level of marketization in the province in which a firm is
headquartered. Higher index values indicate higher level of marketization.
An index that measures the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in
which a firm is headquartered. Higher index values indicate higher level of legal protection.
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains (part of)
personal name(s) related to the founder(s)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder
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Table 3.2 Distribution of firm-year observations
A firm is defined as a family firm if both of these two conditions are met: (1) the founder and his family members hold at least 20% of the firm's control rights; and (2) the founding family (all
family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder.
Panel A Number and percentage of firm-year observations by year
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

All firms
334
394
423
456
515
577
621
3320

Family firms
75
103
105
130
186
228
265
1092

Nonfamily firms
259
291
318
326
329
349
356
2228

Percentage of family firms (%)
22.5
26.1
24.8
28.5
36.1
39.5
42.7
32.9

Panel B Number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry
Industry code

Industry description

All firms

Family firms

Nonfamily firms

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M

Agricultural, forestry, livestock & fishery
Mining
Manufacturing
Power, gas & water production & supply
Construction
Transport & storage
Information technology
Wholesale & retail trade
Real estate
Social services
Communication & cultural industry
Comprehensive
Total

89
24
1963
34
64
33
276
208
316
97
9
207
3320

38
6
736
0
28
9
135
21
69
15
4
31
1092

51
18
1227
34
36
24
141
187
247
82
5
176
2228

Percentage of family
firms (%)
42.7
25.0
37.5
0
43.8
27.3
48.9
10.1
21.8
15.5
44.4
15.0
32.9

117

Table 3.3 Means, medians, standard deviations and univariate tests of differences in means and medians between family firms and nonfamily firms
Variables include cost of debt, corporate information opacity index, and borrowing firm characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. Significances are based on p-values using the
two-tailed t-test for mean (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for median). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
All firms
Variables
Dependent variables
Cost of debt (%)
Key independent variables
Family ownership
Family dummy
Opacity index
Other control variables
Total assets (RMB millions)
Firm size
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
Sales growth
ROA
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors
wedge
No. of firm-year obs.

Family firms

Nonfamily firms
(5)
(6)
Mean
Median

Diff. in means

Diff. in medians

(3) – (5)

(4) – (6)

5.876

-0.577***

-0.674***

0
0
0.446

0
0
0.450

0.318***
1.000***
-0.019***

0.293***
1.000***
-0.025***

2144
20.903
0.261
0.665
1.647
0.045
0.289
0.030
0.068
2.149
0.361
0.099

1204
20.906
0.236
0.535
1.155
0.044
0.105
0.023
0
2.197
0.333
0.087

600***
0.342***
-0.021***
-0.214***
0.458***
0.003
-0.012
-0.006**
-0.061***
-0.007
0.005***
-0.025***

278***
0.209***
-0.012**
-0.088***
0.343***
0.007
0.090***
-0.001
0
0
0
-0.047***

(1)
Mean

(2)
Median

(3)
Mean

(4)
Median

5.705

5.662

5.318

5.202

5.895

0.105
0.329
0.440

0
0
0.450

0.318
1
0.427

0.293
1
0.425

2342
21.012
0.254
0.595
1.798
0.046
0.285
0.028
0.048
2.147
0.363
0.091

1302
20.987
0.232
0.502
1.261
0.046
0.137
0.023
0
2.197
0.333
0.074

2744
21.245
0.240
0.451
2.105
0.048
0.277
0.024
0.007
2.142
0.366
0.074

1482
21.115
0.224
0.447
1.498
0.051
0.195
0.022
0
2.197
0.333
0.040

3320

1092

2228
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3.4 Multivariate results
3.4.1 Impact of family control on the cost of debt

In Section 3.2.1, I propose that the negative relationship between family ownership and the
cost of debt documented in Anderson et al. (2003) may not hold for the Chinese market. To
test this conjecture, I estimate the following ordinary least square regression model, which
makes my results directly comparable with prior empirical evidence:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)

+ 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀

Equation (3.1)

Standard errors of the OLS regression results reported in column 1 and column 3 of Table 3.4
are corrected for firm-level clustering. 16 The coefficient of Family ownership and Family
dummy is -1.480 and -0.377, respectively, both statistically different from zero at the 1%
level. The results confirm the univariate differences reported in Table 3.3 that family control
is associated with a lower cost of debt. The findings here and in Anderson et al. (2003)
suggest that family firms enjoy lower costs of debt both in China and the U.S., despite the
immense difference in investor protection and other institutions. However, my results seem to
be inconsistent with the findings documented in Ellul et al. (2007), which would suggest that
family firms in China suffer from higher debt cost than nonfamily firms. This motivates us to
examine other factors (rather than country-level institutions) that may affect the relationship
between family control and the cost of debt.
16

As a robustness check, I adjust standard errors for clustering at the firm and the year level (Petersen, 2009),

which controls for both heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. My findings are robust to the twoway clustering.
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Table 3.4 Family firms and the cost of debt
This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family firms. Columns 1 and 3 use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. The
dependent variable is the cost of debt in all models. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Constant
Family ownership

OLS
(1)
0.682
[2.250]
-1.480***
[0.465]

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
2.392
[2.809]
-1.012**
[0.507]

OLS
(3)
0.772
[2.265]

Firm-fixed effects
(4)
2.240
[2.812]
-0.142**
[0.071]
-0.093
[0.113]
2.709***
[0.652]
0.049**
[0.019]
-0.151
[0.107]
0.254
[0.506]
-0.023
[0.041]
0.228
[0.323]
-0.903**
[0.423]
-1.126
[1.099]
No
No
3320
0.612
3.33***

Year dummies
Industry dummies
No. of obs.

-0.146*
[0.088]
3.087***
[0.597]
0.052**
[0.024]
-0.529***
[0.184]
-2.538***
[0.601]
-0.031
[0.056]
0.738*
[0.380]
-0.294
[0.334]
0.342
[1.166]
Yes
Yes
3320

-0.090
[0.113]
2.686***
[0.654]
0.049***
[0.019]
-0.151
[0.107]
0.234
[0.506]
-0.022
[0.041]
0.225
[0.323]
-0.901**
[0.423]
-1.162
[1.095]
No
No
3320

-0.377***
[0.144]
-0.144
[0.089]
3.148***
[0.603]
0.052**
[0.024]
-0.530***
[0.183]
-2.546***
[0.603]
-0.034
[0.056]
0.761**
[0.383]
-0.294
[0.335]
0.033
[1.158]
Yes
Yes
3320

Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

0.333
18.10***

0.613
3.70***

0.331
17.75***

Family dummy
Log assets
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
Sales growth
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors
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Except for the estimate of the ratio of outside directors, the OLS coefficients of control
variables (columns 1 and 3) have the predicted signs. Specifically, larger (Firm size), better
performing (Cash flow), less risky (Debt ratio, Current ratio, and Negative equity) firms pay
a lower cost of debt, relative to smaller, worse performing, and riskier firms. The OLS results,
however, suggest no significant effect of a firm's growth, board size, and the ratio of outside
directors on its cost of debt. The OLS results for the control variables reported in Table 3.4
are similar to those in prior studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Anderson et al., 2003;
Pittman and Fortin, 2004).

There is, however, a concern that some firm-specific variables may be omitted, which causes
the OLS results to be biased. Nikolaev and van Lent (2005) suggest that fixed effects
estimations reduce endogeneity bias. I therefore use fixed effects model to correct for
unspecified heteroskedasticity, which takes into account heterogeneity among individual
firms. The results are reported in column 2 and column 4 of Table 3.4. The coefficients of
Family ownership and Family dummy remain negative and statistically different from zero
(albeit with lower significances), confirming the OLS results reported in columns 1 and 3.
Overall, the results in Table 3.4 provide evidence that family control on average is associated
with lower costs of debt in China.

In all subsequent analyses, I present just the results on family ownership for brevity purpose.
Results are similar when I use the family control dummy. The constant term and control
variables are also included in all regressions but their coefficients are not reported. 17

17

However, those results are available on request.
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3.4.2 Impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and the
cost of debt
3.4.2.1 Primary test of Hypothesis H1

I point out in Section 3.2.2.1 that entrenched controlling shareholders tend to supply
relatively more opaque information to outside investors. Consequently the negative effect of
family control on the firm's cost of debt is expected to be weaker when corporate opacity is
relatively higher. To examine this proposition, I carry out two sets of tests.

I first divide the full sample into two subsamples based on the level of corporate opacity.
Low-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is below the sample
median. High-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is above the
sample median. For each of these two subsamples, I then rerun the baseline regression model
described in Equation 1. The results are reported in Table 3.5. Second, to explicitly examine
the joint effect of corporate opacity and family control on the cost of debt, I estimate the
following OLS model as well as the corresponding firm-fixed effects model:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)
+ 𝛽2 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

+ 𝛽4 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀

Equation (3.2)

The results for regressions based on Equation 3.2 are reported in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.5 Family firms and the cost of debt (subsample analyses)
This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family firms, for the low-opacity subsample (columns 1 and 2) and high-opacity subsample (columns 3 to 4). Columns 1 and 3 use OLS
estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. The dependent variable is cost of debt in all models. Low-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is below the
sample median. High-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is above the sample median. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level
clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Cost of Debt

Family ownership
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-2.061***
[0.546]
Yes
Yes
1779
0.343
14.95***

Low-opacity subsample

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-1.037**
[0.523]
Yes
No
1779
0.734
2.95***

OLS
(3)
-0.463
[0.531]
Yes
Yes
1541
0.368
14.48***

High-opacity subsample

Firm-fixed effects
(4)
-0.745
[1.720]
Yes
No
1541
0.546
2.63***

Table 3.6 Family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Yearn and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-3.182***
[1.011]
4.527**
[2.012]
1.091**
[0.479]
Yes
Yes
3320
0.339
17.54***

Dependent variable: Cost of Debt

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-1.634***
[0.706]
0.763**
[0.351]
2.082**
[0.929]
Yes
No
3320
0.615
3.79***
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5 report the Equation 3.1 regression results for the subsample
with relatively low opacity. The coefficient of Family ownership is negative and significant at
either the 1% level (coef. = -2.061 in column 1) or the 5% level (coef. = -1.037 in column 2).
The result is similar to that in Table 3.4 but with larger coefficients. However, the coefficient
of Family ownership is insignificant (albeit with a negative sign) in columns 3 and 4, which
represent the relatively more opaque subsample. Cross-equation restriction tests show that the
coefficients of Family ownership in these two sub-samples are significantly different (p-value
= 0.003 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.018 for columns 2 and 4). To appreciate the
economic significance of my findings, consider the coefficients reported in columns 1 and 3
of Table 3.5. When corporate opacity is below median (column 1) a one-standard-deviation
increase in family ownership (an increase of about 18%) reduces debt cost by 0.373
percentage points. However, when corporate opacity is above the median (column 3) a onestandard-deviation increase in family ownership (about 17%) lowers debt cost by only about
0.077 percentage points. 18 The results in Table 3.5 provide clear evidence that the negative
impact of family ownership on the cost of debt is stronger when corporate opacity is
relatively low.

In Equation 3.2 I extend the baseline model in Equation 3.1 by adding the interaction term
between family firm and corporate opacity. Both models in Table 3.6 show that, as expected,
the coefficient of the stand-alone Family ownership remains negative and statistically
significant, suggesting that when corporate opacity equals zero family firms enjoy lower

18

The statistics summary shows that in the low opacity sub-sample, a one standard deviation increase in

family ownership represents 18% increase. To calculate the increase in the cost of debt, we multiply 18% by the
absolute mean impact of family ownership on the cost of debt (i.e., 2.061 from Table 3.5), that is
0.18*2.061=0.373. Similarly, in the high-opacity sub-sample, the corresponding figure is 0.17*0.463=0.077.
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costs of debt than nonfamily firms. The coefficient of the interaction term Family ownership
* Opacity index is positive and significant, opposite the sign of the stand-alone Family
ownership. The opposite signs mean that as corporate opacity increases the negative impact
of family ownership on the cost of debt becomes weaker.
Taken together, the results in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 indicate that when corporate opacity is
zero, family firms enjoy significantly lower costs of debt than nonfamily firms. However, as
corporate opacity increases the difference in the cost of debt becomes insignificant. These
results provide strong support to hypothesis H1 that the relationship between family control
and the cost of debt is affected by corporate opacity. Specifically, the negative impact of
family control on the cost of debt becomes weaker as corporate opacity increases.

3.4.2.2 Endogeneity of family control

There is one potential endogeneity concern about the results for the relationship between
family firms and the cost of debt and for the moderating role of corporate opacity on such a
relationship. In particular, I explicitly assume the causality running from family control (or
family ownership) to a lower cost of debt. However, it is also possible that there is an inverse
causality. Specifically, a lower cost of debt indicates better firm performance, ceteris paribus.
It is intuitive to argue that founding families are more likely to retain control when their firms
perform well.

I address this potential endogeneity issue in this section with the instrumental variable (IV)
approach. An appropriate IV needs to satisfy two conditions. First, the IV needs to be
exogenous in the main regressions. Second, the IV must be correlated to the endogenous
variable, conditional on other covariates. Following Fahlenbrach (2009), the first IV
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(Personal name) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO
contains at least part of the personal name(s) of the founder(s). There is no reason to believe
that the name of a firm at the time of IPO is related to its current cost of debt. It is however
reasonable to assume that a firm still bearing the name(s) of the founder(s) at IPO is more
likely to be a family-controlled firm. Thus, the first IV satisfies both conditions for an
appropriate IV. Following Adams et al. (2009), the second IV (Multiple founders) is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder (from different families).
There is no systematic evidence that whether a firm has more than one founder has a direct
effect on its cost of debt. But it is also reasonable to believe that a firm is more likely to
remain controlled by one of the founders if it was founded by more than one founder. Thus,
the second IV also meets both conditions.

In estimating IV regressions, I employ the full sample with interaction terms of family
ownership and corporate opacity. If family ownership is endogenous, then it’s likely that the
interaction between family ownership and corporate opacity, which is an exogenous variable,
is subject to endogeneity concern too (Kelejian, 1971). Therefore, I model Family ownership
and Family ownership*Opacity index as endogenous variables and estimate a two-stage least
squares regression model.

The IVs are Personal name, Multiple founders, Personal name*Opacity index, and Multiple
founders*Opacity index. In the first stage, each endogenous variable is regressed on IV and
control variables. The F-statistics in the first stage (unreported but available on request)
indicate that the coefficients of Personal name and Multiple founders are significantly
different from zero at the 1% level, providing further support for the validity of these two IVs.
In the second stage, the predicted values from the first stage regressions are used as key
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independent variables. Table 3.7 reports the second-stage regression results with the cost of
debt as the dependent variable.

As can been seen, the coefficients of Family ownership and Family ownership*Opacity
index have the same sign as those corresponding coefficients in Table 3.6, but with even
larger magnitudes. For example, the coefficient of Family ownership and Family
ownership*Opacity index in column 1 of Table 3.7 is -6.091 and 8.070, respectively,
compared to -3.182 and 4.527 in column 1 of Table 3.6. Thus, the results from the IV
regressions are consistent with my earlier analyses and support hypothesis H1 that corporate
opacity weakens the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. This finding is
robust to controlling for potential endogeneity concerns.

3.4.3 Other factors influencing the role of corporate opacity on the relationship between
family control and the cost of debt

In this section, I aim to explore some factors that influence the mechanism through which
corporate opacity affects the relationship between family control and the cost of debt. In
particular, I focus on factors that are related to the potential incentives of dominant
controlling families to expropriate outside investors, because such incentives directly impact
creditors' demand for transparent corporate information and consequently the sensitivity of
the relationship between family control and the cost of debt to corporate opacity (refer to the
discussion in Section 3.2.2.2).

Specifically, I examine how the moderating effect of corporate opacity is affected by the
following factors: the divergence between controlling families' control rights and cash flow

127

rights (i.e., control-ownership wedge), external institutions (market development and
property rights protection), and firms' political connection.
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Table 3.7 Family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt (instrumental variables estimations)
This table presents instrumental variable regressions of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity. Column 1 uses OLS estimation and
column 3 uses firm-fixed estimation. Both the stand-alone Family ownership and the interaction term Family ownership*Opacity index are instrumented. The IVs in the first stage are Personal
name, Personal name*Opacity index, Multiple founders, and Multiple founders*Opacity index. Personal name is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO
contains a personal name related to the founder(s). Multiple founders is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder, i.e., founders from different families. All other
variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Log Assets
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
Sales growth
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-6.091***
[2.311]
8.070***
[2.225]
1.593***
[0.418]
-0.208**
[0.096]
2.925***
[0.592]
0.053**
[0.024]
-0.514***
[0.186]
-2.287***
[0.589]
-0.037
[0.057]
0.733*
[0.395]
-0.244
[0.337]
1.117
[1.211]
Yes
3320
0.334
18.21***

Dependent variable: Cost of Debt

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-9.081***
[1.819]
8.542***
[2.841]
0.723**
[0.302]
-0.018
[0.113]
2.686***
[0.656]
0.042**
[0.020]
-0.150
[0.107]
-0.051
[0.512]
-0.010
[0.042]
0.092
[0.329]
-0.726*
[0.418]
-1.804*
[1.006]
No
3320
0.615
6.75***

129

3.4.3.1 Control-ownership wedge

Previous studies show that for many firms around the world the ultimate largest shareholders
exercise effective control over the firms with a relatively small equity ownership (Claessens
et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002), resulting in a divergence between the ultimate largest
shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights. In the presence of the control-ownership
wedge, controlling shareholders have a greater incentive and ability to expropriate outside
investors, which often causes a firm’s value to be discounted (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;
Johnson et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).

Consistent with this view, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011) find that the
cost of debt financing is significantly higher for firms with wider control-ownership wedges,
especially when the ultimate largest shareholders are families. As a result, creditors have a
greater incentive to monitor firms with higher wedges to ensure their investments are not
expropriated by the controlling shareholders. Consequently, the relationship between family
firms and the cost of debt is expected to be more sensitive to corporate opacity when the
control-ownership wedge is high. In other words, the joint effect between family firms and
corporate opacity is expected to be stronger for firms with a higher wedge.

To test this proposition, I divide the full sample into low-wedge and high-wedge subsamples.
The low-wedge subsample contains those firms that have a control-ownership wedge below
the sample median; the high-wedge subsample contains those firms with a control-ownership
wedge above the sample median. I then repeat the testing in Equation 3.2 for each subsample.
The results are reported in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8 Control-ownership wedge, family firm, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt
This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, for the high-wedge subsample and low-wedge
subsample. Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. The dependent variable is cost of debt in all models. Wedge is defined as the difference
between the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights. High-wedge firms are defined as those for which the control-ownership wedge is above the sample median.
Low-wedge firms are defined as those for which the wedge is below the sample median. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are
reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Cost of Debt
High-wedge subsample
OLS

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index

Low-wedge subsample
Firm-fixed effects

OLS

Firm-fixed effects

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-3.821***

-3.488**

-2.425**

-1.488**

[1.380]

[1.695]

[1.134]

[0.696]

4.183***

5.964***

3.354

-1.197

[1.484]

[1.773]

[2.641]

[2.305]

1.520***

1.489**

0.804*

0.466

[0.409]

[0.660]

[0.431]

[0.423]

Constant and control variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year and industry dummies

Yes

No

Yes

No

No. of obs.

1660

1660

1660

1660

Adjusted R-squared

0.297

0.670

0.359

0.577

13.10***

3.92***

10.57***

2.41***

F-stat.
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As I can see from all four model specifications, the coefficient of the stand-alone Family
ownership is negative and significantly different from zero, indicating that when corporate
opacity is zero family firms have a lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms, regardless of the
level of control-ownership wedge. This finding seems to be different from that of Boubakri
and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011), who find that the positive impact of family
ownership on the cost of debt becomes significantly stronger as the control-ownership wedge
increases. My explanation is that for Chinese family firms as a whole, controlling families'
alignment effect is so dominant over their entrenchment effect that even a high controlownership wedge does not significantly change the overall negative impact of family control
on the firms' cost of debt.

However, the interactive impact of family ownership and corporate opacity on the cost of
debt differs significantly between high-wedge firms and low-wedge firms. In firms with high
control-ownership wedges (columns 1 and 2), the coefficient of Family ownership*Opacity
index is positive and significant at the 1% level. By contrast, neither of the coefficients of the
interaction terms is significant for firms with low control-ownership wedges (columns 3 and
4). Cross-equation restriction tests show that the coefficients of Family ownership*Opacity
index in these two sub-samples differ significantly (p-value = 0.008 for columns 1 and 3; pvalue = 0.000 for columns 2 and 4).

The results in Table 3.8 therefore support my expectation that the relationship between family
ownership and the cost of debt is more sensitive to corporate opacity when the controlling
shareholders' control-ownership wedge is relatively high.
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I also note that the coefficient of Opacity index is positive and significantly different from
zero at the 1% or 5% level when controlling shareholders' control-ownership wedge is
relatively high (columns 1 and 2); but when the control-ownership wedge is relatively low the
coefficient is only marginally significant at the 10% level (column 3) or insignificant
(columns 4). Cross-equation restriction tests show that the coefficients of Opacity index in
these two sub-samples differ significantly (p-value = 0.024 for columns 1 and 3; p-value =
0.071 for columns 2 and 4).These results are consistent with the notion that creditors have a
greater demand for transparent information when controlling shareholders' expropriation
potential is higher. These results also confirm the empirical evidence in some previous
studies such as Lin et al. (2011).

3.4.3.2 Market development and legal protection of property rights

The literature argues that institutional development is important in mitigating agency
conflicts and in curbing private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al.,
2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Recent studies also show that external institutions (legal
protection of investors in particular) are negatively associated with the cost of debt (Boubakri
and Ghouma, 2010; Qi et al., 2010). The analysis in Section 3.2 of this chapter indicates that
when controlling families are entrenched, corporate information becomes more opaque and
the negative relation between family control and the cost of debt becomes substantially
weaker.

In this section, I take advantage of the huge variation in economic and legal development
among China’s diverse regions to test whether the development of institutions affects the
moderating role of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and the cost
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of debt. When external institutions are stronger, it is more difficult or more costly for
controlling families (and more broadly, controlling shareholders) to extract private benefits
from their control of the firms (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Thus, in regions with stronger
legal protection and more advanced market development, even those controlling families with
relatively more opaque information find it difficult or costly to take advantage of corporate
opacity to expropriate outside investors. In other words, the moderating effect of corporate
opacity on the relationship between family control and the cost of debt is weaker when
external institutions are relatively more developed.

The testing in this section is based on Fan et al. (2011), who evaluate a wide range of
economic and institutional factors in China and construct a range of indices to measure these
factors at the provincial level. The indices are available up to 2009 at the time I was
developing this chapter. Therefore, the sample period is 2004–2009 in this section. I focus on
two indices obtained from Fan et al. (2011) as proxies for institutional development at the
provincial level. Market development is an index that measures the overall level of
marketization of the province in which a firm is headquartered. A higher market development
index value indicates a higher level of marketization. Property rights protection is an index
that measures the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is
headquartered, with a higher index value indicating a higher level of legal protection.

As in Section 3.4.3.1, I divide the full sample into two subsamples, based on whether the
level of market development and property rights protection is below or above the sample
median, respectively. I report the testing results in Table 3.9, with Panel A using market
development as the proxy for external institution and Panel B using property rights as the
proxy for external institutions, respectively.
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Table 3.9 External institutions, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt
This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, subject to market development (Panel A) and property
protection (Panel B). Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. The sample period in this table is 2004–2009, for which the market development
index and property protection index are available. Market development (property protection) is an index that measures the overall level of marketization (property rights protection) of the
province in which a firm is headquartered (Fan et al., 2011). Higher index values indicate higher level of marketization (or property protection). High-market-development (High-propertyprotection) firms are defined as those headquartered in provinces for which the market development (property protection) index is above the sample median. Low-market-development
(Low-property-protection) firms are defined as those headquartered in provinces for which the market development (property protection) index is below the sample median. All other
variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Yearn and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Low-market-development subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
-3.604***
-4.803***
[1.330]
[1.536]
8.745**
10.084***
[4.040]
[3.653]
1.190**
1.448**
[0.558]
[0.660]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1346
1346
0.238
0.617
9.88***
21.65***

High-market-development subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(3)
(4)
-1.166**
-1.006**
[0.544]
[0.463]
-0.418
-1.746
[1.858]
[2.316]
0.927*
0.411
[0.522]
[0.502]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1353
1353
0.515
0.751
14.46***
2.24***

Low-property-protection subsample
(1)
(2)
-3.453**
-4.318**
[1.599]
[2.141]
8.258**
9.693***
[3.703]
[2.557]
1.372***
1.441**
[0.534]
[0.692]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1342
1342
0.253
0.614
11.34***
21.35***

High-property-protection subsample
(3)
(4)
-1.265***
-1.651**
[0.454]
[0.811]
0.091
-1.333
[1.016]
[1.505]
0.845
0.486*
[0.545]
[0.291]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1357
1357
0.457
0.753
5.91***
2.55***

Panel B

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Yearn and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.
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In the weak-institutions subsample (columns 1 and 2), the coefficients of Family
ownership*Opacity index are all positive and significant at either the 1% or 5% level,
indicating that in regions with weak institutions, high corporate opacity significantly weakens
the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. However, the moderating effect of
corporate opacity becomes insignificant in regions with relatively strong institutions, which is
proved by the insignificant coefficient of Family ownership*Opacity index in column 3 and
column 4.

I compare four pairs of coefficients of the interaction term (columns 1 and 3, and columns 2
and 4 in Panel A and Panel B, respectively) using the cross-equation restriction tests. Among
them the coefficients in columns 2 and 4 of Panel B differ at the 5% level (p-value = 0.014);
all other pairs of coefficients differ significantly at the 1% level.

Taken together, the results in this section support my proposition that the moderating effect
of corporate opacity is stronger when external institutions are weaker. I also note that in all
models in Table 3.9, the stand-alone coefficients of Family ownership is negative and
significantly different from zero, indicating that when corporate opacity is zero family firms
pay a lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms, regardless of the strength of external
institutions.

This finding seems to be different from that of Ellul et al. (2007), who find that family firms
pay a lower (higher) cost of debt than nonfamily firms in countries with strong (weak) legal
protection of investors. The results suggest that firm-level corporate opacity may play a more
important role than country-level external institutions in explaining the actual impact of
family control on the cost of debt.
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Similar to the result in Table 3.8, the coefficient of the stand-alone Opacity index is
significantly positive when market development or property rights protection is low (columns
1 and 2 in Table 3.9); while the coefficient is generally less significant in situations with
relativeely high market development or strong property rights protection (columns 3 and 4).
The coefficients of Opacity index in these two sub-samples are significantly different
(columns 1 and 3 in Panel A have the largest p-value = 0.068). The results provide further
empirical support to my earlier analysis that corporate opacity matters more for the cost of
debt when controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors.

3.4.3.3 Firms' political connections

A number of studies examine the implication of political connection for controlling
shareholders' incentives to expropriate outside investors. Faccio et al. (2006) find that
politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out by governments and Leuz and
Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find that politically connected firms have preferential access to loans
from state-owned banks, which may suggest that controlling shareholders at politically
connected firms are less concerned about outside investors' negative reaction to expropriation.

However, Ma et al. (2013) argue that in the Chinese context, the primary motivation for
private entrepreneurs to establish political connection is to overcome the imperfect market
mechanism and disadvantage in resource allocation. Furthermore, to maintain the highly
sought-after political connection, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to see their
firms continue to perform well. Consistent with this view, they find that privately controlled
firms with political connection have less tunneling than those private firms without political
connection. Therefore, following the analysis in Section 3.2.2.2, I expect the interactive
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impact of family control and corporate opacity on the cost of debt to be stronger for firms
without political connection.

I follow Fan et al. (2007) in defining a firm as politically connected if either the chairman or
the CEO of the firm is a current or former government official, military officer, member of
the Chinese People's Congress (CPC), or member of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). I divide the full sample into politically connected and
non-connected subsamples and separately test Equation 2 for each subsample. The results are
reported in Table 3.10.

As expected, the coefficients of the interaction terms Family ownership*Opacity index are all
positive and significantly different from zero for firms without political connection (columns
1 and 2); while neither of the coefficients of the interaction terms is significant for firms with
political connection (columns 3 and 4). Cross-equation restriction tests show that the
coefficients of Family ownership*Opacity index in these two sub-samples differ significantly
(p-value = 0.009 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.048 for columns 2 and 4). The coefficient
of the stand-alone Family ownership is negative and statistically different from zero in all
four columns, indicating that when corporate opacity is zero, family firms pay a lower cost of
debt than nonfamily firms, regardless of whether or not these firms are politically connected.

In summary, the testing results in Section 3.4.3 show that the moderating effect of corporate
opacity on the relationship between family firms and the cost of debt is affected by the
probability (incentives and capabilities) of controlling shareholders expropriating outside
investors. Specifically, the moderating effect of corporate opacity is stronger when the
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controlling shareholders' control-ownership wedge is wider, when external institutions are
weaker, and when firms are not politically connected.

The results provide strong support for hypothesis H2 that corporate opacity plays a more
important role in the relationship between family control and the cost of debt when the moral
hazard of dominant shareholders is greater. The results also indicate that these three factors
appear to be less important than corporate opacity in explaining the relationship between
family control and the cost of debt.

3.5 Robustness checks and additional tests
3.5.1 Robustness checks using alternative opacity measures

So far in this chapter, I have followed Anderson et al. (2009) and used a comprehensive index
consisting of four components (trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-return trading days,
and stock return volatility) to measure corporate opacity. There is a concern, however, that
my corporate opacity index described above is inclined to be a liquidity measure and/or it can
represent only the inherent information opacity of a firm that is less likely subject to the
managers’ control. In that case, my inference that family firms can benefit from a lower cost
of debt by reducing corporate opacity may be questioned.

To address this concern, I introduce earnings quality (or the likelihood of earnings
management) as alternative information opacity measures. Earnings management is initiated
by managers to alter information opacity. Information opacity reduces trading volume and
increases stock return volatility, which would be reflected in the previously used corporate
opacity index.
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Table 3.10 Political connection, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt
This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, for politically-connected subsample and nonpolitically-connected subsample. Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. The dependent variable is cost of debt in all models. Political connection
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO of the firm is politically connected. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of Debt
Non-politically-connected subsample
Politically-connected subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-4.708***
-1.163**
-1.647***
-1.643**
[1.427]
[0.548]
[0.603]
[0.819]
7.242***
1.847**
1.925
2.498
[2.656]
[0.918]
[2.544]
[2.448]
1.142**
0.796**
0.554
0.935*
[0.470]
[0.383]
[0.556]
[0.530]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
2099
2099
1221
1221
0.341
0.583
0.371
0.726
12.01***
2.74***
9.85***
3.63***
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Two proxies for earnings quality are used. The first measure is the unsigned (absolute value)
discretionary accruals calculated using modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). Large
discretionary accruals indicate low earnings quality and more opaque information disclosure.
I estimate discretionary accruals using firm-year specific method (Francis et al., 2004), by
rolling a five-year window. The estimates are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Due to
data availability, I can only obtain discretionary accruals for 2220 of the initial 3320 firmyear observations. Family firms and nonfamily firms account for 485 and 1735 of the reduced
sample, respectively.

Univariate test shows that there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals between
family and nonfamily firms (0.068 vs. 0.072, p-value = 0.225), suggesting that family firms
as a whole have similar earnings quality as nonfamily firms. However, I have argued that
family firms are heterogeneous in their agency problems which can be reflected in different
earnings quality among family firms. Thus, I replace opacity index with discretionary
accruals and rerun the regressions described in Section 3.4. The results are presented in
Appendix. As in the main results, I only report results for family ownership. Results are
similar when I use the family control dummy.

In Table A3.1, the negative impact of family ownership on cost of debt exists only in those
firms with low discretionary accruals. Results in Table A3.2 show that when discretionary
accrual is zero, family controlled firms pay a significantly lower cost of debt than nonfamily
firms; however, the significant and positive coefficient of Family ownership*Discretionary
accruals indicates that discretionary accruals mitigate the negative impact of family
ownership on the cost of debt. The results in Tables A3.3 to A3.5 suggest that the moderating
effect of discretionary accruals is significantly more profound when perceived expropriation
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potential by control shareholders is greater. Overall, the results are largely consistent with
those reported in Section 3.4, thus providing additional support to my hypotheses.

One notable observation from the results presented in the Appendix is that, except for in two
model (columns 1 and 5 of Table A3.4), the coefficient of the stand-alone Discretionary
accruals is insignificant, suggesting that earnings quality as measured by discretionary
accruals has no impact on the cost of debt for nonfamily firms. This finding seems to be
inconsistent with earlier evidence (e.g., Sengupta, 1998; Francis et al., 2005b). One possible
explanation is that the overall earnings quality is relatively low for China’s listed firms;
therefore creditors discount the information contained in earnings quality when making
lending decisions. However, the significant coefficient of the interaction term Family
ownership*Discretionary accruals indicates that earnings quality matters more for family
firms than for nonfamily firms for the reasons given in Section 3.2 of this chapter.

The second measure is a dummy variable (Small auditor) denoting high corporate opacity if a
firm's annual report is not audited by one of the international Big Four or the largest six
domestic auditors by revenue. 19 Numerous studies find a negative association between the
quality of external auditors and the opacity of the audited firms' financial information (see
Armstrong et al. (2010) for a comprehensive review of the related literature). Untabulated
results, which are available on request, suggest that my findings remain robust to this
alternative measure of corporate opacity.

19

The international Big Four include Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG, and PwC. The six largest domestic auditors are

Shanghai Lixin, Xinyong Zhonghe, Yuehua, Daxin, Dahua, and Zhongshen.
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3.5.2 Uniqueness of family blockholders and different effects of founder-, non-founderfamily-, and outside- CEOs

I have so far provided evidence that family firms enjoy significantly lower costs of debt than
nonfamily firms when corporate opacity is relatively low, because the family blockholders'
alignment effects dominate their entrenchment effects. However, it is possible that this
finding may also apply to all firms with concentrated blockholders who have a relatively
dominant position, rather than being limited to family firms.

To test whether family owners are different from other types of blockholders, I introduce two
new sets of variables. Family block dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate
largest shareholder has at least 10% of the cash flow rights in the firm (note that 10% cash
flow rights is used in my definition of family firms) and is a founding family; and equals zero
otherwise. Nonfamily block dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate largest
shareholder has at least 10% of the cash flow rights in the firm and is not a founding family;
and equals zero otherwise. In untabulated regressions, I use 20% or 30% of total control
rights 20 as alternative thresholds in defining blockholders and the main results remain
unchanged.

Based on the 10% threshold, there are 1092 firm-year observations with a family blockholder
and 1610 firm-year observations with a nonfamily blockholder in the full sample. In other

20

A threshold of 20% of control rights is used in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002); a

threshold of 30% of control rights is one of the criteria used by the China Securities Regulatory Committee
(CSRC) in defining effective control; see "Notice about Issuing 'Guides to Constitutions of Listed Companies'",
CSRC, December 16, 1997 (in Chinese, the title is translated by the authors).
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words, 2702 out of the total 3320 (or 81.4%) sample firm-year observations have a
blockholder with at least 10% cash flow rights. Family block ownership (Nonfamily block
ownership) is the fractional equity ownership of the ultimate controlling shareholder if a firm
has a family blockholder (nonfamily blockholder); and zero for all other firms without a
family blockholder (nonfamily blockholder). The regression models in Table 3.11 are based
on those in Table 3.4 and Table 3.6, but Family ownership and Family dummy are replaced
by the new variables described above.

Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 examine the overall effects (i.e., without taking corporate opacity into
account) of family blockholders and nonfamily blockholders on the firm's cost of debt. The
coefficients of Family block ownership and Family block dummy are all negative and
significant at either the 1% or 5% level. These results confirm those reported in Table 4 and
support my view that firms with family blockholders pay a lower cost of debt than those
without family blockholders. However, none of the coefficients of Nonfamily block
ownership and Nonfamily block dummy is statistically significant, indicating that nonfamily
blockholders do not have the same effect as family blockholders in reducing the firm's cost of
debt. This finding suggests that the relative dominance of the entrenchment or alignment
effect on the cost of debt (discussed in detail in Section 2) is unique to family blockholders.

I next examine whether the moderating role of corporate opacity differs between family
blockholders and nonfamily blockholders. As can been seen in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, the
coefficients of the interaction terms Family block ownership*Opacity index and Family block
dummy*Opacity index are all positive and significant, similar to the coefficients of those
interaction terms in Table 3.6. However, none of the coefficients of the interaction terms
Nonfamily block ownership*Opacity index and Nonfamily block dummy*Opacity index is

144

significantly different from zero. These results indicate that, while there is a significant
difference in the cost of debt between opaque and transparent family firms, no significant
difference exists between opaque and transparent nonfamily firms. In other words, corporate
opacity matters more for family firms than for nonfamily firms, in terms of its association
with the cost of debt. This provides further support to the choice of corporate opacity in
examining the relationship between family control and the cost of debt.

Prior studies find CEO type (e.g., founder-, descendent-, or outside- CEOs) affects firm
performance and some other firm behavior (Morck et al., 1988; Anderson et al., 2003;
Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and Srinivasan, 2011). To investigate the
impact of CEO type on the cost debt, I extend the testing in Equation 2 by adding dummy
variables for each CEO type. Founder CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO in a
family firm is the founder herself. Family CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO
in a family firm is a member (other than the founder) of the founding family. Outside CEO is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO in a family firm is from outside of the family. I
report the results in Table 3.12

The results in columns 1 and 2 show that only those family firms with founder-CEOs enjoy
lower costs of debt than nonfamily firms. In column 3, the coefficient of Family ownership is
negative and significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficients of Family CEO and
Outside CEO are both positive and significant at the 1% level as well. The positive and
significant coefficients of Family CEO and Outside CEO in column 3 indicate that both
family member CEOs and outside CEOs weaken the overall negative impact of family
control on the cost of debt. The firm-fixed effect regression result in column 4 generally
confirms the result in column 3.
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The results are generally consistent with those in Villalonga and Amit (2006), Fahlenbrach
(2009), and Li and Srinivasan (2011), among others, who find that founder-CEOs lead to
better performance and corporate governance, which in turn helps to reduce the cost of debt.
However, the negative and significant coefficients of Family ownership in columns 3, 4, 7,
and 8 indicate that even after controlling for CEO type, family firms overall still pay lower
costs of debt than nonfamily firms.

The results in columns 5 to 8 reveal that the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship
between family control and the cost of debt varies with the type of CEO, specifically,
whether the CEOs are founders or not. The coefficient of the interaction term Founder
CEO*Opacity index is not significantly different from zero; however, the coefficients of
Family CEO*Opacity index and Outside CEO*Opacity index are both positive and
significant. These results indicate that, relative to those family firms with family member
CEOs and outside CEOs, firms with founder CEOs are perceived to have fewer agency
problems between family blockholders and outside investors (Villalonga and Amit, 2006);
consequently the cost of debt of founder-CEO firms is less sensitive to corporate opacity.

I further delineate between family firms with family CEOs and family firms with outside
CEOs. Although the coefficients of Outside CEO*Opacity index appear to be larger than the
coefficients of Family CEO*Opacity index in all four columns 5 to 8 (especially in the firmfixed effects models), the unreported results of the F-tests indicate no significant difference,
as none of the F-values is significant at even the 10% level. For example, the result for the
test of difference between coefficients of Outside CEO*Opacity index and Family
CEO*Opacity index shows F-value = 0.69, with a p-value = 0.401.
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Table 3.11 Family blockholder, nonfamily blockholder, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt
This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family blockholders, nonfamily blockholders, and their interactions with corporate opacity. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) use ordinary
least squares estimation and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) use firm-fixed effects estimation. The dependent variable is cost of debt in all models. Family block ownership is the fractional equity
ownership by a family if the family is the controlling shareholder with at least 10% of cash flow rights. Nonfamily block ownership is the fractional equity ownership by a nonfamily controlling
shareholder with at least 10% cash flow rights. Family block dummy (nonfamily block dummy) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a family (nonfamily)
with at least 10% cash flow rights. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family block ownership

OLS
(1)
-1.726***
(0.000)

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-1.027**
(0.044)

-0.552
(0.102)

-0. 402
(0.687)

Family block ownership * Opacity index
Nonfamily block ownership
Nonfamily block ownership* Opacity index

OLS
(3)
-3.874***
(0.001)
0.115**
(0.018)
-0.529
(0.541)
0.004
(0.908)

Family block dummy

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
(4)
(5)
-1.455*
(0.064)
0.033*
(0.083)
0.841
(0.384)
-0.004
(0.803)
-0.357***
(0.007)

Firm-fixed effects
(6)

OLS
(7)

Firm-fixed effects
(8)

-0.278**
(0.026)

-1.522***
(0.000)
0.057***
(0.001)
-0.335
(0.347)
0.017
(0.258)
0.015
(0.296)
Yes
Yes
3320
0.336
21.03***

-0.727**
(0.048)
0.028*
(0.064)
-0.342
(0.320)
0.004
(0.753)
0.012
(0.320)
Yes
No
3320
0.615
6.44***

Family block dummy * Opacity index
Nonfamily block dummy

0.028
(0.803)

0.094
(0.325)

Yes
Yes
3320
0.331
22.19***

Yes
No
3320
0.613
6.08***

Nonfamily block dummy * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Yes
Yes
3320
0.334
23.47***

Yes
No
3320
0.613
6.42***

0.026**
(0.027)
Yes
Yes
3320
0.338
21.99***

0.025***
(0.006)
Yes
No
3320
0.614
6.63***
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Table 3.12 Family firm CEO type, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt
This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family firm CEO type and their interactions with corporate opacity. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) use ordinary least squares estimation
and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) use firm fixed-effects estimation. The dependent variable is cost of debt in all models. Founder CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO in a family
firm is the founder herself. Family CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO in a family firm is a member (other than the founder) of the founding family. Outside CEO is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the CEO in a family firm is from outside of the family. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. P-values based on standard errors corrected for firm-level clusterging
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
OLS
(1)

Firm-fixed effects
(2)

-0.522***
(0.000)
0.287
(0.224)
0.224
(0.197)

-0.231*
(0.057)
0.182
(0.275)
0.005
(0.984)

OLS
(3)
-2.152***
(0.000)
0.167
(0.411)
0.945***
(0.001)
0.828***
(0.001)

Yes
Yes
3320
0.333
21.82***

Yes
No
3320
0.612
5.52***

Yes
Yes
3320
0.336
21.65***

Family ownership
Founder CEO
Family CEO
Outside CEO
Founder CEO * Opacity index
Family CEO * Opacity index
Outside CEO * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of Debt
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
(4)
(5)
-1.168**
(0.048)
0.025
-1.494***
(0.920)
(0.000)
0.418*
0.183
(0.059)
(0.778)
0.264*
-0.876**
(0.096)
(0.050)
0.189
(0.848)
1.933***
(0.004)
2.150**
(0.013)
1.036***
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
3320
3320
0.612
0.338
5.44***
20.40***

Firm-fixed effects
(6)
-0.651**
(0.041)
-0.190
(0.831)
-0.682
(0.168)
0.555
(0.531)
0.947*
(0.062)
1.488*
(0.082)
0.651***
(0.009)
Yes
No
3320
0.614
5.76***

OLS
(7)
-1.765***
(0.002)
-0.831*
(0.052)
0.741
(0.270)
-0.374
(0.437)
0.157
(0.873)
1.739***
(0.009)
2.133**
(0.015)
0.968**
(0.011)
Yes
Yes
3320
0.340
20.13***

Firm-fixed effects
(8)
-0.855**
(0.040)
-0.435
(0.247)
-0.036
(0.968)
-0.480
(0.367)
0.588
(0.501)
0.887*
(0.085)
1.460*
(0.092)
0.654***
(0.009)
Yes
No
3320
0.614
5.63***
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3.5.3 Other additional tests

I winsorize all continuous variables used in the multivariate tests at the 1% and 99% level;
therefore, the results in Section 3.4 are unlikely to be driven by outliers. In Section 3.4.2.2, I
also address the concern about potential endogeneity of family ownership and the cost of debt
using the instrumental variable (IV) 2SLS approach. I find that the results are also robust to
various alternative model specifications.

In the main analyses, I measure a firm's cost of debt as its interest expense for the year
divided by the average short-term and long-term debt during the year. As mentioned in
Section 3.3.3.1, Chinese public firms often integrate interest expense into an accounting item
called "financial expense", which includes interest expense, interest income, profit and loss
on foreign exchanges, and various fees and charges by financial institutions. As a robustness
check, I use firm-level financial expenses (scaled by total assets), rather than interest
expenses, as a proxy for the cost of debt.

"Financial expense" is explicitly disclosed by every firm in their annual reports and is directly
available from the CSMAR database, which minimizes the possibility of mistakes in my
manually collecting data from notes to the annual reports. As interest expenses generally
represent the largest component of a firm's overall financial expenses, I expect similar results
to those reported in Section 3.4. I repeat all tests in Table 3.4 to Table 3.12 using financial
expenses (scaled by total assets) as the dependent variable. The results generally confirm my
expectation and remain statistically significant.
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Finally, the by-industry distribution of sample firm-year observations (Table 3.2B) shows
there is no family firm in the power, gas, and water production and supply industry (industry
code D). To control for potential industry effects, I follow Anderson et al. (2003) and exclude
this industry (34 firm-year observations) from the sample. I find similar results to those
reported in Table 3.4 to Table 3.12 using this new sample, which contains 3286 firm-year
observations (with all industries containing both family and nonfamily firms).

3.6 Summary and conclusion

The existing literature provides inconclusive empirical evidence on the relationship between
family control and firms' cost of debt. Moreover, several studies that examine such a
relationship from a perspective of country-level institutions (e.g., Ellul et al., 2007; Boubakri
and Ghouma, 2010) seem to generate inconsistent results. Therefore, I posit that the impact of
family control on the cost of debt is affected by certain firm-level factors. Using a sample of
3320 firm-year observations of privately (i.e., nonstate) controlled but publicly listed firms in
China over the period 2004–2010, I find that on average family controlled firms pay
significantly lower costs of debt, relative to nonfamily controlled firms. I also find that
controlling families' negative impact on the firms' cost of debt exists mainly in relatively less
opaque firms. There is no significant difference in the cost of debt between family and
nonfamily firms when corporate opacity is relatively high.

I further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity on the relationship
between family control and the cost of debt is affected by certain other factors. Specifically,
the cost of debt of family firms is more sensitive to corporate opacity when the controlling
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shareholders' control-ownership wedge is wider, when external institutions are weaker, and
when firms are not politically connected.

This study has important implications for family firms. Like firms in many other emerging
markets, listed firms in China overall rely heavily on debt to finance their growth. Therefore,
identifying factors that influence the relationship between family control and the cost of debt
is especially important in helping family firms, not only in China but also in other emerging
markets, to find out how they can benefit from lower costs of debt. In addition, families in
both developed and emerging markets commonly control the firms with a relatively small
equity ownership. The results show that family-controlled firms with high control-ownership
wedges can still enjoy a lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms, if they provide relatively
more transparent information to outside investors.

The findings that the impact of family control on the cost of debt is more sensitive to
corporate opacity when external legal and market institutions are relatively weaker indicate
that transparent information is even more valuable to family firms in countries with weak
institutions, where, according to Ellul et al. (2007), family firms are more likely to suffer
from higher costs of debt.
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Appendix Robustness checks using unsinged (absolute value) discretionary accruals as a measure of corporate opacity
Tables in this appendix present regression results of the impact of family firms on the cost of debt and on the role of corporate opacity on the relationship between family firms and the cost
of debt. The dependent variable is cost of debt in all regressions. Discretionary accruals are calculated using modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). Higher (absolute) values of
discretionary accruals indicate greater corporate opacity. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. The constant term and control variables are included in all regressions but their
coefficients are not reported. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Table A3.1 Family firms and the cost of debt (full sample and sub-sample analyses)
Full sample

Family ownership
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-0.884**
[0.426]
Yes
Yes
2220
0.204
12.02***

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
Low-accruals subsample
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
(3)
(4)
-1.326*
-1.219***
-0.922**
[0.706]
[0.408]
[0.444]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
2220
1110
1110
0.414
0.209
0.508
2.89***
6.68***
2.31***

High-accruals subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(5)
(6)
-0.436
-0.370
[0.615]
[1.520]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1110
1110
0.221
0.308
11.22***
2.27***

Table A3.2 Family firms and the cost of debt (full sample with interaction term)

Family ownership
Family ownership*Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Yearn and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-1.246**
[0.601]
6.165**
[2.563]
0.509
[0.395]
Yes
Yes
2220
0.207
11.97***

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-1.549**
[0.741]
4.492**
[2.083]
0.007
[0.985]
Yes
No
2220
0.415
2.57***
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Table A3.3 Control-ownership wedge, family firm, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-1.289**
[0.636]
2.664**
[1.329]
0.588
[0.481]
Yes
Yes
1196
0.235
18.44***

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
High-wedge subsample
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-3.256**
[1.609]
9.892**
[4.984]
-0.430
[0.914]
Yes
No
1196
0.540
2.47***

Low-wedge subsample
OLS
(3)
-1.141**
[0.575]
7.199
[5.113]
0.740
[0.585]
Yes
Yes
1024
0.210
30.56***

Firm-fixed effects
(4)
-1.336***
[0.436]
2.429
[12.091]
1.423
[3.035]
Yes
No
1024
0.321
3.46***

Table A3.4 External institutions, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
External factor: Market development
Low-market-development subsample
High-market-development subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-1.469**
-2.219*
-0.332**
-1.445*
[0.577]
[1.161]
[0.147]
[0.874]
10.737**
7.119**
4.668
1.254
[4.887]
[3.501]
[6.112]
[1.726]
1.759*
0.434
0.312
1.003
[0.906]
[0.834]
[0.873]
[1.262]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
925
925
948
948
0.215
0.540
0.345
0.634
14.44***
39.94***
6.21***
2.90***

External factor: property protection
Low-property-protection subsample
High-property-protection subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-1.558**
-2.536***
-0.264**
-1.763*
[0.722]
[0.823]
[0.126]
[0.904]
13.714***
10.127**
7.297
3.630
[5.082]
[5.002]
[6.073]
[6.182]
1.151*
0.160
0.826
0.352
[0.674]
[0.853]
[0.583]
[1.319]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
933
933
940
940
0.235
0.542
0.311
0.638
14.25***
53.38***
4.88***
2.76***
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Table A3.5 Political connection, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
Non-politically-connected subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
-1.622***
-1.870**
[0.631]
[0.766]
9.277**
6.190*
[4.045]
[3.403]
0.384
0.753
[0.443]
[1.539]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1430
1430
0.219
0.356
9.80***
2.43***

OLS
(3)
-0.970**
[0.491]
1.863
[2.003]
0.913
[0.828]
Yes
Yes
790
0.239
5.32***

Politically-connected subsample
Firm-fixed effects
(4)
-0.520
[0.346]
2.740
[2.268]
0.421
[0.720]
Yes
No
790
0.652
2.60***
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Chapter Four Financial reporting quality in family firms:
Evidence from restatements

4.1 Introduction

High-quality accounting information plays a central role in designing the mechanisms that
mitigate various agency conflicts among blockholders, managers, and outside investors
(Bushman & Smith, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010).
Because of the prevalence of family firms across the globe, a growing number of studies
examine the association between family ownership/control and the quality of accounting
information (e.g., Wang, 2006; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino,
& Sansone, 2010; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2014). The evidence from existing studies is,
however, inconclusive. Moreover, little is known about whether and how family control
influences the way investors react to changes in accounting information quality.

In this chapter, I examine whether mandatory material restatements 21 are associated with
family control which has so far received disproportionate academic attention despite the
prevalence of family firms across the world. I focus on restatements because they are a highly
visible and relatively objective form of low financial reporting quality (Dechow, Ge, &
Schrand, 2010; Cao, Myers, & Omer, 2012). Although existing literature provides limited

21

Because prior literature finds significant differences in market reactions between restatements of material and

immaterial nature and between restatements initiated by different parties (e.g, Palmrose, Richard, & Scholz,
2004; Hennes et al., 2008; Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2011; Cao et al., 2012), I in this chapter focus on mandatory
material restatements to avoid unnecessary complexity. However, future research to further examine the
possible different impacts of family control on these different types of restatements will be interesting.
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direct evidence on the association between restatements and family control, it nonetheless
provides necessary backgrounds for my research. In this study I build on prior literature to
answer two related questions. Does family control reduce or increase the likelihood of a firm
restating its financial statement? Do investors react differently to restatements announced by
family-controlled firms and those by nonfamily-controlled firms? 22

The link between family control and the likelihood of accounting restatements is well
supported by economic theory and existing literature. On the one hand, the multi-generation
nature of controlling families' ownership suggests that they have greater reputation concerns
than nonfamily blockholders (Gilson, 2007; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008). The costly
reputational penalties (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008; Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2009) as
well as losses of other reputation-based nonpecuniary benefits such as a high social status and
political connections are likely to deter family-controlled firms from misstating their financial
statements. At least, family firms will avoid material misstatements that are likely to trigger
enforcement actions such as mandatory restatements and/or condemnation from regulators.

In addition, family owners' concentrated and underdiversified equity ownership means that
they will bear a significant proportion of economic losses resulted from mandatory
restatements. This further reduces family owners’ incentive of misreporting. On the other
hand, family owners’ concentrated ownership could induce them to expropriate other
investors and they are likely to distort financial statements to cover up private benefits of
control. Furthermore, family mangers are generally less likely to be replaced than nonfamily

22

Throughout this chapter, I use the term 'family firms (nonfamily firms)' or 'family-controlled firms

(nonfamily-controlled firms)' interchangeably, because my definition of family firms requires that the founding
family exercises effective control of the firm (see Section 4.3.3.1 for more details).
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managers even when misreporting is later discovered (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003;
Leone & Liu, 2010).

In summary, controlling families' greater reputation concerns and high equity ownership
indicate that they have more incentives provide high-quality financial reporting. However,
family owners’ expropriation incentives and less career concern could induce them to
misreport financial statements. Although family control certainly has influence on financial
reporting quality, it is unclear, ex ante, what the actual impact will be.

I next explore whether investor reactions to forced restatements differ between familycontrolled firms and nonfamily-controlled firms. Restatements provide new information that
leads to erosion of investor perception about managers’ and/or controlling shareholders’
trustworthiness and financial reporting credibility (Mercer, 2004). Restatement firms have
incentives to take various actions in a bid to restore investor trust and to enhance perceived
credibility of future financial reports (Faber, 2005). The unique nature of family ownership
suggests that family control could affect market reactions in two opposite directions.

On the one hand, family firms’ greater reputation concerns could give them more incentives,
as opposed to nonfamily firms, to take actions to address problems and to restore impaired
reputation. As investors value improvement in corporate governance following restatements
(Faber, 2005), this suggests that investors are likely to react less negatively to restatements
made by family firms than to those by nonfamily firms.

On the other hand, family-controlled firms are characterized by potentially more serious
agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders (i.e., Type II
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agency problem), suggesting that investors have a greater demand for high-quality accounting
information for family-controlled firms and consequently are more sensitive to the
deterioration in the quality of accounting information in family-controlled firms than in
nonfamily-controlled firms.

In addition, accounting restatements reveal that the design or/and the implementation of
corporate governance is relatively weak, deepening investors' concerns about possible
expropriation by controlling shareholders, which are perceived to be more severe in familycontrolled firms than in nonfamily-controlled firms. Finally, the literature finds that the media
is more likely to publicize targets or events with higher information demand or with high
prominence (e.g., Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Dyck & Zingales, 2003). This suggests that
restatements announced by family-controlled firms are likely to attract more media attention,
which further reinforces the more negative market reactions to family firm restatement
announcements.

I test these two competing theories about the impact of family control on the likelihood of
financial misreporting and on market reactions to restatements with a sample of 151
mandatory material restatements announced by non-state-controlled public firms in the period
of 2004 to 2010. Using a matched-firm approach, I find clear evidence that compared to
nonfamily-controlled firms family-controlled firms in China have a significantly lower
likelihood of misreporting their annual financial statements, even after controlling for firm
characteristics and other corporate governance proxies that are found to be associated with
restatements in prior studies. This finding is consistent with the notion that controlling
families have a greater concern for reputation as well as the overall evidence that family
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owners have greater incentives to mitigate agency costs than nonfamily blockholders (e.g.,
Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2008, 2014).

With respect to investor reactions to restatement announcements, I find that family control is
associated with significantly stronger market reactions, specifically more negative cumulative
abnormal return (CAR), higher abnormal return variance (ARV), higher abnormal trading
volume (ATV), and higher abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over short windows
surrounding the restatement announcements. The more negative reactions to family firm
restatements are even more pronounced when corporate information is more opaque. I also
find that family restatement firms experience a significantly larger loss in the information
content of earnings measured by earnings response coefficient (ERC) compared to nonfamily
restatement firms.

Recall earlier finding that family firms are less likely than nonfamily firms to restate their
financial reports due to their greater reputation concerns; the results on market reactions thus
suggest that restatements do more damage to investor trust for firms with good past record.
To this extent, my findings are consistent with that in Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi (2013)
who find that market reactions to announcements of regulation violations are stronger for
firms with low past violations.

This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I establish a direct link
between family control and market reactions to accounting restatements. In this regard, this
study complements an important body of literature that tries to identify the determinants of
market reactions to restatements (e.g., Palmrose et al., 2004; Callen, Robb, & Segal, 2008;
Peterson, 2012).
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Second, prior studies commonly argue that family firms have a greater concern for reputation
than nonfamily firms. I build on prior literature to address an important but largely ignored
question, 'What are the implications or consequences when the reputation of controlling
families is impaired?' To this extend, the results also provide empirical support to the
expectancy violation theory (Burgoon & LePoire, 1993; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).

Third, this study enhances our understanding of the impact of family control/ownership on
reporting quality and provides a possible direction for future research. For example, an
alternative explanation for the more negative market reactions to family firm restatements
could be that, although family firms are less likely to misreport, once they are engaged in
financial misreporting they are associated with more serious restatements 23. Although I am
unable to directly test this hypothesis due to data limit, future studies can examine whether
the impact of family control on financial misreporting is conditioned on the severity of the
misconduct.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related literature and
presents the hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the research design and sample. Section 4.4
reports main empirical results. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.

4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development
4.2.1 Family control and the likelihood of accounting restatements

23

Although all restatements in the sample are initiated by regulators, they can still differ in terms of severity.

Ideally, I would like to have the data on the ratio of the amount in question to the total earnings/assets/revenue.
However, not all firms disclose these figures in their restatement announcements.
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Direct evidence on the relationship between family control and the incidence of accounting
restatements is scarce. Therefore, I briefly review the literature that elaborates the unique
characteristics of family ownership and some empirical evidence on the relationship between
family firms and the quality of financial reporting, from which I then introduce my
hypotheses.

The literature often points out family owners' greater concern for reputation as a salient
characteristic of family firms. Gilson (2007) points out that 'because of intrafamily
inheritance and family ties, the current generation of decision makers, at least in functional
family businesses, treats the next generation's utility as the equivalent of their own' (p. 643).
Therefore, family owners' desire to pass on successful family businesses to future generations
can constitute a powerful motivation to adopt a long-term investment approach and naturally
give them greater incentives to invest more to build and protect a reputation (Gilson, 2007;
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). In addition, Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer
(2003) point out that a family name connected to a successful family business may bring in
nonpecuniary or reputational benefits, such as a high social status and political connections.
The analysis thus suggests that controlling families have stronger incentives than nonfamily
blockholders not to misstate their financial statements, because misstatements could impair or
even damage firm reputation, which is more difficult to restore for family firms than for
nonfamily firms.

We argue that family owners in China are likely to have even a greater concern for reputation
than their counterparts in more developed markets. The relatively weak formal institutions in
China and especially the lack of an effective judicial and investor protection system mean
outside investors have few channels through which to take actions against controlling
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shareholders when their rights are jeopardized (MacNeil, 2002; Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005).
As a result, contracting and financing in China often rely on alternative informal governance
mechanisms. Reputation probably plays the most important role in informal enforcement,
along with relationship (Allen et al., 2005; Gilson, 2007; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2012). This is
in stark contrast with contracting in more developed markets where it is largely rule-of-lawbased.

Controlling families' long-term oriented approach also means they are less interested in the
day-to-day stock price movements, thus giving family-controlled firms less incentives to
manage earnings to manipulate short-term stock prices. In addition, the (frequent) unification
of the positions of controlling shareholder and management or their dominant power over
nonfamily managers suggest that controlling families are effective 'monitors-in-place'
(Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009) who are both motivated and well positioned to discipline
managerial agents. Furthermore, family members are often as knowledgeable as managers
about their firms, enabling them to provide effective checks on professional managers.
Consistent with this view, Chen (2005) finds that not only can family owners quickly detect
managers’ manipulation of accounting information, they can also rely less on accountingbased performance measures in designing management compensation. This in turn reduces
managers' opportunistic behavior in earnings management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Coffee,
2005).
Taken together, given that family control can either reduce or increase the likelihood of
restatement, I present the first hypothesis as nondirectional:

H1: Compared to nonfamily-controlled firms, family-controlled firms are less likely to
misstate their accounting statements.
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4.2.2 Family control and market reactions to accounting restatements

Family firms are also characterized by concentrated ownership that may imply possibly more
severe agency problems between large shareholders and minority shareholders. Minority
shareholders, being concerned about controlling families' potential expropriation risk, will
demand high-quality accounting information. This suggests that, compared to minority
shareholders in nonfamily-controlled firms, those in family-controlled firms are more
sensitive to the quality and hence the deterioration in the quality of accounting information.
In addition, a strong internal corporate governance system is important in helping to mitigate
agency conflicts, especially when external governance (e.g., statutory regulation and formal
institutions) is weak, such as in the Chinese market. Restatements provide new information
that allows outside investors to learn that either the firm's internal governance policy is not
well designed to prevent controlling shareholders' opportunistic behavior, or such a
governance system is not effectively implemented (Kinney & McDaniel, 1989). Furthermore,
restatements exacerbate the information asymmetry between insiders and minority
shareholders, making it even more difficult for minority shareholders to assess the efficacy of
a firm's internal governance. As minority shareholders are generally more concerned about
controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behavior in family-controlled firms than in
nonfamily-controlled firms, the analysis above thus suggests more negative investor reactions
to restatements announced by family-controlled firms.

In addition, a number of studies find that the media (or the press) can play an important role
in identifying and monitoring firm frauds (Miller, 2006). In choosing which firm or fraud to
cover, reporters/publishers will maximize the benefits of articles by focusing on firms that
have high visibility or those with great information demand (Dyck & Zingales, 2003). The
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literature finds that the media is more likely to publicize targets or events with prominence or
high reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). This suggests that,
compared to nonfamily firm restatements, restatements by family-controlled firms, and in
particular those involving high-profile entrepreneurs, are more attractive to readers and more
likely to be picked up by the media. Does such a bias in media coverage affect investor
reactions? Dyck and Zingales (2003) find that stock prices are most reactive to earnings
announcements emphasized by the media, which implies that investors will react more
strongly to family firm restatements than to nonfamily firm restatements, because the former
are likely to attract more intense media coverage.

Finally, firms found to be involved in accounting irregularities and other frauds commonly
take actions in a bid to improve corporate governance and to restore investor trust. Replacing
the CEO and/or other members of the firm's top management is one of the most typical
actions (Hennes, Leone, & Miller, 2008; Karpoff et al., 2008). It is a common practice for the
founder or other members from the controlling family to take key management positions in
family firms. The literature has provide theoretical (e.g., Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003)
and empirical evidence (e.g., Leone & Liu, 2010) that a top manager from the controlling
family is significantly less likely than an outside manager to be punished or even fired,
especially when such an action will have a spillover effect on family relationships outside
business. The discussion here thus suggests that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms
are often short of one important and effective tool to signal to investors the firms' intent and
commitment to improve corporate governance and to restore investor trust.

Summing up our discussion, minority investors on the one hand have a higher expectation
about the reputation concerns of the controlling families; while on the other hand they have
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greater concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behavior. Thus, they have both a
higher expectation about the supply of and a greater demand for high-quality accounting
information from family-controlled firms. Once a family-controlled firm restates its
accounting statement, minority investors' initial expectation about reputation is violated and
their concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behavior become dominant. In other
words, a restatement by a family firm will turn around investors’ attitude towards family
firms. Such a perception, together with the unfavorable bias in media coverage, is likely to
lead minority investors to react more negatively to family firm restatements. Thus, we state
our second hypothesis as follows:

H2: Accounting restatements announced by family-controlled firms lead to stronger and
more negative market reactions than restatements announced by nonfamily-controlled firms.

4.2.3 Information opacity and the impact of family control on market reactions

Financial misstatement implies information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and
outside investors. The controlling shareholders conceal the true information for the purpose
of further expropriation of minority shareholders. Therefore, opaque corporate information
leads outside investors to perceive that the potential agency conflicts between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders are more serious, compared to when information is
more transparent (Fan & Wong, 2002; Luez et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2009). This will
further increase outside investors' mistrust in the controlling families/managers. As
restatements are likely to lower the credibility of the restatement firm's accounting
information and as well as increase investors' concerns about controlling families'
opportunistic and expropriating behavior, the analysis above thus suggests that the
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relationship between family control and market reactions to restatements can be affected by
the relative opacity of the firm's information. Thus, I state my third hypothesis as follows:

H3: The impact of family control on market reactions to restatements is more pronounced for
firms with more opaque corporate information.
4.3 Research design and sample
4.3.1 Research design

To test the first hypothesis, I estimate the following logit model:
k

Rε statε = β 0 + β1 Family + ∑ β i Control i + Fixεd Effεcts + ε

(4.1)

2

In this model, Restate is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm restates its annual financial
report in a given period; Family is a dummy variable that denotes a family-controlled firm;
and Controli is a set of control variables. All control variables in Eq. (1) are measured in the
year when the misstatement occurs and not in the year when a subsequent restatement is
announced.

To test the second hypothesis, I estimate the following baseline regression model:
k

Market Re actioni = β 0 + β 1 Family + ∑ β i Control i + Fixed Effects + e i

(4.2)

2

In this model, Market Reaction is the reaction generated by a firm's announcement of an
accounting restatement and is represented by one of the following four measures: cumulative
abnormal return (CAR), abnormal return variance (ARV), abnormal trading volume (ATV),
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or abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS) over the short-term window surrounding the
announcement. If family control leads to more negative market reactions to a restatement
announcement, I expect 𝛽1 to be negative when market reaction is measured by CAR and 𝛽1

to be positive when market reaction is represented by the other three measures, and vice versa.
While it is relatively easy and straightforward to understand an expected positive 𝛽1 when

market reaction is measured by ARV and ABAS, the reason why a positive 𝛽1 for ATV

indicates more negative market reaction is as follows. Karpoff (1987) argues that volume is
positively related to the magnitude of price change and to the price change per se. Friedman
(1969) further points out that a heavy volume of trading reflects differences of opinion among
investors about the future course of prices. I argue that if restatements by family firms result
in greater uncertainty about the credibility of the firms' post-restatement performance as well
as the performance per se, it should be reflected in larger short-term stock return variances,
which in turn are expected to be associated with larger trading volumes based on the
theoretical and empirical evidence in Karpoff (1987) and Friedman (1969).

In addition to the baseline regression model, I will also examine whether the relationship
between family control and market reactions is affected by corporate information opacity. To
test the third hypothesis, I estimate the following regression model:
Market Re actioni = β 0 + β1 Family
+ β 2 Family ∗ Ownership Wedge ( or Opacity Index)
+ β 3 Ownership Wedge ( or Opacity Index )
k

+ ∑ β i Control + Fixed Effects + e i

( 4.3 )

4

In this model, Ownership Wedge is the difference between the controlling shareholder's
control (voting) rights and cash flow rights; Opacity Index, measured by a comprehensive
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index that consists of four components based on stock trading information and analyst
coverage, gauges the relative information opaqueness of a firm.

I estimate all regressions by controlling for year and industry fixed effects. Industry dummies
are based on the two-digit classification issued by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to
minimize the influence of outliers. In line with prior studies, I control for heteroskedasticity
using White-adjusted standard errors.

4.3.2 Sample construction

The sample selection procedures are as follows. I first manually check all announcements
containing the keyword 'correction' ('gengzheng' in Chinese pinyin) that are issued by listed
nonfinancial firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange websites. The sample
period spans from 2004 to 2010. I choose 2004 as my beginning year for the following reason.
On January 6, 2004, the CSRC issued a notice in which it clearly stated that 'a firm must in a
timely manner disclose restated financial information in the format of a significant event
announcement if there are accounting errors'. Thus, restatements of substantive significance
exist only after 2004.

Although this study focuses on restatements of annual reports only24, I do not include 'annual'
or 'annual report' as my filtering keywords because I note that a number of restatement

24

Listed firms in China are not mandatorily required to have their quarterly and half-yearly financial statements

formally audited. Thus, these two types of financial statements are not expected to have the same credibility as
that of annual statements.
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announcements do not contain these two words. In other words, including 'annual' or 'annual
report' in the search would significantly reduce the sample size. I include in my sample only
those restatements that are initiated by external auditors and regulators such as CSRC and
stock exchanges.
I first exclude 'ST' (special treatment) firms. ST firms are those firms that have made losses in
two consecutive years and face the risk of being delisted if they continue to make losses for a
third year, which gives them strong incentives to misreport their financial statements. The
trading behavior of ST firms is also likely to be different from non-ST firms.

I then restrict the sample to non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) for the following
reasons. SOEs in China often have various political and social objectives, such as improving
employment, strengthening fiscal conditions of local governments, and maintaining social
stability, in addition to operating performance. Therefore, compensation and/or promotion of
managers of SOEs rely less on accounting measures when compared to managers of nonSOEs. Moreover, SOEs' access to bank loans is also less related to firm performance. Thus,
compared to managers of non-SOEs, managers of SOEs have weaker incentives to
manipulate accounting earnings. Furthermore, Firth et al. (2011) point out that even when
false accounting has occurred, disclosure of it through accounting restatement is less likely
for SOEs than for non-SOEs. I require that a firm is a non-SOE both in the year of
misstatement and in the year of restatement. I identify 420 restatements announced by nonSOEs during the sample period.

Following Firth et al. (2011), I next limit the sample to restatements that affect revenues, net
earnings, or/and assets. I also exclude restatements resulting from minor or technical errors
(e.g., nondisclosure of immaterial information, misprints, or simple miscalculations in the
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original annual reports), because Hennes et al. (2008) emphasize the importance of
distinguishing between errors and irregularities. These criteria reduce the sample size to 183.
Next, I exclude restatements that are corrections or supplementary restatements to previously
announced restatements. This requirement further reduces the sample size to 177. Finally, I
eliminate observations that lack the required stock trading data. As a result, the selection
criteria yield a final sample of 151 restatements. The sample construction procedure is
summarized in Table 4.1.

Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Leone & Liu, 2010; Firth et al.,
2011; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013), I adopt a matched-firm approach. I match each of the
151 restatement firms with a matching firm that satisfies all of the following requirements: (1)
has the same CSRC two-digit industry code as the restatement firm; (2) has the closest size
(total assets) to the restatement firm; (3) does not announce any material restatements within
a five-year window (two years before and two years after) surrounding the announcement of
a restatement by the restatement firm; (4) has been listed for the same number of years (and
on the same stock exchange when possible) as the restatement firm; and (5) is not an ST firm.
The average misstatement firm is slightly smaller than the average matching firm (p = 0.093).
I control for firm size in all multivariate regressions.

I obtain accounting and corporate governance data from the China Securities Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Compiled by Shenzhen GTA Information
Technology Company Ltd., CSMAR is one of the most widely used databases for research on
the Chinese stock market. Daily stock return and trading volume data are also from CSMAR;
while data used to calculate bid-ask spreads is provided by Securities Industry Research
Centre

of

Australia

(SIRCA).
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Table 4.1 Sample selection
This table summarizes the sample selection process. The sample period is between 2004 and 2010. Each restatement firm is matched with a control firm that is based on size, IPO year, stock
exchange, and CSRC two-digit industry code. Each control firm is required to have not announced a restatement within a five-year window.

Number of restatements of annual reports identified on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange websites
(requiring that a firm is a non-SOE in the year the restatement is announced)
Less restatements where the firm is an SOE in the year of misstatement
All restatements issued by nonstate-controlled firms
Less restatements that result from minor and/or technical errors
Restatements that involve corrections to revenue, earnings, or assets
Less restatements that are a correction or supplementary to previous restatements
Less restatements that lack required stock trading data
Sample of restatements
Plus matching firms
Total sample of restatement and matching firms

492
(72)
420
(237)
183
(6)
(26)
151
151
302
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4.3.3 Variable definitions
4.3.3.1 Family control

Because of concentrated ownership in many European and East Asian countries, researchers
commonly apply a minimum threshold for the largest shareholder's ownership to ensure
effective control (Fan & Wong, 2002; Dyck & Zingales, 2004). In this study, I use a dummy
variable Family to denote family control if: (1) the founder and members of the founding
family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at least 20% of the firm's control rights;
and (2) the founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest
shareholder.

In addition to the criteria described above I also apply some other rules in determining a
family-controlled firm, given the unique characteristics of the Chinese markets. First, if a
firm is established by more than one family, I regard the family with the largest control rights
as the controlling family.

Second, private individuals were not allowed to own or control a business until some years
after the start of the economic reform; until then many businesses were registered as village
and town enterprises (VTEs), even though they were founded and controlled by natural
persons. There firms were later re-registered as private enterprises when it was permitted by
the new laws. In those cases these firms are regarded as family firms if they meet the two
criteria of my family firm definition (i.e., ultimate largest shareholder with at least 20%
control rights). In some other cases, managers of VTEs later become the controlling
shareholders through management buyouts. I view these firms as nonfamily firms, even if the
controlling shareholders have more than 20% of control rights.
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4.3.3.2 Market reactions

In this chapter, I test market reactions to restatement announcements with four measures,
namely cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), abnormal return variance (ARV), abnormal
trading volume (ATV), and abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over the event window
surrounding the announcement.

I follow prior studies such as Firth et al. (2011) and Pevzner, Xie, and Xin (in press) to
calculate CAR using the market-adjusted-model returns. I first calculate the daily abnormal
return (AR) over the event window from the following model:
𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑚 )
where 𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the AR of firm i on day t, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual stock return (dividend adjusted) of

firm i on day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑚 is the market return (dividend adjusted) on day t, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the
market model estimates of firm i obtained from the estimation window [-120, -21]. I then
sum 𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 to calculate the CAR over the event window.
I adopt the approach in DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007) and Pevzner et al. (in press) to
calculate the ARV as follows. I obtain the stock return variance over the event window as the
2
average of the squared market-adjusted return 𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡
. I next obtain the stock return variance

over the estimation window [-120, -21] as the variance of the residual returns from each
firm's market model estimated over the estimation window. The ARV is then calculated as
the ratio of the stock return variance over the event window to the stock return variance over
the estimation window.
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I again follow DeFond et al. (2007) and Pevzner et al. (in press) to calculate the ATV by
dividing the average daily trading volume over the event window by the average daily trading
volume over the estimation window [-120, -21], where trading volume is measured as the
number of shares traded on day t scaled by the total number of tradable shares outstanding on
day t.

I measure the ABAS as the average bid-ask spread over the event window divided by the
average bid-ask spread over the estimation window [-120, -21]. Following prior studies such
as Cai (2004) and Firth et al. (2011), I use the relative bid-ask spread, i.e., absolute spread
divided by the average of bid and ask, in my tests. The average relative spread is then
calculated as the mean relative spread measured in hourly intervals over the event window
and the estimation window, respectively.

4.3.3.3 Corporate information opacity

To test H3, I use two variables as proxies for a firm’s information opacity. The first variable
is the divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights.
Fan and Wong (2002) and Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2005) find that accounting
information is less informative (i.e., more opaque) when the controlling shareholder’s control
rights exceed cash flow rights. Leuz et al. (2003) also find that controlling shareholders have
incentives to provide opaque information when they intend to extract private benefits of
control which is more likely when there is a divergence between control and cash flow rights.
Following prior studies, the control-ownership wedge is calculated as the difference between
control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate largest shareholder. A larger wedge
indicates a higher level of information opacity.
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The second variable follows Anderson et al. (2009) and is a comprehensive index that
consists of four components based on stock trading information and analyst coverage. To
construct the corporate opacity index, I first calculate the four individual components of
opacity, namely trading volume, log of the number of analysts following the firm, proportion
of zero-return trading days, and daily stock return volatility. I next rank each of these four
components into deciles, with a value of 10 representing the most opaque firms and a value
of 1 representing the least opaque firms. I then sum these four components and divide it by a
factor of 40, which is the maximum possible value. This process yields a corporate opacity
index that ranges from 0.1 to 1, with higher values indicating higher levels of information
opacity.

4.3.3.4 Control variables

I include a set of control variables in the regression models following prior studies. Firm size
(Firm size), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (Leverage), and whether the firm records a
loss in the previous year (Negative EPS) are found to be associated with the occurrence of
accounting restatement in a large number of studies (e.g., Kinney & McDaniel, 1989;
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Cao et al., 2012). Starting from 2005, China conducts a
nontradable share (NTS) reform. After the NTS reform, those previous nontradable shares
(often held by blockholders) become freely tradable in the stock market. This may have two
opposite effects on the likelihood of misstatements. On the one hand, blockholders may
become more concerned about potential negative market reactions once misstatements are
caught. One the other hand, blockholders may have greater incentives to misstate financial
statements in order to manipulate stock prices. It’s unclear which motivation will dominate.
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Thus, I introduce a dummy variable Reform, which equals 1 if a firm has completed the NTS
reform and zero otherwise.

I also control for several corporate governance variables in the regressions. A large number
of studies find a positive association between a firm’s earnings quality and the external
auditor being Big N, both in the international setting (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Teoh &
Wong, 1993; Faber, 2005) and for the Chinese market (Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang, 2011;
Firth et al., 2011). I therefore control for external auditor identity (Big auditor) and whether a
firm receives a modified (nonstandard) opinion on its annual report (MAO) (Kinney &
McDaniel, 1989). Big auditor is coded 1 if a firm hires one of the international Big Four
auditors, or the six largest national auditors by revenue to audit its financial reports. 25 Board
independence or the ratio of outside directors (Outside directors) is a commonly used
variable in evaluating the strength of corporate governance and has been found to be
associated with a lower probability of financial misreporting (Cao et al., 2012; Kryzanowski
& Zhang, 2013). I also control for the existence of an audit committee within the firm (Audit
committee), which is a dummy variable, and the financial expertise of the board (AF
background), which is measured by the proportion of board members who have either
accounting or financial background, following a large literature that examines the impact of
these two factors on earnings/financial reporting quality (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991;
Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Firth et al., 2011). Finally, I control for the equity ownership by
the largest blockholder (Top shares) following Firth et al. (2011).
Detailed descriptions of the key variables used in this chapter are listed in Table 4.2.

25

Inevitably, it is a subjective judgment as to how many auditors are deemed to be big auditors. As a robustness

check, I alternatively classify the largest eight (Chen et al., 2011) or the largest 15 auditors (Firth et al., 2011) as
big auditors. The main findings are robust to these alternative definitions.
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Table 4.2 Descriptions of key variables
Variable
Dependent variables
Misstate
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
Abnormal return variance (ARV)
Abnormal trading volume (ATV)
Abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS)
Key independent variables
Family
Post
Ownership wedge
Opacity index
Firm characteristics
Firm size
Leverage
ROA
Top share
Outside directors
Big auditor
MAO
Negative EPS
Reform
Audit committee
AF Background

Description
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm misstates its annual financial report in a given period (and therefore has to restate the financial report in
a later period); zero for control firms
Equals the sum of the daily abnormal returns over the event window, where daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market-adjusted
model.
Equals the average of the squared market- model- adjusted daily return over the event window scaled by the stock return variance over the
estimate window [-120, -21].
Equals the average of the daily trading volume over the event window scaled by the average daily trading volume over the estimate window [120, -21].
Equals the average of the hourly relative spread (i.e., absolute spread divided by the average of bid and ask) over the event window scaled by
the average of the hourly relative spread over the estimate window [-120, -21].
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate largest shareholder in a firm is a family (all family member ownership combined); zero otherwise
Dummy variable indicating post-restatement period
The difference between control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate largest shareholder
An index that ranks four components, trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-return trading days, and stock return volatility in deciles and
divides the sum of the four components by 40, resulting in an opacity index between 0 and 1. A higher value of opacity index indicates that a
firm’s information is more opaque.
Natural log of total assets
Total liabilities / total assets
Net income / total assets
The proportion of equity ownership by the largest shareholder
Number of independent directors / total number of directors
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s annual report is audited by one of the largest 10 auditing firms in China; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a modified (qualified) audit opinion on its annual report; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a negative EPS (earnings per share); zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has completed the nontradable share reform; zero otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if there exists an audit committee within the firm
The ratio of board members who have either accounting or financial background
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4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Summary statistics

I report the yearly distribution of restatement sample firms in Table 4.3. Restatements by
family-controlled firms account for 36 of the total 151 restatements (or 23.8%) in the sample.
On average about 3.0% of family-controlled firms restate their financial reports each year
(column (d)), which is significantly lower than the overall percentage of restatements at about
4.5% (column (b)). An alternative comparison also shows the lower likelihood of restatement
by family-controlled firms than by nonfamily-controlled firms. Across the whole market,
family-controlled firms account for about 35.9% of all listed firms during the sample period
(column (e)), but restatements by family firms represent only about 23.8% of all restatements
announced (column (f)). Even in the year 2008, when the ratio of family restatements to all
restatements is at its highest level, only less than one third (31.8%) of all restatements are
announced by family-controlled firms.

Table 4.4 presents the summary statistics of the characteristics of the restatement and
matching firms. Family firms account for about 23.8% of the restatement firms and about
33.8% of the matching firms. In other words, compared to matching firms, restatement firms
are less likely to be family firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level. Restatement
firms on average are slightly smaller than matching firms as measured by total assets.
Restatement firms have a substantially higher debt level than matching firms, which is
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kinney & McDaniel, 1989; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991).
Firms with net loss in the prior year (Negative EPS) are significantly more likely to misstate
their financial reports. This is not surprising because loss-making firms have strong
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incentives to manipulate their accounting numbers in order to conceal their true financial
performance and/or to avoid the ST designation.

Noticeably, there are no significant differences between restatement firms and matching firms
in several key corporate governance variables, such as board independence, the existence of
an audit committee, and board members' accounting and financial expertise. These variables
are found to be negatively associated with the likelihood of misstatements in Western
countries (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005, Cao et al., 2012; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013). The
data thus indicates that these corporate governance mechanisms fail to deter Chinese firms
from misstating financial reports. Consistent with prior studies, restatement firms are less
likely to hire a big external auditor and more likely to be issued with a modified auditor's
opinion prior to misstatement.

4.4.2 Family control and restatements

I test the first hypothesis by estimating the regression model specified in Eq. (4.1) and report
the results in Table 4.5. The dependent variable in both columns (1) and (2) is the likelihood
of a firm misstating its financial report. In column (1), where the family control dummy is the
only independent variable other than year and industry fixed effects, I find that family control
has a significant and negative effect (coef. = -0.744, p = 0.010) on accounting restatements.
In column (2), I control for a set of variables including firm-specific characteristics, auditor
attributes, and firm performance. The coefficient of Family remains negative and significant,
although its magnitude (-0.733 vs. -0.744) and statistical significance (p = 0.018 vs. p = 0.010)
become slightly lower.
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These findings provide support for H1 that family control affects the likelihood of mandatory
accounting restatements. Specifically, the results indicate that controlling families have
greater concern for reputation than nonfamily blockholders. The larger reputation-related loss
from mandatory restatements will deter family firms from misstating their financial reports at
least not to the level that is likely to trigger enforcement actions from regulators.

In other word, with respect to whether or not to attempt a misstatement, controlling
shareholders face a “tradeoff” between short-run benefits and long-run reputation loss which
may result in higher future cost of capital (Qian & Yeung, 2014). As the reputation loss from
mandatory restatements will be difficult to recover and family firms are more concerned with
reputation than nonfamily firms, it thus reduces the likelihood of mandatory restatements
from family firms.

With respect to control variables, the results are mostly consistent with the univariate
statistics reported in Table 4.4. The main differences are for firm size and auditor quality.
Neither the coefficient of Firm size nor Big auditor in Table 4.5 is significant, indicating that
these two factors do not significantly affect the likelihood of accounting restatements after
controlling for family control and other firm-specific factors. Although these two variables
are found to be different between misstatement firms and control firms in Table 4.4, these
results shouldn't be too surprising because the difference in firm size and auditor quality
between these two group of firms is only marginal (p = 0.093 and p = 0.088, respectively, in
Table 4.4).
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Table 4.3 Sample distribution
This table reports the distribution of sample firms (restatement firms only) by year and by whether they are family-controlled firms.

Year

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

Number of
restatements

Ratio of restatements all
listed firms (%)

Number of
family restatements

a
10
31
26
16
22
20
26
151

b
3.0
7.9
6.1
3.4
4.1
3.4
4.1
4.5

c
1
4
7
4
7
6
7
36

Ratio of family
restatements to all family
firms (%)
d
1.1
3.5
5.7
2.7
3.4
2.4
2.4
3.0

Ratio of family firms to all
listed firms (%)
e
26.6
29.2
29.1
31.9
38.4
41.4
45.0
35.9

Ratio of family
restatements to all
restatements (%)
f
10.0
12.9
26.9
25.0
31.8
30.0
26.9
23.8
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Table 4.4 Univariate analyses on mean differences between misstatement firms and matching firms
All variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on one-tailed t-tests are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Misstatement firms
(1)

Matching firms
(2)

Diff. in means
(3) = (1) - (2)

Family

Mean
0.238

Std. Dev.
0.043

Mean
0.338

Std. Dev.
0.048

Firm size

20.767

0.906

20.957

1.044

Leverage

0.903

0.808

0.690

0.953

ROA

0.024

0.014

0.024

0.013

Top shares

0.215

0.140

0.242

0.162

Negative EPS

0.264

0.442

0.113

0.318

Reform

0.528

0.501

0.572

0.496

Outside directors

0.359

0.059

0.360

0.065

Big auditor

0.205

0.406

0.265

0.443

MAO

0.179

0.384

0.033

0.180

Audit committee

0.464

0.500

0.470

0.501

AF background

0.290

0.227

0.317

0.196

Obs.

151

-0.100***
(0.009)
-0.190*
(0.093)
0.213**
(0.012)
0.000
(0.979)
-0.027***
(0.006)
0.151***
(0.000)
-0.044
(0.216)
-0.001
(0.941)
-0.060*
(0.088)
0.146***
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.454)
-0.027
(0.139)

151
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Table 4.5 Family control and the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report
This table presents logistic regression results of the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report on family control. P-values based on White standard errors are reported next to
coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:

Misstate
(1)

Family
Firm size
Leverage
ROA
Top share
Negative EPS
Reform
Outside directors
Big auditor
MAO
Audit committee
AF background
Constant
Year effect
Industry effect
Pseudo R-squared
Wald Chi2
Obs.

coefficient
-0.744***

0.071

p-value
0.010

0.962
Included
Included
2.12%
5.48**
302

(2)
coefficient
-0.733**
-0.211
0.136**
-7.434
-1.734**
0.435**
0.266
0.790
-0.259
2.187***
-0.079
0.515
3.850

p-value
0.018
0.187
0.032
0.516
0.046
0.014
0.289
0.724
0.148
0.000
0.810
0.422
0.269

Included
Included
7.53%
28.68***
302
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4.4.3 Family control and market reactions to restatements
4.4.3.1 Short-term reactions

In this subsection, I test H2 in two steps. I first compare short-term market reactions to family
firm restatements and with reactions to nonfamily firm restatements. Univariate tests are done
over three event windows, [0, +1], [-1, +1], and [-3, +3], with day 0 being the announcement
day. The results are reported in Table 4.6. I then use market reactions during the window [-1,
+1] as the dependent variables to estimate the baseline regression model, as specified in Eq.
(4.2), and report the regression results in Table 4.7. In unreported tests, I use market reactions
over windows [0, +1] and [-3, +3] as dependent variables and find that the main findings
remain qualitatively unchanged.

Short-term market reactions, measured by CAR, ARV, ATV, and ABAS, to all restatements,
family firm restatements, and nonfamily restatements are reported in column (1), column (2),
and column (4), respectively. Consistent with my expectation, CARs are negative while
ARVs, ATVs, and ABASs are all positive for both family firm restatements and nonfamily
firm restatements. All the p-values in column (3) and column (5) are significant at the 1%
level, with only one exception (CAR [0, +1] for nonfamily firm restatements) which is
significant at the 5% level. These statistics show that accounting restatements are associated
with significantly negative short-term abnormal stock returns and increased investor
uncertainty about the firms' future performance.

My focus is the differences in market reactions to family firm restatements and nonfamily
firm restatements as reported in column (6). As can be seen, compared to restatements
announced by nonfamily firms, restatements announced by family firms are associated with
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more negative short-term abnormal stock returns. For example, over the three-day window,
CAR [-1, +1] is -3.601% for family firm restatements but only -1.660% for nonfamily firm
restatements. The difference is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.034). The differences for the
other three measures are all significant as well. For example, ARV [-1, +1] for family firm
restatements is 1.791, which is significantly larger than ARV [-1, +1] for nonfamily firm
restatements (p = 0.039).

In summary, the data in Table 4.6 shows that although both family firm restatements and
nonfamily firm restatements result in negative short-term abnormal stock returns and
increased uncertainty among investors about the restatement firms' future performance, the
consequences are significantly more serious for family firm restatements.

I further test H2 with multivariate regressions and report the results in Table 4.7. The purpose
here is to test any differences in market reactions between family firm restatements and
nonfamily firm restatements, and thus the sample in Table 4.7 contains all restatement firms
but no matching firms. I run four sets of regressions using CAR, ARV, ATV, and ABAS, as
the dependent variable, respectively. For each of the four market reaction measures I estimate
two regression models: one uses the family control dummy as the only independent variable,
apart from year and industry fixed effects, and the other model also includes a set of control
variables.

As can be seen from Table 4.7, the coefficient of Family is significant in all eight model
specifications. The sign of the coefficient is consistent with the statistics reported in column
(6) of Table 4.6. Specifically, the coefficient of Family is negative when CAR is the
dependent variable and is positive when ARV, ATV, or ABAS is the dependent variable. The
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magnitude of the coefficient of Family becomes even larger when control variables are
included in the regression, e.g., -2.181 in column (2) compared to -1.777 in column (1).

Taken together, the findings in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 indicate that when a firm is forced to
restate its financial report, being family-controlled is associated with significantly more
negative short-term stock returns (CAR), higher abnormal return variance (ARV), higher
abnormal trading volume (ATV), and larger abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS). These
findings validate H2 that family control matters for market reactions to restatements.

The results confirm my analysis that investors are more concerned about the deterioration in
accounting earnings quality in family firms and consequently react more strongly to
restatements by family firms than those by nonfamily firms. Recall the result in section 4.4.2
in which family firms are less likely to restate their financial reports than nonfamily firms, the
results in this section thus suggest that once a family firm restates tits financial report
investors quickly adjust their perception about the balance between controlling family’s
reputation concern and potential more serious type II agency problems. Specifically, investor
concern about controlling family’s type II agency problems overweighs reputation concerns
after the restatement.

The results can also explained by “trade-off” theory discussed in section 4.4.2. The trade-off
theory suggests that when a family firm conducts a material restatement, the short-run private
benefits must overweigh the higher long-run capital costs. Investors are aware of the potential
risk and response more negatively to mandatory restatements by family firms than to those by
nonfamily firms.
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Table 4.6 Comparison of market reactions to restatements by family firms and by nonfamily firms
This table presents univariate tests of the different market reactions to restatements announced by family firms and by nonfamily firms, for short windows surrounding announcements
(column 6). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. ARV is the abnormal return variance. ATV is the abnormal trading volume. ABAS is the abnormal bid-ask spread. This table also tests
whether the market reactions are different from zero for restatements by family firms and nonfamily firms, respectively. P-values in columns (3) and (5) are based on H0=0 (CAR) and H0=1
(ARV, ATV, and ABAS). Significances are based on p-values using the two-tailed t-test, except for those in column (6) which are based on one-tailed t-test.
All restatements
CAR [0, +1] (%)
CAR [-1, +1] (%)
CAR [-3, +3] (%)
ARV [0, +1]
ARV [-1, +1]
ARV [-3, +3]
ATV [0, +1]
ATV [-1, +1]
ATV [-3, +3]
ABAS [0, +1]
ABAS [-1, +1]
ABAS [-3, +3]

(1)
-1.481
-2.122
-2.665
2.661
1.499
1.538
1.462
1.401
1.432
2.508
2.323
2.127

Family firm
restatements
(2)
-2.603
-3.601
-4.575
2.700
1.791
1.898
1.949
1.924
2.019
2.793
2.633
2.395

p-value
(3)
0.001
0.001
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Nonfamily firm
restatements
(4)
-1.130
-1.660
-2.067
2.221
1.408
1.437
1.310
1.238
1.248
1.588
1.324
1.262

p-value
(5)
0.016
0.004
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.007
0.009

Diff. in means
(6) = (2) – (4)
-1.473**
-1.941**
-2.508*
0.479**
0.383**
0.461**
0.639**
0.686***
0.771***
1.205**
1.309**
1.133***

p-value
(H0: Diff = 0)
(7)
0.044
0.034
0.056
0.024
0.039
0.030
0.012
0.005
0.005
0.045
0.021
0.008
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Table 4.7 Family control and market reactions surrounding restatement announcements
This table presents regression results of short-window market reactions surrounding restatement announcements on family control. All variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on
White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Dependent variables:

Family
Firm size
Leverage
Top share
Negative EPS
MAO
Outside directors
Constant
Year effect
Industry effect
Obs.
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic

Cumulative abnormal return
CAR [-1,+1]
(1)
(2)
-1.777**
-2.181**
(0.032)
(0.011)
1.293
(0.430)
-0.884**
(0.031)
0.041*
(0.066)
-1.468*
(0.097)
-1.075
(0.113)
0.052
(0.894)
-0.717*
-5.610*
(0.060)
(0.076)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
3.14%
7.93%
4.69**
2.74**

Abnormal return variance
ARV [-1, +1]
(3)
(4)
0.376**
0.396**
(0.045)
(0.049)
-0.243
(0.292)
0.221**
(0.039)
-0.427
(0.583)
0.256*
(0.061)
0.460*
(0.098)
0.080
(0.665)
1.409***
-3.548**
(0.000)
(0.045)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
5.52%
6.41%
7.66***
2.66**

Abnormal trading volume
ATV [-1, +1]
(5)
(6)
0.716***
0.771***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.154
(0.434)
0.120*
(0.065)
0.402
(0.532)
0.064
(0.852)
0.268**
(0.055)
0.025
(0.876)
1.231***
-2.043*
(0.000)
(0.066)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
12.84%
14.46%
12.78***
2.65**

Abnormal bid-ask spread
ABAS [-1, +1]
(7)
(8)
1.817**
1.911**
(0.049)
(0.038)
-0.999**
(0.020)
0.052
(0.764)
-0.729
(0.804)
1.090
(0.271)
1.200*
(0.095)
-0.021
(0.751)
1.534***
23.340**
(0.001)
(0.015)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
2.90%
15.19%
2.11**
1.75**
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4.3.2 Corporate information opacity and the impact of family control

In this subsection I perform additional tests to examine whether the level of information
opacity of the restatement firm has any effect on the relationship between family control and
short-term market reactions (i.e., H3). The tests are based on regression models specified in
Eq. (4.3). More specifically, I add to the baseline regression models specified in Eq. (4.2) a
stand-alone variable as a proxy for information opacity and its interaction with family control.
The regression results are reported in Table 4.8.

As in Table 4.7, I run four sets of regressions using CAR, ARV, ATV, and ABAS, as the
dependent variable, respectively. And for each dependent variable I estimate two regression
models: one uses the ultimate largest shareholder's control-ownership wedge as the proxy for
information opacity and the other uses a comprehensive opacity index as the proxy.

In each of all eight models, the coefficient of Family remains significant and keeps the sign
as its corresponding coefficient in Table 4.7. The results indicate that even for firms with low
information opacity (i.e., firms of which the controlling shareholders are less likely to extract
private benefits of control), family control is still associated with more negative investor
reactions. The coefficient of the stand-alone variable Ownership wedge is significant across
all four models and has the same sign as that of Family. This indicates that control-ownership
wedge, similar to family control, also increases investor concern about agency problem and
uncertainty. The coefficient of the stand-alone variable Opacity index, although having the
same sign as that of Ownership wedge is not significant across all four models.
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My main interest is the interaction terms Family*Ownership wedge and Family*Opacity
index, which capture the incremental effect of information opacity on market reactions to
family firm restatements. The coefficient of either Family*Ownership wedge or
Family*Opacity index is statistically significant in all of the eight model specifications. The
coefficients of the interaction terms have the same sign as the corresponding coefficients of
the stand-alone Family, i.e., negative when CAR is the dependent variable and positive when
ARV, ATV, or ABAS is the dependent variable.

Overall, the findings in Table 4.7 support H3 that the more negative market reactions to
family firm restatements become even more pronounced as the restatement firm’s
information opacity increases. The results suggest that as the restatement firm’s information
opacity increases, investors have even greater concerns about controlling shareholder's
credibility, agency problems, and uncertainty following restatements. This will further
reinforce the impact of family control on market reactions to restatement announcements.

4.4.4 Additional tests
4.4.4.1 The timeline

To investigate the effect of restatement over the longer term, I perform two sets of tests in
this subsection. I first follow up the tests in Section 4.4.3 to compare the difference in market
reactions (i.e., return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread) before the restatement
announcement (window [-120, -21]) and after announcement (window [+21, +120]), for
family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firm, respectively. See Figure 4.1A for
the timeline. I then follow the large body of literature to examine the drop in the information
content of earnings as measured by earnings response coefficient (or ERC) after the
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restatement announcement, by comparing the ERC in one year before and one year after the
restatement announcements. Because I only have annual earnings data, I focus on yearly ERC
rather than quarterly ERC, as in some prior studies such as Wilson (2008) and Chen, Cheng,
and Lo (2014). See Figure 4.1B for the timeline.

4.4.4.2 Longer-term market reactions

In subsection 4.4.3.1, I examine the differences in market reactions to family firm
restatements and nonfamily firm restatements over three short-term windows, [0, +1], [-1,
+1], and [-3, +3]. In this subsection, I test if the stronger market reactions to family firm
restatements are still observed over a longer period. The literature provides mixed empirical
evidence on whether the effects of restatements (e.g., the drop in ERC) are short-lived (e.g.,
Wilson, 2008; Chen et al., 2014). Although it is not my intention to find out exactly how long
the effects of restatement last, the tests I perform in this subsection may provide
complementary evidence to enhance our understanding of the issue.

I first adopt a difference-in-difference approach. I compare the pre- and post-restatement
stock return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread for restatement firms and matching
firms (i.e., nonrestatement firms), respectively. I then compare the changes (from pre- to
post-restatement period) in these three measures between restatement firms and matching
firms. Because I identify each matching firm based on industry, size, IPO year, and stock
exchange, such a comparison also controls for the influence of these factors. The results are
reported in Panel A of Table 4.9. The left-hand side of Panel A presents the results for 36
family restatement firms and 36 matching firms. The right-hand side presents the results for
115 nonfamily restatement firms and their corresponding matching firms. The pre- and post-
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restatement estimation window is [-120, -21] and [+21, +120], respectively, where day 0 is
the restatement announcement day.

To illustrate my findings, I take daily stock return variance as an example. For family
restatement firms, the average return variance increases significantly from 3.311 in the prerestatement estimation window to 3.628 in the post-restatement window (diff. = 0.317, p =
0.008). During the same period, although the matching firms also experience an increase in
return variance, their increase is insignificant (diff. = 0.129, p = 0.182). The difference in the
change in return variance (or difference-in-difference, marked in bold font in Panel A)
between family restatement firms and their matching firms is statistically significant (diff. =
0.188, p = 0.048). In contrast, although nonfamily restatement firms also experience a
significant increase in return variance from 3.201 to 3.306 (diff. = 0.105, p = 0.078), the
difference-in-difference is insignificant (p = 0.455) between nonfamily restatement firms and
their matching firms.

These difference-in-difference analyses indicate that while family restatement firms
experience a significant increase in stock return variance over a longer window (up to 120
days after the restatement announcement in my tests) compared to their nonrestatement
matching firms, there is no significant difference in the change in return variance between
nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms. The results are similar if I look at the
changes in trading volume and bid-ask spread.

I next perform tests to directly compare the changes in return variance, trading volume, and
bid-ask spread between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, in addition
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to comparing the changes between each group of restatement firms and their corresponding
nonrestatement matching firms. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.9.

I again take stock return variance as an example to illustrate the findings. For both family
restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, their return variance in the postrestatement period is significantly larger than that in the pre-restatement period (p = 0.008 for
family firms and p = 0.078 for nonfamily firms). When I look at the difference in the change,
it can be seen that the increase in return variance is significantly larger for family firms than
for nonfamily firms (diff. = 0.212, p = 0.030). In other words, the impact of restatement
announcement on return variance increase is more pronounced for family restatement firms
than for nonfamily restatement firms. Comparisons in trading volume and bid-ask spread
yield similar results.

Overall, the findings in Table 4.9 indicate that while both family restatement firms and
nonfamily restatement firms experience an increase in return variance, trading volume, and
bid-ask spread following restatement announcement, the impact is substantially more
significant for family restatement firms. In fact, there is no significant difference in these
three measures between nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms up to 120 days
after the restatement announcement. But for family restatement firms, the increases are still
observed.
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Table 4.8 Expropriation risk and the impact of family control on market reactions to restatement announcements
This table presents regression results of how the impact of family control on short-window market reactions surrounding restatement announcements is affected by the potential risk of
expropriation by controlling families. The potential expropriation risk is measured by control-ownership wedge and corporate opacity. All variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based
on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variables:

Family
Family * Ownership wedge
Family * Opacity index
Ownership wedge
Opacity index
Firm size
Leverage
Top share
Negative EPS
MAO
Outside directors
Constant
Year effect
Industry effect
Obs.
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic

Cumulative abnormal return
CAR [-1, +1]
(1)
(2)
-1.148*
-3.947*
(0.053)
(0.052)
-0.106**
(0.042)
-4.252*
(0.064)
-0.106**
(0.029)
-3.668
(0.204)
1.031
1.333
(0.157)
(0.277)
-0.833*
-0.840**
(0.059)
(0.048)
0.048**
0.041*
(0.046)
(0.067)
-1.411*
-1.425
(0.098)
(0.101)
-1.340*
-1.409*
(0.089)
(0.083)
0.044
0.023
(0.454)
(0.690)
4.822**
7.315*
(0.023)
(0.065)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
6.40%
8.58%
2.03**
2.77**

Abnormal return variance
ARV [-1, +1]
(3)
(4)
0.679**
1.821**
(0.023)
(0.022)
0.752**
(0.026)
2.696**
(0.045)
0.181*
(0.057)
0.757*
(0.093)
-0.207
-0.310
(0.358)
(0.210)
0.203*
0.227**
(0.051)
(0.048)
-0.308
-0.440
(0.694)
(0.569)
0.196*
0.244**
(0.074)
(0.042)
0.491*
0.420*
(0.077)
(0.094)
0.122
0.120
(0.492)
(0.506)
-3.383**
-5.366**
(0.045)
(0.028)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
4.04%
7.03%
1.93**
2.38**

Abnormal trading volume
ATV [-1, +1]
(5)
(6)
0.900***
1.099*
(0.000)
(0.091)
0.430**
(0.035)
0.929*
(0.086)
0.101*
(0.063)
1.229
(0.430)
-0.160
0.255
(0.416)
(0.225)
0.119*
0.166*
(0.067)
(0.063)
0.358
0.471
(0.589)
(0.460)
0.071
0.067
(0.774)
(0.798)
0.306
0.438
(0.180)
(0.157)
-0.087
-0.103
(0.573)
(0.375)
-1.777*
-2.856**
(0.065)
(0.050)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
10.77%
14.60%
2.02**
2.42**

Abnormal bid-ask spread
ABAS [-1, +1]
(7)
(8)
0.538*
3.123**
(0.092)
(0.030)
1.023**
(0.046)
8.610**
(0.020)
1.182**
(0.033)
8.583**
(0.020)
-1.344*
-1.503*
(0.096)
(0.067)
0.033
0.030
(0.605)
(0.617)
-1.754
-0.794
(0.460)
(0.794)
0.733
0.601
(0.169)
(0.203)
0.860*
1.160*
(0.092)
(0.077)
0.029
0.013
(0.500)
(0.762)
27.956*
28.225*
(0.073)
(0.060)
Included
Included
Included
Included
151
151
5.41%
14.53%
1.94**
2.92***
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Figure 4.1 Illustration of timeline
Figure 4.1A: Timeline of market reaction tests
Pre-restatement estimation window

Day

-120

Event window

-21

-1

0

+1

Post-restatement estimation window

+21

+120

Figure 4.1B: Timeline of earnings informativeness tests

Pre-restatement window

May (Year t-2)

April (Year t-1)

Post-restatement window

0

May (Year t+1)

April (Year t+2)
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Table 4.9 Longer-term effects of restatement announcements
Panel A: Difference-in-difference tests
Panel A of this table present the difference-in-difference test results of longer term effects of restatement announcements on market reactions, i.e., daily stock return volatility, daily trading
volume, and bid-ask spread. The left-hand side of the table reports the statistics of the family restatement firms (36 firms) and their matching firms. The right-hand side of the table reports
the nonfamily restatement firms (115 firms) and their corresponding matching firms. The pre-restatement estimation window is [-120, -21] and the post-restatement estimation window is
[+21, +120], with day 0 being the restatement announcement day. Stock return variance is the variance of the residual returns from each firm's market model; trading volume is the number
of shares traded on the day divided by the number of tradable shares outstanding on that day; bid-ask spread is the average relative spread (i.e., absolute spread divided by the average of bid
and ask) over the test period measured in hourly intervals. Significances are based on p-values using the one-tailed t-test.

Prerestatement (a)
Restatement firms (1)
Stock return
variance

Control firms (2)
(1) – (2)

Restatement firms (1)
Trading
volume

Control firms (2)
(1)– (2)

Restatement firms (1)
Bid-ask
spread

Control firms (2)
(1) – (2)

Family restatement firms
Post-restatement
(b)

3.311

3.628

2.977

3.106

0.334

0.522

2.382

3.196

2.344

2.678

0.038

0.518

0.236

0.337

0.209

0.258

0.027

0.079

(b) – (a)
(p-value)
0.317***
(0.008)
0.129
(0.182)
0.188**
(0.048)
0.814**
(0.030)
0.334
(0.122)
0.480*
(0.054)
0.101**
(0.033)
0.049*
(0.098)
0.052*
(0.064)

Prerestatement (a)

Nonfamily restatement firms
Post-restatement
(b)

3.201

3.306

3.003

3.087

0.198

0.219

2.960

3.052

2.768

2.896

0.192

0.156

0.217

0.241

0.222

0.230

-0.005

0.011

(b) – (a)
(p-value)
0.105*
(0.078)
0.084
(0.282)
0.021
(0.455)
0.092
(0.340)
0.128
(0.288)
0.036
(0.411)
0.024
(0.209)
0.008
(0.433)
0.016
(0.218)
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Panel B: Direct comparison between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms
Panel B presents the statistics using an alternative approach to compare the difference in change in return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread between family restatement firms and
nonfamily restatement firms. I then compare the changes in these measures between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, following restatement announcements.

Family firms (1)
Stock return variance

Nonfamily firms (2)
(1) –(2)
Family firms (1)

Trading volume

Nonfamily firms (2)
(1) –(2)

Family firms (1)
Bid-ask spread

Nonfamily firms (2)
(1) –(2)

Pre-restatement
(a)

Post-restatement
(b)

3.311

3.628

3.201

3.306

0.110

0.322

2.382

3.196

2.960

3.052

-0.578

0.144

0.236

0.337

0.217

0.241

0.019

0.096

(b)-(a)
(p-value)
0.317***
(0.008)
0.105*
(0.078)
0.212**
(0.030)
0.814**
(0.030)
0.092
(0.340)
0.722*
(0.057)
0.101**
(0.033)
0.024
(0.209)
0.077*
(0.051)
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4.4.4.3 Information content of earnings (ERC)

Earnings response coefficient (ERC) is the most commonly used empirical measure of
information content of earnings and a popular proxy for earnings quality (Dechow et al.,
2010). A large number of studies document a significant drop in the ERC after restatement
announcements (e.g., Anderson & Yohn, 2002; Wu, 2002; Wilson, 2008; Chen et al., 2014).
According to Chen et al. (2014), the key argument underlying the drop in the ERC is that the
credibility of financial reporting is lower after the restatement. This argument suggests that
the drop in the ERC is expected to be more severe for family restatement firms than for
nonfamily restatement firms, because my findings in section 4.4.3 suggest that family
restatement firms are subject to greater credibility concerns.

To test my prediction, I follow prior studies (e.g., Fan & Wang, 2002; Chen et al., 2014) to
estimate the following model (Equation 4):

Returnt = b 0 + b1 NI t + b 2 NI t * Family t + b 3 NI t * Post
+ b 4 NI t * Post * Family t + b 5 NI t * Firm Sizet
+ b 6 NI t * Tobin Qt + b 7 NI t * Leveraget + Fixed Effects + e t

( 4.4 )

In this model, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡 is the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns at year t,

calculated from monthly stock returns from May to April (April 30 is the deadline for listed
firms in China to release their annual reports). 𝑁𝑁𝑡 is the net earnings of year t divided by the

market value of equity at the beginning of year t. Post is a dummy variable that indicates the
post-restatement financial year. My focus is on the coefficient 𝛽4 . Because the results so far

suggest that investors are more concerned about restatements by family firms, I expect postrestatement earnings of family firms will be even less informative than those of nonfamily
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firms. Therefore, 𝛽4 is expected to be negative and significant. I report the regression results
in Table 4.10.

The tests in Table 4.10 include only restatement firms. The positive and significant
coefficient of NI across all columns indicates that stock prices do respond to earnings in the
Chinese stock markets. The insignificant coefficient of the interaction term NI*Family (coef
= 0.001, p = 0.999) in column (1) indicates that prior to restatements, there is no significant
difference in the ERC between family and nonfamily firms, despite the fact that family firms
are less likely to misstate their financial reports (i.e., family firms have a higher reporting
quality) as reported in Table 4.5.

However, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term NI*Family in
column (2) (coef. = -8.046, p = 0.000) indicates that after the restatement announcement,
family restatement firms have a significantly lower ERC than nonfamily restatement firms.
The results in column (3) confirm the finding in column (2). Although the negative
coefficient of NI*Post (coef. = -2.847, p = 0.000) indicates that nonfamily restatement firms
also experience a significant drop in the ERC after restatement announcements, the drop is
substantially more serious for family restatement firms, as demonstrated by the interaction
term NI*Post*Family (coef. = -4.304, p = 0.047).

Overall, the findings in Table 4.10 confirm my prediction that the drop in the ERC after
restatement announcements is more significant for family restatement firms than for
nonfamily restatement firms, because family restatement firms are subject to greater
credibility concerns than nonfamily restatement firms. The results in Table 4.10 also provide
additional support for findings in section 4.4.3.
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Table 4.10 Family control and the effect of restatement on the information content of earnings
This table presents regression results of the effect of family control on the impact of restatement on the information content of earnings. The dependent variable is the cumulative net-ofmarket 12-month stock returns, calculated from monthly stock returns from May to April. Pre-restatement (columns (1)) refers to pre-restatement financial year (Year t-1) and postrestatement (columns (2)) refers to post-restatement financial year (Year t+1), where Year t refers to the year in which the restatement announcement falls. Post is a dummy variable
indicating post-restatement financial year (t+1). All other variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:

NI
NI*Family
NI*Post
NI*Post*Family
NI*Firm size
NI*Tobin Q
NI*Leverage
constant
Year effect
Industry effect
Obs.
Adj. R-squared
F-statistic

(1)
Pre-restatement
coefficient
p value
32.149***
0.008
0.001
0.999

1.648***
-0.996***
0.650***
-0.086
Included
Included
151
5.03%
11.99***

0.004
0.001
0.001
0.684

Cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns (Return)
(2)
Post-restatement
coefficient
p value
40.580***
0.003
-8.046***
0.000

1.857***
-0.277
-0.018
0.619**
Included
Included
151
51.24%
11.32***

0.003
0.153
0.976
0.038

(3)
Full sample period
coefficient
p value
31.472***
0.000
0.068
0.604
-2.847***
0.000
-4.304**
0.047
1.373***
0.004
-0.353**
0.026
0.428
0.277
0.334
0.108
Included
Included
151
23.41%
3.91***
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4.5 Conclusion and implications

Existing literature has found that family control can either lead to better performance or
worse expropriation of minority shareholders. This naturally raises two questions in relation
to accounting issues. Are family-controlled firms indeed more likely to have low-quality
financial reporting than nonfamily-controlled firms? Does family control affect investor
reactions to the revelation of low quality or the deterioration of accounting information
quality? These questions are important because of increasing concerns among regulators and
other market participants about the widespread and increasing incidence of accounting
irregularities, as well as the fact that family-controlled firms represent one of the most
prevalent organization forms across the globe. Although the first question attracts increasing
academic interest, the second question has so far been largely ignored by researchers.

In this chapter, I examine the impact of family control on the likelihood of a mandatory and
material restatement of a firm’s financial report and on investor reactions to accounting
restatement, with a focus on the latter. I find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms
are significantly less likely to restate their financial reports, consistent with the notion that
controlling families have greater reputation concerns than nonfamily blockholders, which
motivates them to stay away from reputation-damaging mandatory restatements.

I also find that following accounting restatements family-controlled firms trigger
substantially more negative investor reactions, measured by more negative cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR), larger abnormal return variance (ARV), larger abnormal trading
volume (ATV), and higher abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over a short window
surrounding the restatement announcements. Further tests show that the more negative
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investor reactions to family firm restatements are more pronounced when corporate
information is more opaque. These findings indicate that following restatement
announcements investors quickly rebalance their belief between controlling families'
reputation concern and incentives of private benefits of control. Specifically, restatements
lower investors' perception of the credibility of accounting information and ultimately the
credibility of controlling families, which in turn is likely to increase investors' concerns about
the Type II agency problems.

In fact, the significant increases in return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread in
family restatement firms are still observable 120 days after the restatement announcements;
but these effects of restatements disappear for nonfamily restatement firms during the same
period. Moreover, an examination of the ERC indicates that, after restatement announcements,
investors perceive accounting earnings of family firms to be less informative than those of
nonfamily firms.

My findings have two important implications. At the firm level, this study suggests that
family-controlled firms should promote a high quality of financial reporting practice with
greater efforts than nonfamily-controlled firms, in order to avoid the severe penalties imposed
by the market. At the policy level, to maximize the benefits of accounting information in
reducing market frictions and in facilitating the development of a resilient stock market,
regulators should take measures to encourage the adoption of credible reporting by all listed
firms, as well as enhancing the market perception of the trustworthiness of corporate insiders
by, for example, strengthening investor protection.
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Chapter Five Conclusion

In this thesis, I investigate the implications of family control for corporate governance in the
Chinese markets. My investigation is focused on three important aspects of corporate
governance practice, namely controlling shareholders’ tunneling behaviour, shareholderdebtholder agency issues, and financing reporting quality. Empirical evidence shows that
firms controlled by families differ systematically from those controlled by nonfamilies and
those without effective controlling shareholders in these governance practices. The main
results of this thesis are as follows:

5.1 Implication for controlling shareholder’s tunneling

In Chapter 2, I examine whether and how blockholders’ tunneling behavior differs between
family and nonfamily firms. Because prior studies find that even for family firms agency
conflicts can differ between those managed by founders and those managed by descendants, I
in this chapter focus on founder-manager firms to avoid unnecessary complication. As family
firms of modern sense are in their early development stage in China, the majority of family
firms are still managed by founders. Thus, my sample founder-manager firms are good
representatives of overall family firms in China.

Empirical evidence shows that, relative to firms without founder-managers, those with
founder-managers have significantly less tunneling. This finding is robust to controlling for
the divergence between controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights (i.e.,
control-ownership wedge). This result is consistent with the notion that founder-managers
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have greater concerns for reputation and greater incentives to pass on a successful family
business to future generations, which motivate them to better align their own interest with
that of outside investors.

I further investigate how the impact of family control on tunneling is influenced by foundermanages’ political connectedness. The results show that the impact of political connection
(PC) on the relationship between founder-manager and firm tunneling depends on the type
and the hierarchy level of PC. Specifically, the negative association between foundermanager and firm tunneling is further strengthened when founders have CPC/CPPCC-type of
PC and especially when such a PC is at the central level; while official-type PC at the local
level has little effect.

Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by identifying a channel (i.e., firm tunneling) through
which managers’ founder status and political connectedness affect corporate governance and
firm performance. It complements prior studies on the impact of managerial attributes on
risk-taking, investment policy, and capital structure.

5.2 Implication for firms’ debt financing cost

In Chapter 3, I examine the impact of family control on shareholder-debtholder agency
conflicts which in turn affects the cost of debt financing, given the importance of debt
financing for the development and growth of the private sector of the Chinese economy.

Initial test result shows that family controlled firms on average pay a lower cost of debt than
nonfamily firms. This result seems inconsistent with prior cross-country empirical evidence,
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which would imply a positive relationship between family control and debt cost in China, a
country characterized by weak investor protection. Thus, I propose that the impact of family
control on debt cost may be affected by a firm-level factor.

I hypothesize that corporate information opacity plays the moderating role in the relationship
between family control and the cost of debt. Specifically, I expect that, relatively to
nonfamily firms, family firms enjoy a lower cost of debt when corporate opacity is relatively
low, as low opacity indicates the relative dominance of controlling families’ alignment
incentives. Empirical results support my expectation.

I further hypothesize and empirically demonstrate that the moderating role of corporate
opacity is influenced by some other factors such as controlling shareholders’ controlownership wedge, external institutions, and firms’ political connectedness, all of which affect
controlling shareholders’ alignment/entrenchment incentives.

Chapter 3 highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in terms of their impact on
the shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts and consequently on the cost of debt.
Debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing potential agency
conflicts with blockholders. I also demonstrate that firm-level corporate opacity is more
important than several previously examined factors (e.g., external institutions, controlownership wedge, and political connection) in explaining the relationship between family
control and the cost of debt.

216

5.3 Implication for firms’ financial reporting quality

In Chapter 4, I examine the impact of family control on the quality of a firm’s financial
reporting. Specifically, I try to answer two related questions. First, whether financial
reporting quality differs between family firms and nonfamily firms; second and more
importantly, whether and how investors react differently to the deterioration in financial
reporting quality.

Theoretical and existing empirical evidence suggests that the quality of financial reporting of
family firms can be either higher or lower than that of nonfamily firms. Using the likelihood
of accounting restatement as the proxy for financial reporting quality, I find that family firms
are less likely than nonfamily firms to misstate their financial statements, consistent with the
notion that controlling families have greater concerns for reputation.

I further reveal that the restatement announcement effect is more negative and stronger for
family firms than for nonfamily firms. During a short-window surrounding restatement
announcement, family control is associated with more negative stock returns, higher
abnormal return variance, larger abnormal trading volume, and larger abnormal bid-ask
spread. The loss in the information content of earnings up to 120 trading days after the
restatement announcement is significantly greater for family firms than for nonfamily firms.

Before the restatement announcement there is no significant differences in stock return
characteristics and earnings informativeness between family firms and nonfamily firms.
However, the significant differences after the restatement indicate that the potential more
serious Type II agency problems in family firms become the dominant concern for investors.
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Consequently, investors react more negatively to restatements by family firms than those by
nonfamily firms.
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by answering an important question. Although prior
literature frequently points out families’ greater concern for reputation as an important feature
of family ownership, little evidence exists on the consequences when such a reputation is
impaired. My study supports the notion that reputation is more important for family firms
than for nonfamily firms, but from a different perspective.

5.4 Concluding remarks

Family controlled firms play a critical role in economic growth and the development of
China’s financial market. Due to the unique institutional environment in China, empirical
evidence on corporate governance generated from family firms in developed markets and
other emerging markets may not be directly applied to the Chinese market.

Overall, I find that Chinese family firms as a whole have a greater concern for reputation,
which motivates them to better align their interests with outside investors, including minority
shareholders and debtholders. However, the evidence also indicates that controlling families
are heterogeneous in terms of their impact of agency conflicts.

Investors, while on one hand recognize controlling families’ alignment incentives; still have
certain level of concern about the entrenchment potential of family owners. Once family
owners’ reputation concern is not evidenced or when the reputation is impaired, investors
quickly rebalance/adjust their concern for agency conflicts and as a result react accordingly.
For family owners, my thesis suggests the importance in building and maintaining a
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reputation among investors. The cost of reputation loss could be significantly higher for
family firms than for nonfamily firms.
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